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TRANSPORTATION POLITICS IN ATLANTA:

THE MASS TRANSIT BOND REFERENDUM OF NOVEMBER, 1968

BY

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A report prepared under the auspices of the

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION STUDY

Harvard Law School

Cambridge, Massachusetts

1970

Harvard Law School

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION STUDY

The Law School Urban Mass Transportation Study, a part of the School's Urban Legal Studies program, is designed to identify legal obstacles to innovation in Urban Public Transportation and to propose ways in which such obstacles might be overcome. The kinds of problems studied are "legal" in the broadest sense—including the role of the lawyer as legislative and administrative draftsman and as [illegible] facing such issues as integrated metropolitan transportation planning, coordination with state and federal agencies, overlapping jurisdictional arrangements, regulatory standards and procedures, and neighborhood and other local participation in transportation decision making. Such problems are studied against a background of the fiscal and political problems facing Public Transportation systems, changing patterns of consumer need and preference, and the technological possibilities for urban transportation systems of the future.

Studies have included "Mass Transit and the Highway Trust Fund," "Transportation Politics in Atlanta: The Mass Transit Bond Referendum of November, 1968," and several papers on problems of transportation and poverty. In addition, the Law School is cooperating with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in examining legal and institutional problems involved in establishing the first demonstration of the "dial-a-bus" transit service.

Research is carried on by a small staff and a number of students. It has been supported by funds from a variety of sources, including federal and state agencies, other universities, and other parts of Harvard.

JOHN C. WETZEL, *Director*

ADAM YARMOLINSKY, *Faculty Supervisor*

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TRANSPORTATION POLITICS IN ATLANTA:

The Mass Transit Bond Referendum of November, 1968

(with comparisons to referenda in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.)

By

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

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This study was supported by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under Grant Number H-1043, Contract Number MASS-R6-11-69. It represents the opinions of the authors; in no way does it purport to represent the opinions of Harvard Law School, Harvard University, or the funding agency.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In February of 1969, five students at Harvard University undertook a study of recent bond issue proposals for funding mass transportation projects in various cities in the United States. Our research was one of several studies being made at the Law School under a contract with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. This report contains the results of our research and conclusions drawn therefrom.

Three of us were then second year students at Harvard Law School, one was a senior at Harvard College concentrating in the field of social relations, and one was in the third year of a joint law-public administration degree program in the Law School and the Kennedy School of Government.

We have carried out the study under the auspices of Harvard Law School's Urban Mass Transportation Study, under the supervision of its director, John G. Wofford, and the general guidance of Professor Adam Yarmolinsky.

The purpose of the study has been to compare the experience of Atlanta with four other cities in the United States which took the matter of mass transit to the polls during the last eight years, and to suggest within the limits of our training and the data available to us factors which seem to have led to voter approval or rejection in each case. The four other localities are Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and the Virginia and Maryland suburban areas of Washington, D.C.

Summary results of the bond referenda studied follow:

Locality	Date of Election	Percentage Favoring Transit	Percentage Required For Passage	Result
Atlanta	November, 1968	42.8%	50%	Rejected
Los Angeles	November, 1968	44.7%	50%	Rejected
San Francisco	November, 1962	61%	60%	Approved
Seattle	February, 1968	51%	60%	Rejected
Washington, D.C.	November, 1968	71%	60%	Approved

The transit bond experiences of each of these localities were studied with reference to four main considerations: the evolution and characteristics of the physical transit plan put before the voters (Chapter II); the type of authority responsible for the plan and its interaction with other agencies and groups in the planning process (Chapter III); the financial aspects of each of the proposed systems (Chapter IV); and the campaigns and referenda themselves (Chapter V). We then summarize our results and offer some general conclusions (Chapter VI). Included as an appendix is a map of the proposed plan for Atlanta, indicating route and station locations, and a copy of the contract which would have financed the plan but which was rejected by the voters in the November, 1968, election.

Our opportunities to obtain data from the field were limited by our training and by our distance (both in time and in geography) from the events being studied. Two members of the group did spend a week interviewing persons in Atlanta who had been concerned with the transit issue. (Because of their closeness to these events, we have tried to keep the identities of these individuals confidential.) In

addition, in Atlanta as well as the other localities, telephone interviews were held with officials of the various transportation authorities and with other persons. These interviews were supplemented with written material obtained from each authority. Finally, newspaper accounts of the planning process and the campaigns were used as source material.

This report is intended to be suggestive and tentative, rather than final and definitive. It is hoped that by considering some of the factors discussed here before launching their own mass transit campaigns, other cities may increase their chances of success with the voters. Our concern has not been with the determination of the need for mass transit, but with the steps which might be taken subsequent to any such determination in order to facilitate voter approval of a sound transportation plan where such approval is required for a bond issue.

For reasons which are discussed more fully in the conclusion, we are not particularly optimistic about expecting easy transit victories, even with the best of campaigns. Transit in most places is felt to be of immediate utility only to a minority of the population; the auto-driving majority will tend to determine the results of any transit referendum. The dilemmas facing a city trying to put together a winning vote both from that minority and that majority constitute the substance of this report.

Chapter II

THE PHYSICAL FACILITIES PLANNED

It is the purpose of this chapter to describe and discuss the transit plans presented to the voters in the five cities under study. As our primary concern is the experience of Atlanta, the first half of this chapter is devoted to an historical description of how the proposal of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) evolved, with a decided emphasis upon the public debates that surrounded this process, and the probable effect of these debates on the voting outcome. The second half of this chapter is concerned with the common problems faced in all five cities in selecting the proper modes for their public transportation systems. The fear of technological obsolescence, the problems inherent in meeting present needs, and the problem of making long term investments with only limited technical information are considerations on which we have focused in studying the results reached and their probable effects on voting outcomes.

A. ATLANTA

The plan presented to the Atlanta voters was a four-corridor, fixed rail, rapid transit system of 40.3 miles in length. The cost attached to the proposal at the time of the referendum was $750 million, which was calculated on the basis of a very cautious inflationary consideration of 7% compounded per annum.[1] The plan was for a system which would lie entirely

within two counties, Fulton and DeKalb, although long-range expansion goals were planned to give service to the full five-county area of the Atlanta Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. As discussed in Chapter III, Clayton and Gwinnett Counties were also participating members of the MARTA pact, while the fifth county, Cobb, had declined to participate.

The plan was the result of the combined work of MARTA, the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission (ARMPC), and their principal consultant, Parsons Brinkerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel (PBTB). PBTB is an amalgamation of three engineering firms assembled for San Francisco's BARTD. The relationships among these and other planning groups will be discussed in Chapter III.

The plan called for about 30 stations, at least five of which would be underground. About eight miles of the system, called the "Central Line", consisted of subway which ran north from a point south of the Transit Center to north of Pershing Point, as shown in Appendix B of this report. The extremities of the 40.3 mile plan reached the circumferential highway, (I-285) in the Northeast, East, and West corridors; the major airport in the South corridor; and a dead end spur in the direction of Cobb County to the Northwest.

It is important for purposes of this discussion to note that at the time of the MARTA referendum a second plan was being developed. The plan was the work of Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, under contract with a planning agency called the Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS). The Voorhees Report

was part of a long-term public debate, discussed in greater detail below, over proposed facilities; this debate was a critical factor in the outcome of the election.

The final decision to present to the voters of Atlanta the 40.3 mile plan was made on September 7, 1968, scarcely two months before the referendum. Before this time, they had been presented with a number of official public proposals for rail rapid transit systems, variously estimated to cost $215 million, $283 million, $292 million, and $421 million.[2] From ARMPC during the last seven years had come specific proposals for systems of 30, 54, 60, and 66 miles;[3] the city's private bus company had issued plans for systems of 16, 32, and 40 miles, with similarly varying costs.[4] One year earlier the planners had recommended for future consideration a five-county 66-mile system, 12 miles of which would be in Cobb County. It was proposed at that time that MARTA build its 54-mile system by 1983 in a staging program of 21, 30, 37, and 54 miles.[5] However, by April of 1968 the MARTA Board had tentatively decided upon a 48-mile segment of the full 54-mile system, eliminating about 6 miles of tracks in Gwinnet and Clayton Counties. This decision allowed the MARTA referendum to be held in two counties rather than four.

Until October, 1968, it was probably the two-county 48-mile system that was best known, for this system had been described in a series of excellent public relations brochures created by the Director of Information at MARTA.[6] Essentially,

the 40.3-mile plan actually presented to the voters was the 48-mile plan with the "East Branch" service to North Decatur eliminated. The relation between the final 40.3-mile plan and the envisioned 66-mile plan can be clearly seen on the map, Appendix B.

A few comments concerning the geography of the Atlanta area will facilitate a comparative discussion of the various plans. Atlanta is rapidly developing a highly linear central business district (CBD) that follows the alignment of Peachtree Street. This "Peachtree Corridor" is shown in Appendix B, which illustrates the contemplated downtown routing of both the North-South "Central Line" tunnel and the East-West line running over existing rail right of way in "The Gulch". Slightly North of their point of intersection, labeled "Transit Center", lies what has been for years the downtown financial center of Atlanta. Over the past few years, Atlanta CBD growth has been largely to the north, with Peachtree Center contiguous to the financial district, and the new Memorial Culture Center far to the north at Pershing Point. The importance of serving the downtown-uptown Peachtree Corridor is emphasized by MARTA's estimate that 85% of all jobs in the central area are within two blocks of Peachtree Street.

There are existing rail lines roughly one mile to the east and one mile to the west of the corridor which parallel the North-South alignment of Peachtree Street. These lines come together in the East-West alignment called "The Gulch", just south of the CBD.

All lines are in active use by the region's railroads, and thus cannot be appropriated without consideration of suitable service for those industries which rely upon them for freight. The rail lines in Atlanta have never been used for commuter service as such, although regional trains have been used as local carriers. While the existing rail lines serve many of the suburban sub-centers, they cannot provide adequate downtown distribution in their present state.

The MARTA-PBTB plan called for regional express rapid transit at speeds in excess of 70 mph in modern, air-conditioned vehicles designed for the maximum number of seated passengers, depending upon automated train control to permit rush hour headways (or time between trains) of 90 seconds. Park-and-ride stations were emphasized in the outlying areas, while full feeder bus service was promised late in the planning process. A PBTB spokesman told us that the MARTA plan was further along in terms of engineering preparation than any other city's plan at the time of its presentation to the voters. A brief comparison suggests this was clearly true in the case of the Seattle and the two California plans, although perhaps not in the case of Washington, D.C.

In features other than fixed-rail technology, the plan was not as advanced as those of some of the cities discussed below. Architectural studies were displayed sparingly, mainly through artists' renderings of several station designs, which were featured occasionally in the literature. (By "literature" we mean both

the campaign handouts, and the descriptions released earlier during the planning period.) No publicized effort was made to show how the MARTA plan was integrated with the architectural and city planning efforts of Central Atlanta Progress, a prominent civic group, or with the early design work of the new airport facility to be served. In short, MARTA's non-hardware planning fell below the level of its purely engineering considerations.

Criticisms of the physical plan presented by MARTA focused on the level of service offered to various sub-areas of the region. MARTA officials admitted that planning for the system's feeder bus system was largely an afterthought and was subordinate to the concern for fixed rail as the basic technology. Thus, it proved politically embarassing to the Authority when a hastily prepared brochure from the supporting campaign organization, "Rapid Transit Now!", included bus lines on roads which opponents showed did not exist. Such lack of confidence in the feeder bus system created the impression in some neighborhoods, largely composed of blacks, that the only areas to be served were those communities directly on the transit line.

Of great symbolic importance to many was the fact that the system would not significantly improve service to the mainly black Model Cities Project. The blacks, who had previously charged that the Model Cities Plan itself was an attempt to 'contain' their community, claimed that the transportation system was designed to help whites but not blacks. Several observers pointed

out to us that the blacks, living in close-in central city neighborhoods, would continue to rely upon local bus services, at least for downtown destinations.

The service of the proposed system was criticized in terms of quality as well as coverage. As discussed later in this chapter, some critics were to charge that the fixed rail system was inflexible, in that most passengers would be required to change vehicles once, if not twice, in the basic suburb-to-central city trip. Even from a purely technical standpoint, it was argued that the system called for more changes of vehicles than should be necessary. In order to go to the job-intensive Peachtree Corridor, passengers on the East-West line would have been required to change vehicles at the pivotal Transit Center Station. Critics pointed out that the East and West lines could each instead have been through-routed into the planned Peachtree tunnel, without overburdening the tunnel's capcities.[7]

Although it is difficult to estimate, such specific technical criticisms were probably politically insignificant in terms of direct impact, since most laymen tended not to question the official engineers on matters like the capacities of tunnels. It was repeatedly reported to us that opposition to the system based on such criticisms was largely limited to local engineers who had taken on the issue as somewhat of a hobby; their opinions rarely were carried beyond the letters to the editor.

Nevertheless, such squabbling among the experts may well have had an important indirect effect by creating an atmosphere in which technical conclusions -- particularly the major conclusion about the type of technology to be used -- came to be suspect. This is particularly important in view of the proliferation of "expert" transit plans running back for nearly a decade.

The proposed system can be traced directly back through a line of transit plans that begins in August of 1960. The first plan to be presented in Atlanta came from the city's privately owned bus company, Atlanta Transit System (ATS). The plan was created by the Philadelphia consulting engineering firm of Simpson and Curtin, and financed entirely by ATS. Initially, the plan called for the construction of 16 miles of rail rapid transit right-of-way, covering two corridors of a projected five-corridor system. Construction costs of the initial segment were projected at $46 million, with $6.5 million allocated for operating equipment, and $6.5 million allocated for a downtown secondary (pedestrian) distribution system. The proposal, entitled "Rapid Atlanta", utilized only existing right-of-way, which only peripherally serves the central business district, especially the uptown sections. Thus, ATS proposed a large bus and rail passenger station just west of the Transit Center of later proposals, where all passengers would transfer to small cars, each carrying about 15 people, over continuously moving belts within an air-conditioned transparent plastic tube, one story above the sidewalks, to their ultimate destinations. Simpson and Curtin claimed that this system would "effectuate delivery to central business district

points as rapidly as from a more centrally located station, which would rely on bus transportation for distribution." [8]

In July of 1961, the plan of the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission (ARMPC) was released. Its design was strongly influenced by the ATS proposal; it too recommended a downtown Transportation Center with some unspecified form of secondary distribution system extending into the employment concentrations of the business district. Despite ARMPC's lack of federal aid and engineering consultants, its plan was significant as the first to integrate a transportation proposal into a more comprehensive planning effort with land usage and population forecasts. It called for a 60-mile system, with 32 stations on five corridors (there was to be no western corridor).

The type of service to be provided by these systems without downtown tunneling is described in one favorable description of the 1961 ARMPC plan, which commended the planners for realizing that the system "must include: (a) a feed-in trip to a high capacity trunk line; (b) a high-speed express trip along the trunk line itself; and (c) a feed-out trip to the precise destination." [9] It was felt at this time that downtown-oriented public transportation trips inevitably "must" require three different modes, and two changes of vehicle.

The failure of the previous plans to provide for adequate North-South distribution into Atlanta's highly linear central area was largely corrected in the 1962 plan of the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commission (MATSC). This plan was created

by the New York consulting firm of Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade and Douglas, and the staff of ARMPC. All lines coming from the North would have been brought together on a new aerial right of way at a point just North of Tenth Street, on the Peachtree corridor. A combination of aerial and subway line continued South to the Transit Center, where it crossed the East-West line. Three miles of the MATSC system were in subway, 17 miles aerial, and 46 on grade. Scheduled to be completed in 1980, the system was projected to cost $292 million.

MARTA was formally organized in January of 1966. In June of that year, MARTA contracted with Parsons Brinkerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel, to prepare a master plan to be submitted to the voters in 1968. As discussed in the following chapter, the first year of the MARTA planning and engineering work was a quiet one, with the consultants putting together their recommendations without a great deal of publicity, or inter-agency debate. It was during this period that Robert Sommerville, President of ATS, expressed concern that his bus company was being ignored by the railroad engineers who were assembling a fixed rail system that was seriously neglecting the potential contribution of buses. During the spring of 1967 Sommerville commissioned a study, again with the funds of his private company, of the ways in which bus services could be integrated into the development of a regional rapid transit system.

On June 28, 1967, Sommerville released the "RAPID BUSWAYS" study prepared for ATS by Simpson and Curtin, its earlier consultants. The report carefully explained the potential contribution of "busways" (private rights-of-way for exclusive bus operations) as part of a regional transportation network. The primary purpose of the report was to propose that busways be used as an "interim solution ...to carry over until the full rapid transit network can be ... built."[10] Sommerville stressed that Atlanta had transportation problems now, that it would take many years to implement a rapid transit system, and that BARTD in San Francisco did not plan for operations until 10 years after voter approval. The report stated: "To alleviate congestion during the planning and design of the final rapid transit network, this analysis has developed a program of RAPID BUSWAY service between downtown Atlanta and outlying communities which can be put into operation quickly."[11]

The report was careful to point out how this particular proposal, with 32 miles covering five corridors, was only an interim arrangement designed to be coordinated with, rather than to compete against, the proposed all-rail express system. And yet the report clearly had a secondary purpose. Throughout the report the potential of Busways as a <u>long range</u> solution for certain transportation needs was forcefully implied:

> The Busways plan...has a service area which will provide direct access for almost 90% of the Metropolitan area population. Busways <u>in its full development</u> could serve all of the people provided for by the Rail Rapid Transit plan and probably as many as 25% more. This would be at speeds--door to door--even faster than rail rapid transit in some instances. (Emphasis added.)[12]

The report gives pages of tables documenting how Busways would provide superior times, in selected examples, to an all-rail system and how it would be superior in most instances to combined feeder-bus rail service. In terms of capacity, the study quotes the 1962 MATSC conclusion that, if an adequate method can be found for downtown distribution, busways of this type are capable of carrying 15-20,000 passengers per hour. The maximum volume envisioned [with the use of rail transit] even for 1983 was predicted at 12,000 passengers per hour.[13] Finally, the ATS report makes reference to the Meyer, Kain and Wohl study[14] which, it claims, "reaches the conclusion that express bus service on exclusive rights-of-way is potentially the most satisfactory, most flexible means for conveying passengers to work."[15]

The ATS claimed that Rapid Busways could be in operation in a matter of months, the time it would take simply to pave over the existing rail right-of-way. The cost of the 32-mile system was estimated at $52 million, only $22 million of which was for construction. $30 million dollars was allocated for land acquisition over "largely the same right-of-way which a rail system would later use." This investment was justified in the ATS report because "it is a cost which will have to be incurred, sooner or later, for the rail plan."[16] This small investment in the contemplated trunk routes made possible a projected system in which 45% of the aggregate 750 route miles would travel over private right-of-way, non-stop, at

speeds of over 45 mph.[17] Both suburban collection and downtown distribution would be handled over the existing local street system with the same vehicle performing both of these functions as well as the line-haul in a busway, so changing vehicles would be unnecessary for a majority of the downtown commuters.

The Rapid Busways report was greeted with a great deal of interest and publicity. On July 7, 1967, Mayor Ivan Allen directed the MARTA Board of Directors to authorize a study of the proposal. Likewise, the Chamber of Commerce Rapid Transit Committee created four subcommittees to appraise Busways from several different perspectives.

Theoretically, at least, this period of public and quasi-public analysis of the ATS proposal could have been a distinct asset for the MARTA effort, for it was an opportunity to broaden significantly the base of support for the transit effort. It is important to note that Sommerville's overture had several attractive aspects. For one, it was private enterprise stepping in to help solve a critical community problem. Sommerville was offering the services of his company in an effort to cooperate in the phased schedule of development of the long term public plan. Furthermore, he was making public a serious flaw in the PBTB planning to date--the lack of serious consideration for bus services in both interim and long-term plans. In short, the time allotted to the study of Rapid Busways provided an opportunity for MARTA to state publicly its concern for cooperative planning, to embrace on some level the complementary role of express bus service, and, most importantly, to

gain the support of ATS in the coming political effort. The opportunity was allowed to pass.

Three weeks after it was directed to study the plan, and before the Chamber of Commerce subcommittees had had sufficient time to organize their work, MARTA came back with its reply. "The MARTA Board of Directors unanimously agreed that the implementation of the 'Rapid Busways' concept would be much too costly for the amount of relief provided. MARTA consequently recommends that the implementation of this concept not be attempted."[18] The reply, prepared by the staff and consultants, was a point-by-point refutation of the specific details used in the ATS report. The 32-mile plan described in "Busways" was faulted in terms of (1) cost, (2) development schedule, and (3) insufficient common routing. Private right-of-way, the report pointed out, cannot be built simply by paving over existing tracks. New bridges have to be built, and aerial structures have to be used when private railroad sidings must connect with the rail lines. Thus, the cost for the system would be closer to $150 million, and the development schedule would come within a year and one half of the rail program's. Furthermore, considerably less than 50% of the Busway routings coincided with the 1967 MARTA lines, largely because of Busways' use of the North-South lines on both sides of the central area, as compared with MARTA's Peachtree corridor tunnel.

What the review by MARTA did not cover was at least as important as what it did. The potential operations of bus

systems, in terms of market appeal, coverage, trip time and capacity were not commented on in the terse review. Nowhere in the review was there any mention of roles that express bus services might play in either the short-/or long-term. There was no suggestion in MARTA's review that the problem of interim service was legitimately raised, or that buses in private rights-of-way might be used until demand was sufficient to justify full rapid rail investment. Such service, with the buses acting as feeder extensions of growing rail transit lines is common in transit engineering and, as will be seen, was used in the Seattle proposal and in the original Washington D.C. studies. From a political standpoint, MARTA's criticisms of ATS were so strong as to imply that ATS was irresponsible in even making the Busways proposal.

The MARTA review opposed any experimentation with busways, but recommended that "if the public demands an experimental development"[19] it should take place on the East-West line, where the Busways plan shared a common alignment with MARTA's proposed route. Even this investment was opposed, however, because "an entirely different approach is needed for rail and for bus at Transit Center. Buses cannot discharge their passengers at a platform in the volume necessary without causing serious delays to the following vehicles."[20] Thus, an experimental East-West line would have to use exit ramps to the downtown streets--and, "the downtown ramps will occupy some very expensive real estate."[21]

MARTA's terse rejection of the Busways concept did not end the debate about its choice of modal technology. The Transit Committee of the Chamber of Commerce dropped three of its Busways subcommittees which dealt with research, and kept the "Overall Evaluation Subcommittee". The role of express bus services in Atlanta was not dismissed as quickly by this group as by the MARTA review. Reportedly, the North-South busways, which represented a significant added investment because they paralleled the Peachtree corridor tunnel, were never considered seriously by any group. The Chamber of Commerce subcommittee, however, gave serious consideration to recommending that the East-West line be studied immediately by an impartial consulting firm, in spite of MARTA's firm opposition to this suggestion. Such a study, by a firm independent of MARTA's previous planners, was intended to evaluate the two positions, and effectively respond to the criticisms of Robert Sommerville, whose displeasure with the tone of the MARTA review increased his opposition to the Authority.

In the end, after two months of study by the Evaluation Subcommittee, the full Chamber of Commerce took no position either on the Busways proposal, or the MARTA plan, or on an independent study of both. The recommendations of the subcommittee, which have never been publicly revealed, were accepted by the full Chamber as a point of information only, and the Chamber decided to take no action.

It is significant for our discussion that this civic body, whose consistent record of support for transit in Atlanta is

documented in the following chapter, did not manage to produce a stamp approval of MARTA's position. The distrust of MARTA's impartial selection of modal technology apparently had reached even her most faithful political ally.

On September 28, 1967, three months after the release of the "Rapid Busways" proposal, the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission formally transferred its 54-mile PBTB plan to the MARTA Board, and the document was publicly released in November. The full system, which had previously been estimated to cost $292 million, was now estimated to cost nearly one half billion dollars. The figure released in the report was $479 million for the 54-mile system, with the understanding that the 12-mile Cobb County section would send the cost well over the half billion mark.[22] Many observers suggested to us that this vast rise in cost, which was later to be re-estimated at three quarters of a billion dollars for a significantly smaller system, was the single most critical factor in the eventual crumbling of MARTA's once unified civic and political support. This issue will be discussed more fully below.

The questioning of the MARTA plan, which started with Sommerville's sudden presentation of the busways alternative, was to continue through the referendum of the following year. The continuing debate about MARTA's total reliance on fixed rail technology, with its concomitant heavy investment costs, undoubtedly influenced MARTA's decision to reverse its previous position that no further study of the system was needed. As MARTA did not come out of the Busways debate with the ringing endorsement of the formerly sympathetic Chamber of Commerce, it became

obvious that a complete review by an independent consultant might clear the air of whatever doubts had been raised about the proposed facilities. Thus, at their meeting of October 3, 1967, the MARTA Board of Directors tentatively selected the firm of Alan M. Voorhees to conduct a study of the PBTB rail system and make policy recommendations to the Board.[23] There were indeed other, and probably more important, reasons for bringing in the Voorhees firm at this point in the planning; these concern federal regulations for transportation planning, and are discussed in Chapter III. However, we are interested at this point in pinpointing the relationship between the emergence of the Voorhees plan, and the greater debate over MARTA's treatment of alternative technologies. The Voorhees study was intended to provide highly credible expertise that would settle with finality the questions about the MARTA plan. The timing of the report proved to be a critical factor in MARTA's showing at the polls.

After MARTA's decision to sponsor a more complete study of alternatives to its proposed plan, there was considerable public discussion of the merits of the Busways plan. In particular, Glenn Bennett,the Executive Director of ARMPC (and as such a principle designer of the 54-mile plan), stated in November that the final plan for the region might well incorporate elements of both plans--a statement which the MARTA planners had ruled out only a few months before.[24] Then, in December, elements of both the civic and political leadership were to question publicly

the wisdom of MARTA's proposed rail plan. The incoming President of the Chamber of Commerce was quoted as saying, "In the next year we are going to need a lot of hard thinking about rapid transit, and where it's going, and how much it is going to cost, and who is going to pay for it....Maybe we should take some ideas from each plan, but I'm not sure we should necessarily use either."[25] Perhaps the most important voice of dissension was that of Everett Millican, an influential alderman who was repeatedly described to us as "the man who knows more about Atlanta than anyone alive." In December Alderman Millican succeeded in getting an ordinance passed by the Board of Aldermen which called for a study of buses "in an interim, permanent, or a combined rail-bus mass transit system for Metropolitan Atlanta." Millican, who became the leader of the anti-MARTA campaign at the time of the election, commented that the MARTA study "assumes rail transit with feeder buses ...(but) there is a sizable body of public opinion favoring greater consideration of the use of buses in the system." [26]

The Aldermanic request was sent by the Mayor to ARMPC, with the understanding that the planning agencies would have to find funds for the study. The planners explained to us, however, that there was no money with which to make a full engineering study of the bus proposal. All of the original funds had been spent on the PBTB study, and all the federal money for exploring technological alternatives was allocated to the Voorhees program. In effect, then, while the planners endorsed the Voorhees review, they declined to undertake specific engineering studies of yet another proposal. What developed was a feeling that the Alder-

men were being ignored by MARTA, which had apparently disregarded their official request. Many in Atlanta felt that federal money was available for such a study, but that it was somehow "bottle-necked". In fact, as we have seen, these funds were being channeled into a general review of the rail system and alternatives, including buses. Thus opponents were correct in charging that a plan emphasizing buses was not being specifically studied and the planners were correct in their assertion that such a plan was under general consideration.

Over the period described in the past few pages, MARTA did indeed drop its previously limited concept of the kind of transportation system it should operate. As described in the following chapter, the Voorhees study was to grow into a model example of inter-agency, inter-modal cooperative planning. With the high standards of planning used in this process, MARTA should have been cleared of any charge of short-sighted, or technologically biased planning. Richard Rich[27] and Glenn Bennett had declared publicly the desirability of taking the best from each proposal and thereby building the best system possible, rather than relying solely on the 1967 PBTB report. And yet, when MARTA went to the polls one year later, it presented the voters not the promised comprehensive, bi-modal plan, but rather a simple reduction of the 1967 PBTB plan.

During the summer of 1968, MARTA received $166,666[28] in federal planning funds to continue an expanded Voorhees study. It became clear at this point that the study would not be finished, as originally planned, by the November election. Furthermore, far

from being only a "review of planning efforts to date,"[29] the Voorhees study was already seriously questioning the validity of much of the PBTB plan. Because of a transfer of power (to be described in Chapter III), MARTA had by this time agreed to construct whatever plan was ultimately recommended by the Voorhees group.

In spite of this situation, the MARTA Board of Directors decided in September of 1968 to present the truncated PBTB plan to the voters instead of waiting for the completion of the Voorhees plan. The MARTA plan presented was essentially the same as the one defended early in the Busways debate.

Mayor Ivan Allen reportedly asked MARTA not to take the issue to the November election, but to wait for the official plan to be announced. The MARTA leaders felt that they had waited long enough. Chairman Richard Rich did not agree with the federal government's policy of encouraging more and more planning and study. "We could plan for 30 years, and not please everybody. This is a system that has been studied for 12 years, and researched in depth for two and one-half years. If we ever want to build, we have to accept the experts' findings .... What we have here, is expertise."[30]

Mayor Allen agreed to support MARTA officially, and did not openly air his concerns about the timing. But there must have been serious questions in the Mayor's mind about the wisdom of going to the polls with the Voorhees study still underway. Mayor Allen, according to a clear consensus of our interviews, took only a weakly supporting stand for the MARTA

plan during the referendum, and refrained from active involvement in the campaigning. This lack of enthusiasm toward an issue which had long concerned him perplexed many observers, for Allen had been one of the founders of the movement for rapid transit in Atlanta, both as president of the Chamber of Commerce and as Mayor. Perhaps there are other explanations, but it appears to us that MARTA's failure to answer the questions raised by the aldermen and other civic leaders, together with the existence of another yet uncompleted expert study, may well have been crucial.

Mayor Allen was one of the most critical figures in the campaign; Alderman Millican was another. As will be seen in Chapter V, the alderman opposed the MARTA plan so strongly that he financed a last minute campaign against the proposal with his own funds. His opposition was not based on one issue alone, but he repeatedly used the pending Voorhees report as an example of the fact that the MARTA proposal was not ready for official presentation at that time.

It is important to note that neither the existence of the Voorhees Report nor the timing of the election were in themselves important factors in the election. These largely technical points, however, were well understood by the region's transportation technicians and some of the political leaders. It is through intermediaries such as Allen and Millican that largely technical questions are translated into public opinion. Thus, while most of the voters were certainly not aware of the Voorhees study, or the lack of resolution of the old Busways argument, the silence of Allen and the opposition of Millican may well have served as models for other political leaders, and the voters

themselves,to follow. Although we do not believe that the voters rejected the plan out of dissatisfaction with any technical point (except the very cost of the proposal), we do conclude that the lack of consensus and support on the part of the region's transportation technicians regarding the proposed facilities had a direct influence on the civic and political leadership of Atlanta, and that the lack of certainty on this level provided cues to a cautious, tax-conscious public. The technical problems of the proposed rail system thus seem to have been a serious, though indirect, factor in the defeat of the MARTA referendum.

B. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

This section examines the common problems faced in the five cities stemming from the need to design a public transportation network for the future with only a limited conception of the nature of the technological modes which will eventually be available in this rapidly developing field. This constraint is dealt with primarily in terms of its effect on planning decisions and the development of strategies to create voter support for the systems created.

In terms of the technological mode recommended, all five plans look remarkably similar. In each city, consulting firms presented what they considered to be required by the existing "state of the art" in public transportation design: fixed rail services that radiate from the traditional central business

district via four or five corridors. The similarity of design features may be largely an outcome of the fact that only a small number of firms have nationally established reputations in the field. Two of the five plans were drawn up by Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade and Douglas of New York, and two by DeLeuw Cather & Co. of Chicago.

The fixed rail proposals for each of the cities were virtually identical. Each promised a system with minimum headway of 90 seconds, with regional service having maximum headway of 30 minutes. All trains would be capable of speeds of 70-75 mph, with automated controls and an "attendant" on each train. The three cities which commissioned specific vehicle designs all used the same firm, Sundberg-Ferar of Detroit, which came up with similar recommendations for each. Each of the systems under study here incorporated the use of a very long vehicle (assuming 75 feet to be the maximum feasible vehicle length),[31] and judged the various modes on the basis of their ability to maximize line-haul capacity.

While the systems share the same basic radial route configurations, vehicle designs, and service patterns, there are significant variations in their lengths, placement of supporting ways, patronage estimates, and, of course, their costs. The largest of the systems under consideration is the Metro of Washington, D.C., one of two systems (San Francisco's BARTD is the other) to be approved at the polls. With 98 miles of rail

right-of-way, to be coordinated with locally operated feeder bus services, 47 miles of Washington's system will be in subways, an exceptionally high proportion, with 53 of the proposed 86 stations to be placed underground. Only 8 miles of the system will be on aerial structures. The remaining 42 miles will be on grade, with the majority of this trackage located in freeway medians and deserted railroad rights-of-way. The system is expected to cost $2.5 billion, with compounded inflation assumed in that figure. The system's architectural planning, designed by Harry Weese and Associates, incorporates many innovations. Specific station designs, some making great use of giant tunnel linings to eliminate all need for supporting pillars, seem to have been further along at the time of the voting than in other cities. Similarly, a specific design of the vehicle had been approved and accepted at the time of the referendum. The traffic demand consultants, Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, projected a daily patronage of 959,000 riders in 1990. The engineering program was coordinated by DeLeuw Cather & Co.[32]

The second largest system was that designed for Los Angeles by the Kaiser Engineers in conjunction with Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall. Five corridors, with 89 miles of trackage and 66 stations, were proposed. Reflecting the lower density of land usage in Los Angeles, there was less subway construction anticipated. Approximately 18 miles of subways was planned, most of which was to be under Wilshire Boulevard and

in the financial district. There was a far greater reliance on aerial structures in the Los Angeles plan. The system was the only one to incorporate express-track facilities, in this case for a special airport-downtown shuttle system. Like the Washington proposal, its cost was estimated to be $2.5 billion; its 1980 patronage was projected at 477,000 riders.[33]

The third largest system proposed to the voters was the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District system, which is now under construction, with operation scheduled to commence sometime around 1972. The 75 miles of railway is divided almost evenly among the three available track modes: 23 miles underground, 24 at grade, and 28 miles of aerial structures. When taken to the voters in 1962, the plan was to cost $991 million; its cost is presently estimated at more than $1.2 billion. Patronage estimates run about one-third of those forecast for Washington, in the vicinity of 300,000 riders per day in 1980.[34] This plan, like the MARTA proposal, was prepared by the combination of Parsons Brinkerhoff, Tudor and Bechtel consulting firms.[35]

A 47-mile system was proposed in Seattle, under the direction of DeLeuw Cather and a team of architects and urban designers. The planning for the details of this system were clearly the least developed of the five cities at the time of presentation to the voters. However, although engineering details such as exact patronage forecasts and precise route locations had not been set forth, descriptions of the long-range planning goals

and social dimensions of the system are extremely sophisticated. It was only in Seattle that the potential effect on land usage and living conditions was emphasized as strongly as were "hard" engineering considerations. The cost of the system was estimated at $1.15 billion, which incorporated a cautious inflationary consideration. Only preliminary demand forecasting had been completed, indicating a patronage considerably smaller than the BARTD system's.[36]

Finally, for purposes of comparison, the MARTA proposal as it went to the voters was the smallest of those under consideration, at 40.3 miles, as well as the "cheapest" at $750 million.

The problems faced in Atlanta and the four other cities concerning the selection of modal technology for their proposed facilities appear to have been a result of a conflict between immediate needs and long-range possibilities. Each city suffered from very real transportation problems and sought immediate remedial action. But at the same time the decision-makers were well aware of the "primitive" state of public transportation technology, and eagerly awaited breakthroughs which might finally make public transportation competitive with the private automobile. Similarly, many of the most serious questions faced in the development of a unified political strategy for the transit campaigns concerned the prevailing negative public attitudes towards existing public transportation modes. It is important for this study, there-

fore, to understand both the technical decisions involved in the design of the proposed facilities, and the political strategies needed to convince the voters of the validity of these decisions.

In varying forms, the charge of technological obsolescence appeared in all of the five cities. While it is not possible to determine the political significance in each case, the arguments did reach public dimensions in several of the cities. Perhaps the dilemma of immediate needs vs. long-term uncertainty is best shown in this comment of the Atlanta Constitution, just before the election:

> Of comments by Gov. Lester Maddox that the rail system will be obsolete by the year 2000 when men fly around "with wings on their back," engineer John Coil replies: "Wings are exactly what I want in the year 2000, but I won't be here. I hope I'll be up there." He said engineers fully expect the system planned to be still up to date and able to carry peak loads of passengers well into the next century. [37]

Mr. Coil, the project manager of PBTB, explained to us that MARTA's engineers made full studies of future technologies, and concluded unquestionably that the finest service would come from steel wheels on steel rails for years to come. The MARTA leadership considers it one of its greatest failings that their public information program did not convey to the public, and to Governor Maddox, the fact that all foreseeable system technologies, including the monorail, were studied and carefully considered in the course of the planning.

Great dissatisfaction with existing facilities underlies the public's distaste for more of the same and their fear that investment at this time might freeze out a possible future

radical breakthrough that will remedy the situation. Ironically, public beliefs about such an innovative solution have centered around the monorail, which many engineers feel offers virtually no advantage save its ability to arouse the imagination of the public. The set of beliefs that dominates public attitudes is observed in the following statement:

> In the folklore, passengers are packed in like sardines; the ride is slow and dirty and exhausting; the vehicles are places of crime and hooliganism. 38

Given such attitudes towards public transportation in a society which places great value on the free use of an automobile, the issue of "voter education" about the design details of proposed new transit systems becomes more complex. For example, two of our cities, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., actually constructed prototypes of specific vehicle designs which had been selected, while the others decided not to commit themselves to a particular design at this stage in the planning. The engineering reports of Seattle and Atlanta commented on the rapid evolution of vehicle design, and stated that the final details of the car should not be decided until the latest possible moment. Atlanta displayed a prototype but did not claim that the vehicle represented what would, in fact, be used. Los Angeles took the middle road, by commissioning a specific vehicle design but building no prototype.

We can argue that if MARTA had created a specific design for an "Atlanta Car," the Authority would have been in a stronger position to conduct a "voter education" program to break away from the negative image of public transportation. By image, we refer both to the social class stigma that traditionally attaches

to public transportation services such as buses in Atlanta, and to the more specifically distasteful image of rapid transit, which Atlanta has not experienced. (Contributing to the creation of such an image are: noisy and dark streets beneath the "el," dimly lit underground stations, hot and crowded cars with many people standing, and the way of life associated with the crowded conditions of older northeastern industrial cities.) Atlanta's descriptive transit literature pictured recent designs used by other systems. But even in its final engineering and public relations work, MARTA had no specific design proposal around which to mould public support, nor with which to convince a skeptical public that the MARTA system was created to fit the particular preferences of Atlantans. By contrast, a Washington hand-out boasted that, in the Metro car, "picture windows 56 inches high, and 26 inches wide, line the walls providing a panoramic view of the scenic National Capitol area."[39] MARTA's major campaign advertisement used as its symbol a drawing of what is quite clearly marked as a Pennsylvania Rail Road car. The vehicle is pictured emerging from a tunnel in front of a dark, dingy looking city, with its electrification wires cutting through air polluted by tall industrial smokestacks: the caption beside the drawing reads, "Modern Rapid Transit will make Atlanta an even greater city."[40]

This is not to argue, however, that maximum exposure of an individually-designed vehicle will insure the success of transit efforts. While an actual prototype may aid in the process of "changing the image" of public transportation, a

prototype which honestly and realistically shows what kind of a vehicle will be built, given the facts of limited budgets, may serve mainly to confirm the public's suspicions that they are getting "more of the same." The optimal strategy may be that which leaves somewhat to the voters' imagination the possibility that the vehicle might resemble the "Buck Rogers" solution that many voters believe to exist.

An interesting example of the way in which the public's dissatisfaction with rapid transit is related to voting outcome has been shown in the Seattle data. In a before-and-after analysis, Robert Gogerty, a political scientist at the University of Washington, found a sharp discrepancy between the percentage of the voters who stated that they would be willing financially to support efforts to solve the transportation problem and the percentage of voters that actually did support the rapid transit proposal. He notes that 24% of those committed to supporting improved transportation deserted the transit effort. Four months before the election, the campaign leadership took a poll which indicated that 62% of the voters would support transportation programs at the referendum. The validity of this poll is suggested by the fact that a bonding issue for arterial highways, which the ballot implied was sufficient to handle all the projected traffic over the next 20 years, indeed received 62% of the votes. The rapid transit proposal, however, received only 50.6% of the votes(60% was needed for passage).

This seems to show that a certain segment (which in Seattle's case was critical) of the voters is indeed willing to make a

financial commitment to transportation, but not necessarily to rapid transit. Gogerty's explanation of this pattern is valuable for the purposes of this study. In the poll, respondents were asked what they thought was the solution to Seattle's present transportation problem. Rapid transit was the solution most often mentioned, followed by various highway improvements. Then, later in the same interview, the respondents were asked what they thought was the long term solution for Seattle's transportation problem. In response to this phrasing, the replies mentioned highways and freeways more often than rapid transit.

Our interpretation of the results of the Gogerty poll indicates that although the voter is willing to accept some form of rapid transit as a solution to the present "transportation crisis", he maintains a personal preference for the freedom associated with individual car-usage. Thus he is in effect concerned with the "good of the region" for both present and future: he sees transit as a necessary solution to the current problem, given present technological constraints, but he hopes that future breakthroughs will enable everyone to follow his own preference, which in most instances will be for the automobile. Rapid transit thus becomes an acceptable supplementary service for the present, but not a final solution.

Investment in rapid transit thus seems more likely to be supported as an externally-defined "good" than as a specific set of services satisfying the personal preference of the voter himself. Dramatic support for this conclusion is found in the 1963 poll of the Los Angeles Times.[42] Asked "If rapid transit were in effect tomorrow, would you use it?", only 7.3% said they probably

would. And yet, from that same sample, 86.6% of the respondents said that they believed that Los Angeles needed a new rapid transit system. It is important to report, then, from dispersed sources of data drawn from the cities under study, that rapid transit is most likely to be supported in an attempt to make one's personal transportation--by auto--function better. The clearest evidence is from Los Angeles' post-election survey;[43] the two reasons for voting for the transit issue that were most often described as "good reasons" were--"Unable to find space on freeways," and "Relieve rush hour congestion". Over 70% of all the respondents found these reasons sound. By comparison, other "good reasons" received far lower scores: "Reduce need for 2nd or 3rd car" (39%); "Serve my area, be a convenience" (33%); "Result in personal or community benefits" (28%); and "Increase Tax Base" (26%).

We are dealing, then, with a commodity which much of the public finds good in principle but for the use, primarily, of others. We suggest that it is a lack of satisfaction with existing facilities, however disguised in "new" presentations, that underlies much of the public's resistance to rapid transit investment at this time. In spite of feeling that the application of existing technology would provide definite levels of relief to the present traffic crisis, public confidence in rapid transit investment is much lower when transit is suggested as a long term solution because of a dominant belief that "subways" are outdated and will not be able to compete with systems to come. This public belief corresponds with the opinions of many technicians that fixed rail rapid transit technology is inflexible, inefficient, and

rapidly growing obsolescent and that investment at this time might effectively rule out the adoption of later, superior technological system. We will briefly consider these criticisms in light of the proposed facilities of the five cities, commenting on their apparent validity and their relation to voter attitudes.

The charges levelled against the fixed rail technology applied in the cities under study can be divided into two categories: that the rail modes selected would provide inferior services 1) to presently existing alternative modes, such as buses, and 2) to other modes not yet available. Largely because of the amount of data uncovered in the "Rapid Busway" debate and the subsequent Voorhees report, Atlanta provides a good case study for both types of criticism. The full MARTA system was to have 66 miles of electrified rails on a private right-of-way. About 7 miles was to be a subway. (See appendix). Because of the highly linear form of Atlanta's expanding central business district, such a subway has the potential for providing effective downtown distribution services. Electrified rail vehicles, travelling in train formation, can probably serve this corridor more effectively than any other existing mode. Specifically, experts have noted that if buses were to be provided with underground right-of-way through this corridor, each major station (all buses stopping) on the North-South lines would have to include five pull-off bus lanes for passenger loading platforms in each direction, based on the 1988 traffic predictions.[44] Each of these stations would consume a serious amount of expensive urban real estate, in addition to the formidable cost of adequate tunnel

ventilation. Any outright rejection of the contribution of rail services to Atlanta, then, seems unjustified.

What is not clear in the case of Atlanta, however, is that the mode which provides the best investment in downtown distribution is the most rational choice for the rest of the 66 mile system. In order to provide marketable, one-vehicle service from all suburban stations direct to the job centers of the Peachtree corridor, Atlanta would have to provide electrified exclusive rail right-of-way for all of the 66 miles. The problem lies in the fact that in lines of low or moderate patronage, operating costs are not significantly lower for rail vehicles than for buses, since the shorter trains required result in fewer savings in labor costs. Therefore, in areas of low traffic demands, the heavy long term capital investment in fixed rail electrification and controls is not justified by operations savings.

The problem, in short, is that two modes of transportation seem required--rail rapid transit for downtown line haul, and buses for most of the rest. Yet such a "mixed mode" system requires at least one transfer for most patrons--one factor which is universally believed to limit the attractiveness of the transit trip.[45]

To solve problems created by the need for both trains and buses in cities like Atlanta, significant current research in urban transport technology focuses on the development of one vehicle which would unite the functional advantages of these two modes. Such a "dual-mode vehicle"[46] could take advantage of existing local streets and segments of highways with excess

capacity, or could operate on a private roadway, without investment in electrification and controls. The future buslike vehicle could also, however, proceed through downtown tunnels in a virtual "train formation" with others like itself, given technological advancement in both non-polluting propulsion and vehicle spacing systems.

This one technological breakthrough would radically alter the nature of facilities in which cities should invest. And the possibility of such a system has a present impact upon planning and decision-making--including referenda. First, there is the argument of the cost of converting a fixed rail/bus system to a mixed-mode system. And second, it has even been charged that technical details of the plans proposed--such as the narrowness of tunnels--would make an adaptation for "dual-mode vehicles" impossible. If technologically improved buses are ever to go through downtown tunnels, those tunnels will have to be wider than necessary for precisely controlled fixed rail vehicles.

The engineering studies of all five systems referred to the fact that the technology of transit is in a state of flux, yet to serve present needs they all opted for the least flexible system--rail rapid transit. This solution produced attacks from fellow "experts," many of whom favored a short-term solution of buses both for suburban feeder and main line-haul operations. These disputes over different technologies were most marked in Atlanta and Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Times questioned the validity of the research efforts of the transit agency, and other critics charged that a review of alternative technologies was

"fixed" by the agency's assumptions.[47] In Atlanta, even supporters of the public transportation effort were perplexed at the early tendency of the young agency to be concerned with only one narrowly defined area of public transportation, and the "modal prejudice" adopted by the MARTA Board based on their unswerving faith in the "expertise" of their hired engineering advisers.

We can only conclude that this lack of faith in the open-mindness of the decision makers tended to reinforce the public's fear that recommendations for public transportation investment over the long term was being made on a short-sighted basis. James Ellis, who coordinated Seattle's political campaigns so expertly, commented, "At the root of some of the most intransigent urban problems we are likely to find one set of closed minds hard-selling another."[48] It is just that suspicion--that plans are created by closed-minded, perhaps self-seeking, agencies--that must be countered politically by a strategy to broaden the base of technical and political support.

The ability to get other transportation technicians, perhaps with other "modal prejudices", to unite behind public transportation issues may perhaps be an unplanned benefit arising from the strict enforcement of the federal government's requirements for all involved agencies to settle on one comprehensive transportation plan. Many of the arguments and inter-agency bad feelings that hurt MARTA so much in the previous public referendum will very likely be absent when that agency again goes to the voters. At that time, they will be presenting a plan which every significant regional transportation leader is supposed to have agreed

upon and publicly declared to be necessary.

Because voters tend to see individual agencies as self-seeking, anxious to extend their public empires, they are understandably hesitant to authorize public expenditure. There seems to be a critical difference between a proposal on the part of one agency to build "a subway system." and a proposal to create "a regional system of balanced transportation", incorporating roads, public transportation services, and perhaps even port development. If a comprehensive plan is presented to the voters, they at least know that the transportation leaders have agreed on the nature of the system. The voters may still prefer to allocate funds to another sector--to schools or football stadiums, for instance--but at least the transportation "experts" will not be at odds with each other.

Given the American cultural tradition of reliance on private automobiles, public transportation will most likely remain a difficult public issue to "sell". It may have to ride somewhat on the strength of other "vote-getting" elements of an interdependent regional transportation package. At the very least, it should not be seen as competitive with other, more popular elements within the transportation sector of the public economy. Given the tendency of the public to vote for public transportation only when it is seen as a necessary part of a total system providing personally desirable transportation, the presentation of transit as an integral part of a unified whole--both in terms of present and future technologies--may be the single most important strategy to be adopted by cities trying to fund decent public transportation for their citizens.

Chapter III

THE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS

A. ATLANTA

The most politically damaging criticisms leveled against the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority charged that the agency did not coordinate its planning with the existing technical, political, and social institutions of Atlanta. In this chapter, we present an analysis of the structure of MARTA, with particular emphasis on the ability of this organization to incorporate key elements of the Atlanta community into the planning process.

Both MARTA's supporters and its critics told us that the structure of the agency was inadequate to provide effective community participation in the ongoing planning process. In our research, we have found it useful to break down the larger category of "community" into at least three subgroups. The first group discussed in this chapter is comprised of technicians: the structure of the planning agency should provide a mechanism through which all the related transportation decision-makers in the area can be brought together to participate in "comprehensive" planning. Second, the structure of the agency should recognize the importance of gaining the support of elected leaders, and provide a political level of information and planning coordination. Third, the non-political community leadership, and the public which it influences, must be acknowledged in the planning process, both in terms of information and consultation.

Of those whom we interviewed, a preponderance felt that MARTA had failed on all three levels. At the time of the election, there was no unified agreement on the part of the region's transportation technicians that the MARTA plan was the best possible plan, for the technicians had not been lined up behind it during its creation. On the political level, it was commonly charged that MARTA had acted as a "super-government", ignoring the duly elected representatives of the people. Local political leaders claimed that they had been left out of the planning until after MARTA had decided on its own what was the best plan. Consequently, the amount of active support for the proposal on the part of the political leaders was damagingly slight. And finally, the brief voting analysis of Chapter V suggests strongly that the failure to incorporate all segments of the community in the ongoing planning was a critical error. The charge that MARTA planning was carried out by a narrowly constituted elite, which did not reflect the divergent needs of the community at large, was a politically decisive factor in MARTA's poor showing at the polls.

MARTA was officially organized in January of 1966, after a long political history that is summarized in the following section of this chapter. Its staff consists of a General Manager, his assistant, a Chief Engineer, and a Director of Information, and some secretarial help. The Board of Directors is comprised of ten men, chosen by the city of Atlanta and the four member counties, plus an observer from a fifth county which does not presently belong to the MARTA pact. From the Board are chosen a Chairman, Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The post of Secretary has been historically filled by an official of the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission. It is

important to note here that MARTA does not have a Director of Planning, as such, nor any separate planning staff. Their roles were largely left to be filled by the General Manager, who must oversee the entire operation. He must "act as coordinator between the MARTA Board and Parsons Brinkerhoff Tudor Bechtel; various federal, state, and local governmental agencies; manufacturers and suppliers of equipment; and local citizens interested in rapid transit." [1] In short, the entire task of coordinating the agency's planning effort was in reality the responsibility of one man.

1. The Structure of Technical Decision-Making

In order to understand the way in which planning decisions were made by MARTA, and the effect that these decisions had, it is necessary to recount briefly the history of "regional" planning in Atlanta, and the role of critical institutions in this activity. The important criticisms leveled against the planning of the MARTA system must be viewed with an understanding of the structures of other agencies created to perform this kind of decision-making, and the limitations placed on them at their creations.

The planning of the 40.3 mile system that was submitted to the voters was the work of the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission (ARMPC); the agency which came to be responsible for the final creation of a comprehensive transportation plan was the Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS). We shall now describe the historical development of the agencies involved in the planning effort, with particular emphasis on the seemingly "last minute" transfer of authority from the regional planning agency (ARMPC) to the group of transportation officials (AATS) which had originally been

formed by the State Department of Highways.

Planning for regional mass transportation in Atlanta has historically been the concern of two groups, the civic leadership as manifested by the Chamber of Commerce, and the planning technicians of the regional planning agency, ARMPC. The role of the civic leadership is the concern of the following sections of this chapter. It is the role of the planners, in ARMPC, that is our primary concern here.

The immediate predecessor of ARMPC, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, dates back to 1947, making the regional planning effort in Atlanta one of the oldest in the country. As long ago as 1954, this data-gathering commission foresaw that "...within a few years... we will require some type of high speed mass transportation to supplement the bus system and serve our fast growing suburbs."[2] However, it must be emphasized that the function of the Commission was only to advise the existing governmental bodies; it had no power whatsoever to implement its own recommendations.

It was the Planning Commission which first publicly pointed out the inadequacy of an all-highway solution to the region's growing traffic problem. The position of the planners was made clear in 1959 when the Commission published a study on the future of radial traffic to and from downtown Atlanta. The report declared that traffic needs in 1970 would require 120 lanes of expressways radiating into central Atlanta if the region were to ignore public transportation improvements.[3] For this reason, mass transit "will be absolutely essential and should be investigated as an immediate

follow up to this expressway study." [4] At this point the Metropolitan Planning Commission initiated its studies both of probable routings and of operating agencies.

The 1960 Session of the Georgia Legislature significantly broadened the scope (if not the power) of the Planning Commission and created the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission. This Commission covered all five of the region's counties, whereas its predecessor was only "an instrument of voluntary cooperation for Fulton and DeKalb Counties and the City of Atlanta." [5] ARMPC describes its own function in these terms:

> It has the power and responsibility to conduct research, perform broad planning, give out public information, coordinate action, give assistance and advice, help local governments qualify for federal aid, and supplement local planning. After the key service of research, the most important word in the ARMPC's mandate is coordinate. [6]

The five counties of Atlanta's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area include 45 municipalities, nine school districts, 23 sewer systems, 38 water systems, and several authorities.[7] Four men represent Atlanta on the Commission, while Fulton and DeKalb each send three, and Clayton, Cobb, and Gwinnett Counties each send two representatives. The Commission is funded adequately to support a full time professional staff of 25.

It fell to the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce to provide the creative force for rapid transit over the next six years, for while the planners could advise, comment, and coordinate, they were still without adequate political support to bring about an operating agency. In December of 1960, Ivan Allen, then acting

as incoming president of the Chamber of Commerce, set up a Rapid Transit Steering Committee to develop a transportation policy for that body to adopt. The committee, chaired by Richard Rich, himself a former president of the Chamber of Commerce, immediately formed an alliance with ARMPC.[8] During the early part of 1961, ARMPC was preparing its transportation proposal as part of its first comprehensive planning effort. The Steering Committee spent the spring drafting legislation that would create an operating agency for the ARMPC plan. In July, the ARMPC 60-mile plan was announced (described in the previous chapter) and tentatively endorsed by the Chamber. In September, the Steering Committee made an important advance when it persuaded Governor Vandiver to conduct a regional conference in November which would include "a broad spectrum of persons interested in rapid transit."[9] Out of this group of both civic and elected leaders came an Intergovernmental Rapid Transit Steering Committee, comprised of the Mayor of Atlanta, the Aldermen's transit committee, and the chairmen of the five county commissions. The civic group at the Chamber of Commerce had successfully transferred its interest to a group of governmental leaders.

During this time, the position taken by the City of Atlanta concerning rapid transit was largely negative. The Mayor of Atlanta, William B. Hartsfield, was highly suspicious of the "slide-rule boys"[10] at ARMPC, and had actively opposed its enabling legislation. According to the analysis made by Roscoe Martin,[11] Hartsfield feared governmental agencies whose regional organization

might tend to dilute the power of the central city, and appeared at the Governor's conference only with greatest reluctance. He did not accept that meeting's concept of rapid transit as a regional concern to be handled by a regional body. However, Hartsfield was at this point a "lame duck" mayor, whose term of office would expire the next month. The Mayor-Elect was Ivan Allen, who had been responsible for initiating the transit effort.

Hartsfield proposed that the January 1962 legislature create a rapid transit authority that was virtually entirely controlled by Atlanta. Political observers note that the effect of Hartsfield's "swansong" was to fragment whatever regional support existed for legislation. The Chamber of Commerce had quietly built up support for its own legislation by emphasizing that regional transit would encourage the growth of the suburbs, that the system would benefit both the city and the suburbs. The publicity given the outgoing mayor's proposal tended to break down the support in the suburban areas; "it seemed that the support so painstakingly built throughout the region was about to dissolve in a recrudescence of the old quarrel between the central city and outlying areas."[12] After a process of compromise by the pro-transit forces, in order to get the bill through the rural-dominated legislature, what emerged from the January, 1962, session was not an implementing agency, but a study commission, the Metropolitan Atlanta Transportation Study Commission (MATSC).

To many, the study commission was a disappointment; Ivan Allen, disturbed by the last minute activities of his predecessor,

called it "half a loaf."[13] However, the creation of the study commission provided a mechanism through which planners could work out the many problems that had to be resolved before the state could create a functioning operating agency. The most important of these obstacles was the fact that public transportation was not included in the Constitution of Georgia as a legitimate governmental activity. The importance of this point had been made clear when Urban Renewal was challenged in the courts a few years earlier, and was found not to be a legitimately defined governmental concern. Hence there was some question of the propriety of expending state funds in such areas. In November of 1962 an amendment was presented to the voters of the entire state which would have made public transportation a legitimate function of government. While the amendment was approved in Fulton and DeKalb counties, it failed to win a state-wide majority.

Throughout 1962, MATSC oversaw the creation of a regional transportation plan. The Commission was an agency which could funnel public funds "in the employment of engineering, clerical, and other technical assistance in a program to determine the need, advisability, and economic feasibility of providing mass transportation."[14] The actual task of planning was not done through the creation of a temporary staff for MATSC, but by ARMPC.[15] To some extent, this arrangement grew out of a technicality. The legal representatives of the five counties noted that they were not empowered to allocate public funds to transportation projects. They were, however, free to provide funding to ARMPC for regional

planning. Thus, the actual planning of the transit system was still in the hands of the agency that first proposed it, ARMPC. The Executive Director of ARMPC, Glenn Bennett, assumed the position of Secretary of the Study Commission.

In December of 1962, the MATSC plan was presented, and in March of 1963, the Commission voted itself out of existence. The state legislature immediately created another study commission to analyze the MATSC work and recommend suitable implementation. In 1964, this second study group affirmed the MATSC proposals. Also, at the termination of MATSC, a "Rapid Transit Committee of 100" had been formed to channel private funds into a campaign to build voter support for the coming legislation. Invoking a provision of Georgia law which allowed the constitutional amendment to be submitted only to those areas affected, transit supporters in 1964 again brought to the voters the question of transit as a legitimate function of government. The amendment would become law only if approved by a majority of the voters in each of the five counties. With a bare 50.6% in Cobb County, the amendment was approved, the last major obstacle to enabling legislation.

In March, 1965, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act was passed. The Act required that a referendum be held in Atlanta and the five counties to ratify their participation in the new agency. In June of 1965, only Cobb County failed to join the regional pact, and MARTA was ratified by

Atlanta and the four other counties. In January, 1966, MARTA was formally organized with the same regional representation system as had been used in ARMPC and in MATSC. As in the MATSC organizational structure, the planning of the system was delegated to the group of men who had been instrumental in the creation of the Authority, the planning technicians of ARMPC. Similarly, the position of Executive Secretary of MARTA was filled by Glenn Bennett, Executive Director of ARMPC.

It is significant, we believe, that there was considerable misunderstanding about MARTA's early planning effort. In all of our interviews with community leaders associated with the transit effort, it was never mentioned (perhaps because it was not felt to be important) that the creation of the full plan was the work of ARMPC. It has been repeatedly charged, as we noted earlier in this chapter, that MARTA did not work in full cooperation with local agencies. However, the charge that MARTA was deliberately planning on its own, ignoring existing agencies, must have been somewhat confusing to the members of the MARTA Board who had delegated exactly that function to the region's duly constituted, coordinating planning agency.

The planning schedule adopted by MARTA at its inception called for a year of technical study, carried out by engineering consultants hired by ARMPC and MARTA. After this year of study, "[T]he MARTA directors must approve these routes and locations in principle, and recommend them to the local governments; (then) the five local political bodies must approve them tentatively; and public hearings must be held prior to the final approval."[16]

Then the Board would approve the plan to be submitted to the voters, and negotiations on the contract (described earlier in the description of MARTA) would begin.

According to the planning schedule, then, it was not the function of ARMPC, or its consultants, Parsons Brinkerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel (PBTB), to go to the elected and community leaders during the first year for the purpose of getting a consensus on what kind of system was wanted. Rather, this had been scheduled for the next year, after the period of technical decision-making had formulated a tentative proposal. Similarly, communications between PBTB and interested transportation agencies was largely for the purpose of gaining necessary information, rather than seeking advice and guidelines. This level of data-collection was evidently handled quite smoothly through the existing channels of the regional planning commission.

In brief, this year of planning was evidently done with a minimum of activity outside of the ARMPC staff and its hired engineers. Several political figures suggested to us that MARTA was actively trying to maintain secrecy about the planning, in order to minimize speculation in land around areas to be served. Those closer to the planning effort claim that there was no attempt to be secretive. Rather, the fact that the engineers were able to go about their business without political debate and public discussion was seen by those involved as indicative of the fact that technical, not political, decisions were being

made by impartial, external, sources of expertise. The planning, it was felt, was being efficiently managed by the organization which had been preparing itself for the specific function for over a decade--ARMPC.

In September, 1967, ARMPC had completed the planning work on the full system, and passed its recommendations on to the MARTA Board. ARMPC was pleased with the way the plan had been put together, with a heavy reliance on external expertise and internal technical coordination. The following history was published shortly after ARMPC presented its plan to MARTA:

> In 1965, the Transit Act was passed and the Authority was created. In 1966, we updated our plan, made a finance study, made the Authority independent and operative, selected a general manager and staff. The Rapid Transit Authority--MARTA--was our "baby", one of the best examples to date of a regional plan of magnitude implemented "according to the books." 17

As described in the preceding chapter, the story of MARTA's planning does not end with the issuance by ARMPC of the PBTB rail plan. In fact, it was on the same day that the ARMPC recommendations were tentatively accepted, October 3, 1967, that the MARTA Board applied for funds to finance the Voorhees study. Chapter II attempted to show the way in which the continuing debate about the proposed physical facilities influenced the voting outcome. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the existence of a future second plan kept the debate open, and that the timing of the referendum was a critical political error. It is important, then, to document in this chapter (to the extent possible) the process by which the second plan was created, and how the decision to take the first plan to the voters was

made. Emphasis here is placed on how these decisions were affected by the relations between technical agencies under discussion.

The transfer of planning authority from ARMPC to AATS was not a serious consideration until December of 1967. For almost all of the first two years of MARTA's existence the Atlanta Area Transportation Study existed largely on paper. It was created several years before as a project of the State Highway Department in which all local transportation agencies would pool their data for the creation of long-range traffic predictions. It was on 1961 AATS data that MARTA had based its 1988 patronage predictions. In September of 1967, MARTA stated that it maintained "important liaisons"[18] with the AATS study through a representative on the Technical Coordinating Committee of AATS. MARTA described one of the purposes of the AATS as to "propose an overall transportation plan for the metropolitan area, and recommend priorities for improvements."[19] However, just when this plan would be created, and by what method the participating agencies would determine exactly what facilities they would contribute to this plan were details not mentioned in the September, 1967, report, because they had not yet been determined. Until that time, MARTA was proceeding "side by side with AATS, using the same information and looking toward later comparison and blending of results."[20]

The function of AATS in Atlanta's comprehensive planning changed markedly at the end of 1967. MARTA's chief engineer

was to write after the election, "Although the Study was initiated in 1959, it wasn't until early 1968 that it was made evident that it would be necessary to expedite the completion of the Study."[21] Robert Sommerville, the bus company's president, provided a slightly more blunt description of the decision to reactivate the AATS: "MARTA, which had paid not more than passing lip service to the conception of balanced transportation, suddenly faced the reality that federal capital funds would not be available because the Atlanta area had neither adopted a comprehensive transportation policy nor even completed studies leading to it."[22] The Transportation Policy Committee of the Atlanta Area Transportation Study was revived, with Robert Sommerville named as Chairman. He was nominated by Richard Rich.

According to our interviews with MARTA officials, it was MARTA which took the first step to comply with newly clarified federal regulations. With the tentative acceptance of the ARMPC report, MARTA applied for more planning funds for two purposes. The first was to have an outside consulting firm (Voorhees) "reappraise, objectively, the efforts to date, evaluate the technical progress to date, and determine what additional work should be done at the technical and policy levels to assure public acceptance of the rapid transit program."[23] Thus, this outside review of MARTA could be used as proof that MARTA had been objective and self-critical. The technical review would settle the "modal prejudice" debate, and provide expert opinion on ways in which the plan could be improved.

The second function of the proposed review was to have the Voorhees firm look for a suitable superagency in which all transportation agencies could coordinate their work and obtain federal money; the consultant was directed to undertake a "thorough evaluation of the relationship between the rapid transit plans and the area transportation study." [24] The consultant would determine the present condition of the AATS, and evaluate "administrative and technical procedures currently used for Atlanta area transportation planning." [25] Finally, the firm was to recommend an organizational proposal, which would be presented to the Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments, which exists under the auspices of ARMPC. It is important to note that the MARTA proposal made at this time proposed utilizing ARMPC as the agency for coordinative planning, at least informally.

Toward the end of 1967, MARTA approached the Highway Department, and offered to work together, noting its contract with Voorhees to propose a working arrangement. By January, the AATS had been chosen as the agency that would make final decisions in the creation of a comprehensive plan. A Transportation Policy Committee was created comprised of the 15 public and private transportation officials who could allocate funds to transportation projects. In October, MARTA had planned to allocate $25,000 to the Voorhees project.[26] Six months later, under a contract written by the AATS, MARTA was contributing $125,000, which was only half the total. In short, it seems that the function of the Voorhees review of MARTA's plan

changed greatly in scope in this six-month period. It became evident over the summer that the Voorhees study of the MARTA system was so intensive that it would not be completed by the November election, as originally planned in the previous October's proposal.

The critical question that remains is why did MARTA insist upon taking the 40.3 mile PBTB rail system to the voters in November, when it was obvious that the Voorhees study was by no means going to be a rubber stamp, and that the official MARTA plan would not even be known until Voorhees reported back in April, 1969? The best explanation lies in the sense of urgency felt by the men who had fought for so long to present a transit plan to the voters. Since Governor Vandiver's conference, it had taken over six years to create the Authority and work out professional engineering plans. The plan, which was largely finished in October of 1967, was not to be submitted until November of 1968 in order to make sure that the details (particularly the inflationary contingencies) were properly worked out. Having waited this long, MARTA officials felt they had to make the presentation to the voters. Furthermore, it was clearly stated in the MARTA contract that the plan could be altered if all parties agreed, so the AATS plan was assured of implementation anyway.

Thus, the plan which was created "according to the books" was never to be implemented, although much of the corridor study work of the agency is as applicable to the bus/rail

scheme recommended by Voorhees as to the all-rail MARTA proposal. The important question here is why did MARTA's initial planning arm, ARMPC, fail to carry out comprehensive planning? Originally, ARMPC seemed to be the optimal agency to gather data, to coordinate the work of many agencies and municipalities, to create a regional plan that was comprehensive, in terms of both coordinating transportation investments and inclusion of land use planning. Indeed, federal money was originally channeled through ARMPC on the basis of its comprehensive planning abilities.

ARMPC's failure is rooted in its lack of power, for it has only the power to make recommendations to governmental bodies which may or may not choose to accept them. It can perform long-range planning that does not involve the actual commitment of funds. But existing agencies, such as highway departments, are hesitant to surrender their present powers of decision-making to other agencies. The successor planning body, AATS, was comprised of 14 representatives of governmental bodies which can expend funds to construct transportation projects, plus ARMPC which can expend funds only for study. With the transfer of planning to the AATS, Glenn Bennett resigned as Secretary of MARTA.

2. MARTA and the Politicians

MARTA's difficulties were not limited to those of actually putting together a rapid transit plan; it also met difficulty, and ultimately, defeat, in the task of gaining acceptance of its proposal by the citizens of the Atlanta region. One aspect of

this problem is seen in the somewhat estranged relations between MARTA and local political leaders. MARTA was originally the creation of business-oriented civic leaders and their allies in government. At its creation there was considerable optimism that this alliance would lead to widespread acceptance of the eventual proposal. Symbolic of this optimism was the fact that former Chamber of Commerce President and early rapid transit proponent, Ivan Allen, was elected Mayor of Atlanta at the time when MARTA's planning was beginning to get under way. But as MARTA's planning developed, the relationship between the Authority and local politicians deteriorated until, during the final campaign, few active political leaders seemed willing to attach themselves firmly to MARTA's bandwagon.

It was the intention of the men who drafted the MARTA enabling legislation that the governing board be non-political. The MARTA Act reads that "no person shall be appointed as a member of the Board who holds any other public office or public employment."[27] It was the hope of the legislation's drafters that having a Board made up of men who were not actively engaged in partisan politics would give the Board an image, and provide the actuality, of being above the petty politics and corruption often assumed to be a part of local politics. Such an image was felt to be particularly important in a project that was highly technical and involved large outlays of public funds. A Board of civic-minded community leaders was therefore created to set the policy guidelines and

make the final decisions on the engineers' recommendations. To quote its chairman, Richard Rich, "The MARTA Board is comprised of ten public-spirited citizens, not politicians, but businessmen who are concerned about the future of the area."[28]

While this theory of public administration has much to recommend it, it also has several drawbacks. A basic one is that it is an essentially undemocratic theory. Many individuals are reluctant to have appointed,rather than elected, officials making decisions of such major importance to their community. While the Board was not subject to political pressures, it was for the same reasons not accountable to the voters. Several criticisms of this sort were levelled at MARTA during the campaign, by groups and individuals representing a wide spectrum of political philosophies. A second, related, problem lay in the jealousy of other governmental bodies, especially those whose personnel were elected. These people also feared an aloof, "super-government," particularly one that did not include themselves. A third criticism was that private citizens are not necessarily any less likely to work for their own self-interest than politicians. At least some of those who opposed MARTA suggested that some conflicts of interest might exist for certain members of the Board.

It was hoped by MARTA's sponsors that much of this criticism would be dispelled by the close working relationship which existed between the Board and local political leaders at the time of the Authority's creation. It was the failure of this relationship, rather than any of the more basic criticisms of the Board's

structure, which cost MARTA so heavily on the day of the voting. Neither group is fully to blame for this failure; it was the result of misunderstandings shared by both groups.

MARTA approached the problem of developing a transit plan on a largely technical level. Its members did not see it as their function, and this was a reasonable interpretation of the enabling act, to fit their plans to the demands of local politics. It was never their intention to go to each locality and determine how best to maximize support for the system, either from the local elected officials or from the populace itself. Thus, as the engineers were preparing their proposals, little effort was made to consult with the Aldermen or other local officials to see whether there were any major political obstacles to the plan, even if it was technologically acceptable. One local government official told us, "Aldermen and county governments were not consulted enough during the planning stages. Many government officials felt as though MARTA had developed a plan to suit its own needs and then tried to cram it down their throats." Making the same point, another official said, "As it was, it was as if the Authority were working completely on its own, and the local governments were being kept in the dark." These officials also said that when MARTA did meet with government officials, it was more to tell them what had been done, rather than to ask their opinions of what should be done. Such a situation did not give the government officials any feeling of participation in the planning, a

feeling that might have made them more enthusiastic about campaigning for acceptance of the proposal. A few government officials, it seems apparent, were even alienated by this treatment and took positions less favorable to MARTA than had originally been the case.

MARTA officials, naturally, see the situation from a different perspective. They feel that local officials were not as cooperative as they could have been in helping MARTA. They feel that the politicians were not really interested in the engineering data presented them, and did not go to the trouble of considering it carefully enough to make worthwhile suggestions. Several of those we interviewed in MARTA also said that they detected a feeling among many politicians that rapid transit, and the higher taxes necessary to finance it, were not particularly popular with the voters, and that it might be politically wise to avoid too close an identification with such a program. In the opinion of one important planner, most local officials consciously decided to let MARTA go it alone and remain at a safe distance from the controversial activity. For many, it was politically astute to be "ignored" by MARTA.

In spite of the variations in specific interpretations of the questionable relationship between MARTA's ongoing planning and the local government leaders, there is agreement from all parties that the region's elected leaders should have had at the very least more of a feeling of having been represented in the actual decision-making of the plan. For when even the most technical of projects has its ultimate effect on people, and particularly when those people have to give final approval to the project, it is

important to keep open lines of communication with those affected. The elected officials seem one such important line of communication that could easily be assimilated into the planning procedure. One of those who drafted MARTA's enabling legislation emphasized to us that MARTA's greatest failure was not taking people in high places along with it as it worked out its plan.

The disinterested group of civic leaders, who were to watch over the creation of a workable and acceptable rapid transit proposal, suddenly found themselves conducting a political campaign for their proposal's acceptance with considerably less aid from experienced political leaders than had been originally envisioned. Their political inexperience--and some would say naivete--added another obstacle to MARTA's attempt to gain voter acceptance.

3. Community Representation and "The Power Structure"

The political end toward which MARTA was striving was the creation of a broad consensus of public support for its transit proposal. While the culmination of this effort, the pre-election campaign, is discussed in a later chapter of this report, the relationship between MARTA and the voting public, particularly the opinion leaders, during the planning phase played a major role in the polarization of opinion on the issue.

Active interest in the development of a mass transportation system for Atlanta was initiated and developed within a relatively small segment of the community. This segment, broadly referred to as composed of "civic leaders," is present in most communities, and

in most plays a leading role in community activities. In general these civic leaders are businessmen, political leaders, professional men, and, often, religious leaders. Such organizations as the Chamber of Commerce and the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and various Civic Associations, provide the vehicles for originating and planning these improvements. In Atlanta the civic leaders are reputed to play an even larger role than do their counterparts in other cities. While the image of a businessman-dominated "elite" dictating policies for Atlanta may have been exaggerated, it is true that such men have had great influence in the city's development. For a city which is becoming the commercial hub of one of the nation's fastest developing regions, it is not unusual that businessmen would be anxious to maintain an atmosphere which would encourage continued growth. It is with this goal in mind that Atlanta's civic leaders have pressed for development of the downtown area, have tried to consider the complaints of the black community in particular, and have worked for rapid transit.

In Atlanta, as has often been the case elsewhere, it is not only the original initiative for these projects, but most of their planning and their eventual implementation, that is carried out very largely by the same element of the community. While other groups are often considered in the planning, and occasionally even consulted, most of the decisions are made by the civic leaders and their political allies. MARTA and the rapid transit campaign followed very much in this traditional mold; but it did not meet with the acceptance which had usually accrued to earlier projects

of Atlanta's civic leaders. While the reasons for its defeat are many, some of which are discussed in other parts of this paper, one is related to new trends in American politics. Community participation has become a goal for many of those who have previously been largely left out of decision-making procedures. MARTA's response, or lack of response, to such pressures adds another element to the picture of the bond issue's defeat.

Over the previous decade Atlanta's "progressive" image had been maintained by a coalition of civic leaders, moderate politicians, and the city's black community.[29] This was not really a coalition as such; its components never met to plan strategy or even to agree on goals, but represented a conjunction of interests. The candidates for public office and the programs they supported, which represented the interests of business, were those least objectionable to the black community, so the blacks supported them since the alternatives were worse. While it seems likely that in several elections black support was decisive for these candidates' victories, there is little evidence that the winners took many significant positive steps to reward their black supporters.[30] By 1968, however, blacks in Atlanta, as in the rest of the country, were becoming more politically independent and appeared reluctant merely to follow the lead of the white progressives as they had in the past. Instead, they intended to play an active role in formulating issues and putting forth candidates. According to several of those whom we interviewed, the MARTA experience represented a significant turning point--a signal that the old coalition was breaking down.

By nearly all standards, the MARTA proposition was a progressive program which would be of considerable benefit to Atlanta's blacks, yet the blacks overwhelmingly opposed the bond proposition, and were instrumental in its defeat at the polls. Their refusal to take the word of a board of successful businessmen concerning what kind of transportation was best for their community may represent the end of black acceptance of white domination of the coalition.

The break came about not as the result of any particular callousness on the part of the MARTA Board regarding the black community. The Board acted as had similar boards in the past; what was different was the mood of the community with which it was dealing. The root of the problem seems to be that the members of the MARTA Board were not even aware of this new mood. As one observer noted, "MARTA failed to listen to the new drumbeat of the minorities."

The MARTA governing structure provides no forum for determining the community consensus in terms of goals and values to be served. The Board members were not chosen to represent a cross-section of the community, but rather to provide business expertise and command community respect. Thus it was never the function of the Board's one black man to report back to the black community, for he had been chosen more for his expertise as a successful banker than as a community spokesman. The same could be said of the other members of the Board in regard to the white community. This organizational structure not only limited feedback at the highest level, but the "professional" nature of MARTA planning also eliminated general community influence as the system was being planned. It was only

after the basic plans had been produced that the advice of the various communities was sought in public hearings required by the Act which established MARTA. By this time public response could at best only bring about modifications of the plan; its basic nature was too firmly established in the minds of its proposers to be drastically altered.

Several critics of MARTA suggested that the Authority's problems with the black community could have been alleviated somewhat by having black representatives on the Board who were more in touch with grassroots sentiments within that community. It is hard to believe, however, that any one or two individuals could satisfactorily represent such a diverse community. In addition, this pluralistic approach would require defining other communities and finding appropriate representation for them, a very difficult task which would counter the "non-political" nature of the Board. Even highly effective politicians are still uncertain of the veracity of the feedback they get from their constituents, unless they carry out intensive programs to survey opinion.

For an organization like MARTA, which does not have any built-in channel for public opinion but still has to get voter approval for its proposal, the need for developing an effective instrument for gauging or directing public opinion is of great importance, particularly during the planning period before a bond issue campaign and referendum are undertaken. MARTA did act early to establish a public information program; a public information director was appointed in August, 1966, and the first of a series of monthly newsletters was

released in October of that year, but several of those interviewed felt that MARTA did not put as much emphasis on this phase of its work as it should have.

The duty of the Public Information Director, as described in the first issue of "Rapid Transit Progress," the MARTA newsletter, was to be " responsible for the development and implementation of a complete public information and education program." He was to accomplish this task by publishing "Rapid Transit Progress," by maintaining liaison with the other news media, and by " developing other means of telling the Rapid Transit story, through displays, public meetings, speeches, trade shows, etc." As mentioned above, "Rapid Transit Progess" began publication within two months after the Public Relations Director was appointed, but in its distribution one can see (with adequate hindsight) a reflection of the major failing of the MARTA public information effort. Those who received the newsletter initially, and for most of its issues, were civic associations, major corporations, and public officials. Even the final, and largest mailing, was only sent to approximately 15,000 addressees. The general public had its first chance to see what rapid transit might actually entail, when a scale "walk-in" model of a prototype rapid transit vehicle was displayed at the Southeastern Fair, held in Atlanta in October, 1966. MARTA estimates that 350,000 people saw the car while it was in Atlanta, either at the Fair, or later, on display at several branches of a local department store. This was not the vehicle MARTA planned to use in its system. At the time of the display no decision had been made on

this matter, but the public was informed that MARTA's vehicle would be similarly forward-looking. As an isolated incident of publicity for MARTA the display was probably worthwhile; its biggest problem was that it was an isolated incident with little follow-up.

MARTA representatives also began a series of appearances before local civic organizations which were to last until election day. MARTA estimates that over 1000 speeches were made during this period. These speeches, usually accompanied by a slide presentation of MARTA's plans and of rapid transit developments elsewhere, were usually made at the request of the sponsoring organizations. The result of this is that the groups which requested the program were usually those favorably disposed to rapid transit initially, and little of the effect was felt by the mass of the citizens who were uncertain about the issue, or who were generally uninterested in such meetings.

The only time before the voting that the public had a chance to discuss the MARTA proposals directly with MARTA came, as noted earlier, in the public hearings required by the MARTA enabling act. Though the point has been made before, it is necessary to remember that these hearings were held to entertain comments on plans already drawn up by the consulting engineers; they were not to get the opinion of the public on basic routing or planning philosophies. A series of twelve hearings was held in late April and May, 1968, three of them in predominantly black districts. While these meetings were not particularly well-attended, ninety persons were present

at the first. Those present, usually political and civic leaders, expressed general support for MARTA's proposals. In some of the hearings, particularly those in black areas, some opposition was expressed to parts of MARTA's plans or to its organization. Most of the latter complaints were addressed to the " absence of Negro employees on the staff and the limited Negro representation on the Board."

MARTA representatives presided at these hearings, presenting MARTA's proposals and answering questions. Occasionally the original plans would be reconsidered, and sometimes modified, by MARTA in light of these hearings. The outstanding example of this procedure concerned what is referred to as the Buckhead Alternate. The original MARTA plan for the Northeast Line envisioned its construction along the right-of-way of the Southern Railway, but, under pressure from some local commercial interests, MARTA also considered placing a portion of the line slightly off the right-of-way to provide direct access to the Buckhead business district. At the public hearing in Lenox, in the area of the proposed Alternate, the MARTA representative noted that little interest had been originally expressed in the Alternate then under study; "...but since then we have learned of considerable feeling in opposition to this Alternate. When work on this subject progresses sufficiently,

we should go back for another formal hearing." This suggestion was followed through by MARTA, and a public hearing specifically on the matter was held on August 15. By this time the issue had become sufficiently confused so that it was now thought that MARTA was trying to force the Alternate on the community, while very much the opposite was true. MARTA estimates that one thousand people were present at the meeting, most of them voicing considerable opposition to the proposal, particularly in terms of damage to existing neighborhoods. At its September, 1968,meeting the MARTA Board rejected the Buckhead Alternate, noting that "this Authority was given the responsibility by the people of this area, and by their elected officials, to develop a proposal for a rapid transit system which will serve this area in the best manner at the lowest possible cost."

The district in which the Buckhead Alternate discussion was centered is located in the northeast part of the city, a predominantly white, upper middle-income area. While MARTA also reconsidered certain other proposals which were objected to during the hearings, such as a line serving the Perry Homes Model Cities project which was of great interest to the black community, the discussion never reached the level achieved during the Buckhead controversy, and no second hearing was held. Actually, MARTA authorized considerably more money for further study of the Perry Homes project than it did for the Buckhead Alternate, but the publicity emphasis was on the Buckhead matter. We cannot say whether this disparity was the result of different levels of community organization in the

two areas or was due to the fact that the MARTA Board was more alert to the objections of the community from which a good number of its members were drawn. But such instances undoubtedly contributed to the feeling in the black community that MARTA was primarily designed to serve the whites. The failure of blacks as a group to support the bond proposal came less from specific quarrels with the routes chosen, according to the black and white leaders we interviewed, and more from their irritation at having been ignored in the creation of a plan which would greatly influence their lives. Thus the blacks, as well as other groups estranged from the business leadership, were specifically rejecting a decision-making process which they could no longer find acceptable.

After the election, the view was widely held that there had been much too little community and local government involvement in the planning process. Objectively, there was probably a greater chance for involvement than most people believe to have been the case. And even if there had been more, it is unlikely that there would have been a significant difference in the final plan. But this argument misses the essential point. For in a proposal which must ultimately win voter approval to succeed, a critical inquiry must be how the voters see themselves in relation to the planning process. The sense of involvement which is imparted to various communities and interests in the area--including, as we shall see in Chapter V, the white working class and lower-middle-class who, like the blacks, largely opposed the bond issue--can be far more important than the actual effect of that involvement on the final plan. Especially

when dealing with groups that have been traditionally excluded from the decision-making process, the creation of a sense of involvement is vital to legitimize the substantive decision and establish some degree of favorable interest in the outcome.

B. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

In the previous sections of this chapter we have seen how the processes of planning the proposed rapid transit system for Atlanta in themselves helped create the atmosphere which led to the proposal's defeat at the polls. We will now look, more briefly, at the other cities of our study to see whether the same problems confronted them and how they acted to meet these and other difficulties.

The end of the Second World War was a time of major reassessment in many areas of American life. After 16 years of depression and war, the nation was emerging in excellent economic health. While the immediate goal was to transfer from a wartime to a peacetime economy without a new economic catastrophe, many people began to concern themselves about the future direction of the nation's growth. While planning, especially by governmental agencies, has not been popular in a country the mythology of which is firmly based on "rugged individualism," "consumer choice," and "free enterprise," it was increasingly realized that some planning would be necessary to prevent a chaotic future for the nation, particularly in its cities. While our current urban crises appear to indicate that the nation has forgotten its cities over the past several

decades, this appearance is not quite correct. For at least on certain levels of planning there has been considerable thought, and some action. The current problems may stem more from the emphasis of this planning, on material rather than human goals, than from its non-existence.

Transportation was one of the principal concerns of the planners. Even in the depression-dominated Thirties the automobile had achieved a central role in American life. With post-war prosperity came an even greater use of automobiles. Those who were concerning themselves with future developments were aware that the nation's road facilities were totally inadequate for the coming flood of cars. In an effort to meet this threat many cities and states undertook studies of transportation demands and facilities. While most of the early emphasis of these studies was on developing adequate highway facilities, in several it was noted that the solution to the transportation problem could not indefinitely be met by building more lanes of highway. These studies urged that alternate transportation means be developed to ease the burden on the roadways. In most, some form of urban mass transportation was seen as part of the solution.

San Francisco was the first of the cities in our study to focus on mass transit as an alternative to building more highways. To the south, in Los Angeles, civic leaders of San Francisco could see the problems of the nation's first autopolis, and they pledged that the same fate would not overcome their city. Within a year after the end of the war, civic leaders and city planners in San

Francisco and in outlying metropolitan communities were urging development of a mass transit system. The region's representatives in the legislature soon picked up the cause of mass transit. In 1947, the legislature held hearings on Bay Area transportation problems, and by 1949 had passed legislation which would permit the creation of a Rapid Transit District for the Bay Area. But they did not take the second step and actually create the District. Two more years passed before further legislative hearings on mass transportation were held. This time the hearings resulted in the creation of the Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission, which was authorized to make an in-depth study of the need for a rapid transit system and to develop a plan for such a system. The Commission was made up of representatives chosen by the region's constituent governments, both city and county, and several appointed by the Governor. Using its own consultants, but in cooperation with the local planning agencies, the Commission, in 1957, issued a report strongly recommending the construction of rapid transit facilities. In anticipation of this report, the legislature had earlier in the year implemented the enabling act and created the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD).

There are several forms in which an agency for administering a rapid transit system can be organized. Traditionally transit systems, particularly street cars and buses, have been run by private corporations, with some regulation by state public utilities commissions. Financial problems, however, have caused many of these

private corporations to go out of business, leaving local governments with the task of providing mass transportation. Perhaps the most common method of governmental operation of mass transit is by public authority. Authorities are public, non-profit corporations, established by the state legislature. They are usually administered by a board appointed by the governor. Authorities are generally financed by revenue bonds, which may or may not be issued and marketed without voter approval. But authorities do not have public credit, nor do they have the power of taxation, and thus are limited in the extent of the financial resources which they can raise for themselves. If they need funding for a major project, such as the construction of a new rapid transit system, they generally must work out a cooperative arrangement with their parent governments to arrange for the funds (unless, of course, they have revenues from tunnel, bridge, or other tolls). MARTA in Atlanta, and WMATA, in the District of Columbia, are examples of the "authority form" of organization.

A third form of organizational make-up is a hybrid of the public authority and the private corporation, in which the public authority is responsible for the construction of the system and sets general policy, but contracts with a private corporation for the actual day-to-day operation of the service.

Another common method of operating a rapid transit system is through the creation of a rapid transit district. Although both are creations of the state legislature, a district differs from an

authority in several ways. It is an independent governmental body, generally with functional rather than political boundaries. Its governing body is a board made up of representatives of the local governments (county and municipal) in the region to be served. As a governmental body, a district has such powers as taxation and eminent domain. While it still has to go before the public for approval of any general obligation bonds, it may not have to depend upon the local governments for this, as an authority generally does. The California agencies, BARTD and SCRTD, are examples of the "district form" of organization.

A form of organization similar to a district is a metropolitan government. While the ideal form of this governmental structure might have both geographical and functional aspects, replacing the earlier governmental bodies in its region, in its present form it is a combination of functional districts operating in a more or less coordinated fashion. Seattle's Metro is a good example of this form of organization.

BARTD initially consisted of five Bay Area counties, with its administrative board made up of four representatives from each county. These representatives are chosen by the county governing boards or by the governments of the major municipalities in the county. While the board members represent, on the whole, the same elements of the community as do the members of MARTA's board, they played a more active role as liaison with their home communities than was true in Atlanta. MARTA adopted a planning strategy which had its engineers develop a plan without much consultation with local authorities. By contrast, BARTD's engineers, who were independent consultants,

developed their plan in quite close cooperation with local governments. This difference is partly due to the fact that much of the initial support for rapid transit in San Francisco came from these governments, and partly also to the political consciousness of the members of BARTD's Board. Thus while BARTD's plan, like MARTA's, went through several different stages, the impression was one of evolutionary development of a single plan, rather than a competitive effort among several.

In the Los Angeles area, the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) was established in 1964 to develop a rapid transit system for that automobile-plagued region. While SCRTD is a comparatively recent development, planning for rapid transit had been going on in Los Angeles for almost as long as it had in San Francisco. In the years before the Second World War, Los Angeles had a non-grade-separated street railway rapid transit system. But the vast post-war increase in traffic hindered the line's operation so much as to make it go out of business. The complex urban structure of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, with many small commercial centers rather than a single central business district, has led most citizens to favor the flexibility of the private auto. This multi-centered structure has led to much cross-commuting, rather than to a traffic flow on several main corridors leading in and out of a central area. For this reason a massive freeway system, crisscrossing the area, was created for Los Angeles commuters. But like many other such metropolitan freeway networks, the road capacities were overloaded

almost before the roads were even opened to public use. Recognition of this fact led city leaders to search for other solutions to their transportation dilemma. In 1951, the state created the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) to plan and build a rapid transit system. This agency, however, was limited to the use of revenue bonds to finance construction and operation. Since this means of financing could not allow the accumulation of sufficient capital to undertake this task, the MTA never proceeded beyond the survey-planning stage. Realizing that some action was needed to get a transit system in operation, the state, in 1964, created the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD).

There are two major structural differences between BARTD and SCRTD. While BARTD covers a region consisting of several counties, SCRTD is located within one county. Therefore the representatives on the board are chosen by the governments of the municipalities within Los Angeles County. The second difference is concerned with the financial structure. While this will be discussed in detail later in this report, the basic factor is that BARTD is able to use property taxes to secure its bonds, but SCRTD was specifically denied this method of financing. The tax situation in California had developed, in the years between the creation of the two districts, in such a way as to make increased property taxes very unpopular with California voters. SCRTD, therefore, had to develop new tax sources to raise its revenue, finally adopting an increase in the sales and use tax.

SCRTD also differs from BARTD, and from MARTA, in the backgrounds of the men who make up its Board. Those who administer SCRTD have been described as "citizen-politicians," generally small businessmen and lawyers. They are often the "junior partners" of the type of men who make up the BARTD and MARTA boards. It was hoped that these men would be able to maintain a close contact with the municipalities to be served. Some critics, during the campaign, questioned whether those on the Board had the competence to administer a program of the size and complexity of SCRTD's, but they seemingly made a good try in planning to set up a system for a city that may not ever be right for rapid transit. The members attempted to work with local politicians and city-planners, but the municipal complexity of Los Angeles worked against them. In other areas, planners could work with relatively few governments--a few counties and one or two large cities--which covered their entire region, but in Los Angeles they had to deal with officials from a multiplicity of communities, few of them covering more than a small portion of the District. Since the planned system was capable of serving directly only a few of these communities, those not so served did not lend much support to SCRTD, and some openly criticized the planned routings.

Seattle's proposed rapid transit system is an outgrowth more of the development of an overall metropolitan government than of a long period of intensive effort toward solving specific transportation problems. In the early 1950's, a group of Seattle civic leaders, particularly James Ellis, a local lawyer, became aware that Seattle was entering a period of transition from a relatively

small city into a major regional metropolis. These leaders hoped to make this transition as orderly as possible, and to avoid many of the problems that were affecting the other developing metropolises. They decided that the best way to control the growth was to develop a metropolitan government that would include the city of Seattle and much of its surrounding area. After several years of developing support for the idea, Ellis and his associates convinced the state legislature to pass a bill (Ch. 213, Laws of 1957) allowing major cities and their neighboring regions to join together in a governmental body to solve certain joint problems, including sewage disposal, water supply, recreation, and transportation. The following year, voters in the Seattle-King County region approved the creation of a "Metro" for their area. This Metro possessed, however, only one function at the time of its creation, the coordination of sewage disposal plans. The enabling legislation, however, allowed voters to approve additional functions once the Metro was in operation. In 1962, an attempt to add rapid transit to Metro's responsibilities was rejected by the voters. A later act by the state legislature did allow all metropolitan organizations to undertake planning for such programs as rapid transit, even though such functions had not yet been approved by the voters. Under this authorization the planning staff of Metro hired consultants to develop, among other projects, a rapid transit plan for the city. With this background work, the Metro supporters in 1968 offered the Seattle-King County voters a much more ambitious

program. Entitled "Forward Thrust," the program consisted of thirteen items, each to be voted on separately, designed to improve municipal government. These programs ranged from the construction of new storm drains to construction of a mass transit system.

Most of the actual planning and campaigning for the program was done by "Forward Thrust," a non-governmental organization organized by Ellis and his supporters. This organization was designed to include representation from as many interest groups as possible in the Seattle area. By this strategy it was hoped that interests committed to specific projects would work together for the passage of the entire package. This approach did allow the use of a fully integrated design team, including architects, urban designers, and sociologists, in planning the various aspects of the program. This was the only city in our study to make extensive use of such a team; the others relied primarily on engineers for their planning. Thus the Seattle team, making use of social science surveying methods, gave more consideration to the social aspects of transportation planning than did the other cities. The existence of the Metro, whose planning staff was integrated into the Forward Thrust team, eased the problem of coordinating with local governments. Some difficulty arose, however, with the Puget Sound Governmental Conference. This organization consists of governments from the Puget Sound region of Washington State, an area far larger than that of the Seattle-King County Metro. The Conference has the responsibility for transportation planning over its entire jurisdiction, and resented somewhat the Forward

Thrust initiative. However, both organizations have retained the same firm of engineering consultants, thereby simplifying coordination problems.

The Washington (D.C.) Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) serves an area including the District of Columbia and surrounding counties in Virginia and Maryland, the only interstate area in our study. An additional complicating factor is the District of Columbia's lack of home rule. The District's citizens could not go to their own elected representatives to express their grievances, but had to rely on those elected by others, or their appointees. While this situation often resulted in considerable difficulty in planning for mass transit in the region, it has occasionally been surprisingly helpful.

It was on one of these occasions that planning for a rapid transit system for the region was initiated, when Congress, in 1952, authorized studies of the transportation problems of the District. This was the start of a thirteen-year period of studies and reports by such agencies as the National Capital Planning Commission, the National Regional Planning Council, the Congressional Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, and the National Capital Transportation Agency, interlaced occasionally with intensive debates in Congress. In 1965, Congress voted funds to create a "core" rapid transit system to serve the city of Washington. That legislation also laid the groundwork for the establishment of WMATA as a cooperative venture between the District and the governments of the neighboring states, counties, and cities.

Established in February, 1967, WMATA was organized as a compact between the District of Columbia, two Maryland counties (represented by the Washington Suburban Transit Commission), and two counties and two cities in Northern Virginia (represented by the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission). On the WMATA board, each of the representative bodies has two seats filled by its own members. WMATA is empowered to plan, finance, construct, and provide for the operation of a transit system for the entire National Capital Region. While the Authority is empowered to issue revenue bonds based on its predicted earnings, as a practical matter the funds needed to provide for the construction and other capital costs must be raised by the constituent governments. In the District itself the funds are provided directly by Congress, eliminating the need for voter approval of a bond issue. Funds for the "core" system were authorized by Congress in 1965; but a controversy over highway construction, which had virtually stopped in the District as a result of citizen protests, has caused the Appropriations Committee to withhold the construction funds from the WMATA. The suburban areas in Maryland and Virginia each proposed a bond issue in accordance with the general WMATA financing plan.

WMATA differs from MARTA in several respects. First, unlike both MARTA and most Authorities, WMATA Board members are not only named by its constituent bodies, but actually come from the ranks of those constituent bodies. This difference in structure is one

of the reasons why WMATA enjoyed a much closer relationship with its constituent governments than did MARTA. Second, much of the actual pressure, and some of the preliminary planning, for rapid transit development came from the suburban communities around Washington, while in the case of MARTA, the drive for rapid transit seems to have come mainly from the central city, with only limited enthusiasm in the outlying areas. Third, the individuals who made up the WMATA Board also differ from those on the MARTA Board. Instead of representing a local "establishment", they were much closer to the "citizen-politicians" of the SCRTD. In addition most were active in earlier transit planning, particularly in the effort to establish WMATA itself.

No one of the agencies just described appears to be ideal. Although none of them seems to have had the diversity and extent of difficulties which beset Atlanta, only two of them were successful in gaining public support at the polls, BARTD and WMATA. Both of these were products of long periods of study, but so were those that failed. BARTD and WMATA each represented different organizational structures and used different philosophies of selecting Board members, yet in other cities, agencies using similar structures were unsuccessful. One thing the two had in common was a closely cultivated relationship with the local governments and planning agencies. But Seattle, with its Metro government, was in an ideal situation in this respect, too, and yet it failed at the polls.

In other factors that affected the MARTA outcome, none of the other cities appears to provide an optimum solution. This is particularly true of the manner in which each of these agencies attempted to communicate with the voters, and specifically with important minority groups, during the planning process as well as in the final pre-voting campaign. In none of the other cities have we discovered evidence of the negative feelings on the part of the majority of the black community which Atlanta experienced, yet none of these cities made any significantly greater effort to reach this community than was made in Atlanta. In San Francisco, BARTD was conceived in a period of relative racial calm (the civil rights movement was still very much confined to the South), and race was never a major issue. After the initial bonds were approved, however, BARTD faced a challenge from the black community in Berkeley and met it successfully: the BARTD line through Berkeley was originally planned to be aerial; this line was to be built on a right-of-way which went between sections of the city which were primarily white and those which were predominantly black. Black leaders felt that an aerial line along this right-of-way would act as a physical barrier between the two communities, and opposed its construction, so to meet this objection BARTD and the City of Berkeley proposed a special election for Berkeley in which the

voters would be asked to approve an extra bond issue to finance the construction of a subway in place of the elevated line. This proposal was put before the Berkeley voters and was successful.

In Los Angeles, the proposed SCRTD system would have been of considerable benefit to the black communities which have largely been isolated since the demise of the street railways. Bus trips into the main areas of the metropolis from the black communities are often exceedingly inconvenient, to the extent that only those who are able to afford cars have reasonable access to the major job markets. While the SCRTD line did not offer perfect service to the black community, it did represent a considerable improvement over the existing situation. With this knowledge, the blacks of Los Angeles largely supported the SCRTD plan. It is interesting to note however, that another major minority group in the region, the Mexican-Americans, were largely opposed to the measure. And they gave much the same reasons as the blacks of Atlanta--lack of sufficient consultation and poor service--when discussing their opposition.

The District of Columbia has a very large black community, a community that was not completely in favor of the proposed WMATA mass transit plan. However, the District's peculiar political situation--its lack of home rule--rendered the voice of black protest virtually impotent. It was the voters of suburban Maryland and Virginia and the members of the Congressional District Committees whose voices determined the fate of WMATA, not the black (or white) residents of the District.

While Seattle does not have as extensive a minority community as do these other cities, those who were directing the Forward Thrust campaign did try to involve the minorities in their activities. In keeping with their strategy of trying to serve all groups with legitimate interests, the Forward Thrust planners kept in touch with black and other community leaders. Though there is some indication that this contact was carried out in a somewhat patronizing manner, the minorities generally favored the Forward Thrust plan since it served their best interests.

We have also been unable to find little of significance in the general public information programs, as distinct from the final pre-voting campaigns, in each of the cities. Here again, what seemed to work in one city was not sufficient in some of the others. Atlanta's public information efforts have been criticized as being too limited in scope and in the audience to which they were directed. Yet, none of the other cities seems to have had a significantly different approach. BARTD made a great effort to keep the public informed as the plans for the system were being developed. It directed a two-level campaign; one level, directed at the general public, was an effort to sell the general concept of rapid transit, emphasizing the difficulties the city would have in the future without it. The techniques used for this part of the campaign consisted largely of speakers at community groups, public displays, and distribution of a brochure featuring a map of the proposed system. The second level of the campaign was directed specifically at civic leaders, in an attempt to get the elite of the region behind BARTD. In this level of the campaign much the same general techniques

were used, but more intensively.

Since BARTD's experience was the first, and was also successful, other cities followed much the same formula. MARTA seemed to concentrate its attention on the elite, but did sponsor such activities as the display of a prototype rapid transit car at the Southeastern Fair and a local department store in an effort to engender support on the part of the general public. Hindsight has led to criticism of this effort as being too little, but we have found no evidence that a significantly greater effort was successfully made elsewhere. In fact, those behind Forward Thrust in Seattle attempted to outdo San Francisco in their publicity efforts. A concerted effort was made not only to keep community leaders informed of planning developments, but also to get them actively involved in working for the program. In addition, much effort was put into developing a large-scale publicity effort directed at the general public. To this end several brochures were printed and widely distributed, and speakers appeared before many community groups. This publicity program was aimed at building support for the whole sweep of Forward Thrust programs, so it is natural that different sections of the proposal received varying amounts of emphasis according to the interests of the speakers and the audiences. However, the rapid transit section was central to the whole program, and therefore was given considerable emphasis. Yet even this publicity did not help the rapid transit proposal when it came up for the vote.

The pre-campaign publicity program in Los Angeles, like most of the rest of its effort, was undistinguished by any originality.

Efforts were made to keep civic leaders informed as the planning progressed, especially through the Board members, but there was little organized effort to provide a continual flow of information to them. The effort to inform the general public was greatly hindered by a virtual blackout of news about the project in one of the city's two leading papers.

WMATA focused most of its public relations campaign, as well as its final campaign, on the suburban Maryland and Virginia areas where the voting on the bond issue would take place, although it also made some effort at communication with the residents of the District itself. Much of the activity in the suburban area was carried out by the regional transit agencies, whose representatives sit on the WMATA Board. These representatives have close ties to their communities, some of them being elected officials, and were interested in maintaining open lines of communication with the electorate. Public hearings were a major means of informing the public of WMATA proposals, and the officials made considerable use of these hearings for their feedback value in order to learn what the voters thought of the plans. In addition, speakers, displays, and news releases were used to keep up a stream of information on the progress of the plans. Since most of the community leaders were already committed to support WMATA, there was no special emphasis toward this group in the public relations effort.

In comparing the natures of the planning process in these four metropolitan regions with that in Atlanta, it seems apparent that no single element stands out as crucially important in the

passage or defeat of a rapid transit bond referendum. A basically similar pattern was followed in each of the cities, but there were differences in emphasis. Mistakes that seem to have been critical in one area seem not to have mattered in others. An intensive pre-campaign public relations effort would pay off well in one city, but would not make the difference in another. The lessons to be drawn from this part of the study, therefore, are basically general ones: good relations must be maintained with local government and planning agencies; local political leaders, minority groups, and the general public should be kept informed of the progress of the planning; and these groups should not only be kept informed, but their suggestions or criticisms should be considered and, if necessary, acted upon or at least, answered. Even if few in the general public pay much attention to these efforts while they are being carried out, they help build an image of a transit authority anxious to serve the people and help provide a good basis for meeting later criticism from possible opponents.

Chapter IV

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MASS TRANSIT

A. ATLANTA

An appreciation of the difficulties of funding a project as massive as rapid transit in Atlanta is central to an understanding of the history of transit in that city. The price tag on the system--approximately $750,000,000, exclusive of interest--was to be met by a combination of three main groups of contributors: the federal government, the state of Georgia, and the local governments involved.

Although Congress agreed in the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (49 U.S.C.A. § 1604) to pay up to two-thirds of the cost of new mass transit facilities and equipment in urban areas, appropriations for this purpose have been insufficient to meet the demand, and the financial planners for Atlanta had to calculate the federal contribution on the basis of an educated guess as to (1) how much money would actually be available for the whole country during the years of MARTA's construction, and (2) what share of this amount MARTA could expect to receive, given the similar demands of other cities throughout the country. Thus, rather than being able to assume that a certain statutory percentage of the overall expense would be met by federal grants, MARTA had to base the federal contribution on an estimate of what might be available. It is extremely hard to convince a voter that an educated guess can be taken as a firm commitment, and from this state of affairs stemmed many of the criticisms that MARTA had not done its financial homework. But since the

federal government was unable to pledge anything more definite, the guess was all there was to go on. As a guess, the amount chosen, 40% of total cost, was necessarily conservative, and it might well have turned out that the resultant local share of the cost, which was responsible for much of the voter opposition, had been significantly overstated.

Contributions from the State of Georgia were more predictable. The state had passed a referendum permitting the funding of part of a mass transit system from the state coffers. The legislature specifically approved state participation of up to 10% of the total cost of such a system, and the full amount of this share was expected to be available from the state.

The figures used for the federal and state contributions added up to about half of the estimated cost of constructing the proposed 40.3 mile MARTA system. This left approximately $377.6 million dollars to be supplied by the local governments. After Cobb County declined to participate, the MARTA plan had called for participation by the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, DeKalb County, Gwinnett County, and Clayton County. When it was decided to construct only the first 40 miles of the overall 64 mile system, it was thought that Gwinnett and Clayton Counties should not be expected to contribute to a system which would not even reach them. Hence the $377.6 million had to be raised by Atlanta, Fulton and DeKalb. (Whenever the system was expanded to its full length, the other counties would have been required to pay their portion of the cost of the full system, in effect

reducing the original proportions of the three main contributors.)

A scheme had to be devised to determine how this cost should be apportioned among the three local government units. For the purposes of the final plan, Atlanta was treated as a totally separate entity, although it is completely contained within the two counties. Thus any reference to Fulton or DeKalb in this discussion will be to the portion of those counties outside of the City of Atlanta.

The apportionment of cost attempted to follow the proportion of the benefits which each unit of government could expect to receive. Because no one measurable factor would reflect those benefits, the decision was made to use a combination of weighted factors. The key considerations originally proposed were (a) the relative intensity of usage of the system, (b) the relative capacity to pay, and (c) the relative economic development impact on each governmental unit. It was thought that each of these factors would be reflected in the respective figures for (a) population, (b) property tax digest, and (c) employment. Figures for these categories were available from the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission for 1965 and were projected through 1983. Not all of the factors were felt to be of equal importance, so it was determined that they should be weighted differently: population would have a weight of 1, property tax digest 2, and employment 3. Before the final contracts were submitted for local government approval, these factors were amended to include consideration of the amount of the actual physical system to be located in each unit.

When the individual governments got down to brass-tacks bargaining on the contracts with MARTA, this amended version gave way in turn to a detailed schedule of payments (from each governmental unit for each year over the entire period), based primarily upon growth projections during that period. This plan was considered an improvement because, rather than averaging a local government's ability to pay over the several decades and tying it to a set proportion which remained the same each year, the new plan matched a local unit's responsibility for cost with its relative use of the system for each year. The simplicity of a set percentage was thus sacrificed in light of the advisability of considering relative yearly use and ability to pay.

The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act provides two practical methods for local governments to provide funds to MARTA. Whichever of the two plans is chosen must be described in a contract which will be executed between the Authority and the participating governments. This contract may provide (1) that the governmental unit will itself issue bonds in order to meet the required payments to MARTA. These would be general obligation bonds. Or (2) the local unit may contract to pay for the services provided by MARTA by obligating itself to pay the principal, interest, and charges on bonds which MARTA itself would be authorized to issue. The latter arrangement would result in a local government's guaranteeing Authority bonds out of its tax revenues--the only way those bonds would be salable on the market. (See §§ 10 and 24 of Georgia Act No.78 (1965)).

The financial planners for MARTA, Hammer, Greene, Siler and Associates, Inc., of Atlanta, recommended a combination of the two types of bonds. They explained that authority bonds are normally required to pay as much as a half percent higher interest rate in order to sell, since they are not as directly secured by the property of the governmental unit. Hence they would be more costly, and should be used only when necessary. But the general obligation bonds, which would be less costly, are limited by state law such that the total bonded indebtedness of any governmental unit may not exceed 7% of the gross property digest in that unit. Although each of the units involved in MARTA has yet to reach its bond ceiling, it must be remembered that in a city of the size of Atlanta there are other expenditures than rapid transit which may require capital raised by selling bonds.

A further drawback to general obligation bonds is that they must be approved by the voters each time they are issued. In the case of Authority bonds, on the other hand, once the overall contract is approved by the voters, the bonds may be issued and guaranteed by new taxes without any further voter participation. Because general obligation transit bonds would have less chance of approval when proposed as an either/or situation than would Authority bonds which do not seem to compete so directly, and because,although somewhat more expensive, the Authority bond alternative was nonetheless available, the combination of the two was proposed.

The suggested combination was rejected by MARTA. Its members decided that the interest differential was insignificant in view of the obstacles in the way of each unit's issuing

general obligation bonds, so the Authority planned to issue the bonds itself on the strength of the local units' contracts to pay a certain sum each year. It was not stipulated in the contracts that they would be paid through a particular portion of the ad valorem property tax, for the local governments wanted to be free to use whatever new means for obtaining revenue appear over the next thirty years, and MARTA wanted to be able to accept local contributions from whatever ultimate source. Thus, also, MARTA would not be restricted in what funds it might require the local governments to use to meet their contracts, as is the case with some of the hospital funding in the city. MARTA would have had in effect a general claim on the resources of each participating government, on the basis of these contracts.

The financial planners also made recommendations for ways in which the local government units could meet their rapid transit expenses. Taxes of any kind are hard to raise in Georgia; urban areas have been trying for years to legislate new ways of obtaining revenue, but to date have been generally unsuccessful. The recommendation was for an increase in property taxes, which has several arguments in its favor, although it appears basically unpopular with voters. For one thing, property taxes in the Atlanta area have not begun to realize their potential for revenue production. Although they represent the largest single source of tax revenue in Atlanta, her property taxes are fifth from the bottom of the thirty-eight largest cities in the country judged on a per capita basis. The per capita property tax contribution

is only 74% of the median of those cities.[1] Furthermore, because the machinery for collecting a property tax already exists, no further legislation would be required to make it a satisfactory source of revenue for these projects. Another advantage of the property tax is that it is constantly growing as property in the urban areas becomes more valuable. There is no way to tell when the urban legislators will be successful in their fight for new taxing methods, and hence it is impossible to rely upon such methods for an imminent project, although the MARTA contracts made it possible to use alternate sources whenever they became available. In the legislative session just adjourned, proposals for a local-option sales tax were defeated, and it is not likely that before the 1970 census requires reapportionment the cities will have their way. If such new tax sources become available, they may well reduce the property tax obligation, but we must remember that rapid transit will not be the only expenditure they will be required to meet.

Although it is often mentioned that the property tax is regressive in that it affects the poor more seriously than the rich, it is important to note how much of the overall tax is paid not by the individual homeowner, but by the owners of commercial property--almost 80 per cent of the City of Atlanta's property tax income comes from such property, a significant portion of which is not residential. In any event, however desirable a less regressive tax may appear, there is probably very little prospect of obtaining such a tax in Atlanta in the near future.

MARTA, then, was to meet its rapid transit costs through a combination of contributions from the federal government, the state, and the city and two participating counties. The local units were expected to fulfill their obligations through an increase in the ad valorem property tax, or other sources if they became available. That tax income would be used to pay the expenses of bonds issued by MARTA.

As required by the MARTA Act, the voters of each of the local units had to approve the contracts which they were to enter into with the Authority. (See Appendix). Those contracts as described on the ballot included the total cost of the project to each political unit--including prospective interest on the bonds which were expected to be issued. According to MARTA officials, such a requirement is unique in all the country to MARTA. It meant that the local governments' contribution appeared not as the $377,600,000 of the construction cost which they were going to have to meet, but as a total of $993,032,000, proportional amounts of which appeared on the ballots of each of the three governmental units. The requirement is not without its advantages, for it does in fact indicate the true figure of the overall obligation of the city and counties for repayment of principal and interest. But it is misleading when it is compared with other "bond approval" votes, which list only the principal of the bonds involved. The difference stems in part no doubt from the nature of the referendum: this was not a "bond approval" vote, but the approval of a contract which would be expected to result in bond issues. Hence the

entire amount of the contract was the focus of the vote. This description--with its higher monetary totals--must have had an effect on the outcome of the election.

B. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

How could MARTA have handled its finances differently? One of the major obstacles, the lack of a firm federal commitment, was, and remains, out of the hands of the people involved with MARTA. There was little quarrel with the state contribution, although a limit of 10% had been considered by transit enthusiasts an adequate minimum and not a ceiling. The area which calls most for improvement is that of the local funding.

The division of the cost among the participants is necessarily a fairly arbitrary determination. The factors considered by MARTA seem fair enough, given the available information which had to be the basis of any division. The Washington Metro also was required to divide the cost among participating governments, it used a weighted factors approach. Metro based its apportionment on (1) construction cost within the particular unit, (2) mileage and number of stations in the area, (3) projected relative ridership for 1990, and (4) projected relative population for the area for 1990. These factors were given a respective 40-30-15-15 weighting. The figures were "fixed" to some degree because the cost of the construction in the central employment area (Washington itself) was deliberately distributed among the other units. Perhaps the Metro plan has advantages over MARTA's original scheme, for it does not attempt to measure the "relative

economic development impact", based on employment. That figure may be too hard to determine, since no one can be sure of what changes may be wrought in just that area by rapid transit.

Given some method of allocation, however, (and all units seem to appreciate that this is necessarily an arbitrary figure, educated though the guess may be) the means by which the local governments are to meet their obligations demonstrate the most room for improvement. Los Angeles, faced with the prospect of the same voter rejection of property tax increases, considered alternatives of a 1/2 % increase in the sales tax, a gasoline sales tax, and a 1% "in lieu" tax on motor vehicles. The sales tax was finally authorized by the California legislature as a means of meeting the costs of the general obligation bonds required to build the system. The Governor of Georgia, who has not been particularly aggressive on the matter of rapid transit for Atlanta, has stated that he would approve a 1/2% local option sales tax if it were specifically earmarked for rapid transit. Although the returns from such a tax would meet only a small portion of the costs of the MARTA system, they would be a help. There is rural opposition to such a tax, however.

Nothing has been said about the use of revenues from the system to meet the cost of construction bonds, because revenues are not expected substantially to exceed operating costs. In Washington, however, approximately one-third of the cost is expected to be met in this fashion. The individual governments involved

in Metro plan to meet their obligations through the issuance of general obligation bonds, and Virginia is currently considering the establishment of a transit district with the ability to issue such bonds and levy taxes to meet the expenses.

The expenses of San Francisco's rapid transit system are also being met through a combination of federal, state, and local sources. The federal government contributed $6 million for a demonstration project in the area, and has since supplied $52.3 million for the system. A request has been made for an additional $25 million of federal funds. The state itself has helped in several ways. It pledged the tolls from the Bay Bridge to pay the costs of the tube which is being built under San Francisco Bay. An original estimate of $180 million as the state's contribution to the BARTD system has proved insufficient, and additional state funds have been requested in the amount of $150 million. The local portion of the funds for the entire system has been raised by bond issues. The primary source for repaying these general obligation bonds is the ad valorem property tax. The bonds themselves must be approved by the county boards of supervisers and by 3/5 of the voters in San Francisco. However, BARTD differs from the other systems in that it has the power to levy the property taxes to meet the bond costs itself, after approval of the taxes by the voters. Giving a District such powers may be viewed as a "selective consolidation" of the numerous local governments for the purpose of cooperative transit planning. A BARTD bond issue in 1962 of $792 million was backed

by a levy of a 17 mill ad valorem tax. Another method of funding available to BARTD is the issuance of revenue bonds for construction and purchase of rolling stock, since revenues are expected to cover, with a surplus, the operating costs of the system. This is advantageous since revenue bonds do not require voter approval as general obligation bonds do. So far these bonds have been used only for purchase of rolling stock. Finally, BARTD may issue "special assessment" bonds when necessary--it has not done this yet.

Seattle transit experts were optimistic about the prospect of federal aid, and counted on its covering two-thirds of the cost of their $1.15 billion proposed system. The $385 million which remained to be paid by the Seattle Metropolitan Municipality was expected to be raised by the issuance of general obligation bonds to be retired over a forty year period through an increase in the property tax. Revenues from the Seattle system were not expected to exceed operating costs. The Washington State legislature gave local governments the option of adding a surcharge of up to $1 per month per household to utility bills to repay their obligations on the transit bonds; Tacoma has added 50¢ to its bills, and Seattle could follow suit. The state has also provided that public transit agencies need not pay state gasoline taxes, and this will help reduce costs for the Seattle system. Alternatives to the property tax suggestion included the taxing of the increased value of property in the vicinity of stations. The theory behind this tax was that since this

increase is a direct result of the transit construction, and not of any act by the landowner, such a tax would leave owners in no worse condition than before construction began.

One definite conclusion which can be drawn from a study of all of these systems is that federal funds for transit are a necessity. And they must be firmly committed, for a project cannot be allowed to stand in mid-construction while appropriations are being debated.

It is harder to determine the implications of the local funding experiences. It does appear,first, that the more options there are for raising money, the more money will be raised. Second, providing a number of different local sources of revenue, moreover, allows certain expenses to be met through certain particular sources. Although this may have little strictly logical distinction from a plan whereby a total figure is given for the whole project, the "matching" of expenditures and sources, as with the San Francisco Bay Bridge and tube, may have greater voter appeal when the entire funding is complete. Third, the ability of the Transit District itself to levy a property tax, as in San Francisco, may make it easier to increase the ad valorem rates, but it must be remembered that the bond issue which necessitates these funds must be approved by the voters, just as it would be in Atlanta. Hence any improvement would come only where the bond issue had been approved but the local government was recalcitrant about raising the taxes to meet the cost. Fourth, the availability of other types of bonds would be helpful where obstacles to any one kind exist--thus

the use of revenue bonds, where there would be excess revenue, to purchase rolling stock in San Francisco was helpful since the original general obligation bonds had proved insufficient for that purpose, and revenue bonds require no voter approval. Fifth, the use of the sales tax, as proposed in Los Angeles, would be feasible in a city such as Atlanta where the sales tax is presently only 3%. Although it would not meet the entire cost of the system, it would be a substantial help, and it would redistribute the proportion of the overall tax structure which the ad valorem taxes now bear in that city. The property tax itself, however, is not an undesirable source of funds for this sort of project, and perhaps if citizens are educated as to the potential revenue of the property taxes in a city like Atlanta, they will be more agreeable to its use. Other taxes which have been suggested there include the payroll tax, gasoline taxes, and hotel and motel taxes.

In summary, a strong federal commitment, maximum state participation, and the existence of diversified means for local governmental units to meet their obligations appear to be necessary for any feasible funding of massive transit projects.

Chapter V

CAMPAIGN AND REFERENDUM

This chapter describes and analyzes the campaigns which preceded the referenda on transit in each area under study, and attempts to relate various facets of the campaigns to the referenda results in each case. We shall first treat Atlanta, and then discuss comparisons and contrasts with the other areas.

There will be some overlap with earlier chapters dealing with the planning process and the agencies and actors, although we have tried to keep the formal campaign period as separate as possible from the continuous public information programs which preceded them. Obviously such a separation is somewhat artificial, and there are times when our analysis of the one blends with our analysis of the other.

It is worth emphasizing at this point that our discussion of the referenda results is limited both by our own training--which is largely in the study of law--and by a notable dearth of general research materials on non-candidate elections. Where there have been specific studies of the transit referenda--as there have been in Seattle, Los Angeles, and San Francisco--we have relied rather heavily on them.[1]

A. ATLANTA

In this part of the chapter we will examine various aspects of the Atlanta campaign, seeking to assess the effects on the referendum outcome of such factors as the public information program, the length of the formal campaign, the various groups opposing the plan, and the absence of key support from various political leaders.

As described in greater detail in Chapter II, above, the 1968 MARTA referendum was not the first time that the people of the Atlanta area had been confronted with the issue of rapid transit, for the idea has generated much interest and controversy for almost a decade. The concept of rapid transit in Atlanta first aroused widespread interest in 1959 when the Atlanta Metropolitan Planning Commission suggested in a study report on transportation in the area that a rapid transit system was the only long-range solution to the city's growing traffic congestion problem. In 1961 and 1965 major referenda were held to obtain voter approval of a constitutional amendment making rapid transit a legitimate state function. After the passage of the amendment, referenda were held in each of the jurisdictions involved to obtain approval for each government unit's association with MARTA, and state funds were later pledged to the Authority. As MARTA officials discovered, however, an acquaintance with the concept of rapid transit is no guarantee of approval of a transit system.

In discussing the efforts made to build public support for the bond issue, one must distinguish between 1) the public

information function of MARTA and 2) the formal political campaign, which was conducted by professional political consultants and financed through private contributions.

The formal political campaign for the system was preceded by an extensive public information program, which began in 1966 when MARTA hired a Public Information Director. As described in Chapter III, this phase of creating public support for rapid transit included the following:

(1) publication of a periodic newsletter, "Rapid Transit Progress", which reported MARTA's activities and the development of the system plan. The newsletter was originally mailed to local corporations, merchants, chambers of commerce, and public officials. Circulation was gradually expanded so that the final edition before the referendum had a distribution of about 15,000.

(2) providing speakers for organized groups who expressed an interest in MARTA activities. On such occasions, slides of rapid transit systems in other cities as well as of the developing plans for the Atlanta system were shown. Between November, 1966, and November, 1968, over 1000 speeches were made, primarily to local civic and church organizations. These groups were relatively socially and economically homogeneous, however, and did not represent a cross-section of the voters.

(3) special projects, which included the display of a San Francisco-type rapid transit car mock-up at the 1967 Southeastern Fair and at metropolitan area shopping centers. It is

estimated that over 1/2 million people in the Atlanta area visited the display. MARTA also organized a trip for some 96 Atlanta area businessmen, public officials, and civic leaders to view (at their own expense) the rapid transit facilities in Toronto and Montreal.

(4) conducting the public hearings which were required by the enabling legislation to be held in each of the five jurisdictions involved. Some 14 hearings were conducted at each of which the proposed routing of the system through the given jurisdiction was discussed and MARTA representatives were questioned about the Authority's planning functions and activities.

(5) sponsoring two major public transportation conventions in Atlanta--the Institute for Rapid Transit in May, 1968, and the American Transit Association in October, 1968.

(6) preparation and issuance of press releases and two annual reports on MARTA's activities.

The actual political campaign for approval of the bond issue lasted only three weeks. The brevity of the campaign was the result of 1) a decision by MARTA officials, made late in the planning process, to undertake a complete recomputation of the capital cost and funding expenses of the proposed system, and 2) subsequent difficulties in reaching agreement on the terms of contracts between MARTA and the three jurisdictions involved in the referendum. As early as the previous November, the proposal for putting the question on the 1968 general election ballot

had been made. Announcement of the final plan had been scheduled for the spring of 1968, and the campaign was to have begun at that time, culminating in the November, 1968, referendum. Although the physical plan had been substantially completed by the scheduled date, the MARTA board became aware of the financial difficulties which San Francisco was having because BARTD had underestimated the extent of inflation in computing the capital cost of its system. In order to avoid a similar situation, the MARTA board decided to recalculate the entire cost of the proposed plan, increasing the estimated annual rate of inflation from 3% to 7% and providing adequate allowances for contingencies. They hoped this would prevent having to return to the voters for approval of additional funds halfway through construction. The new estimates were not completed until the latter part of the summer.

MARTA then had to negotiate with the political leaders of the jurisdictions involved to determine what percentage of the total system's cost would be allocated to each government and to reach agreement on the final contract terms. All political, financial, and legal problems were resolved just in time for MARTA to meet the October 5 deadline for filing its request for a referendum in the November general election. This left exactly one month to prepare, launch, and execute the campaign.

Many question the wisdom of MARTA's decision on the timing of the referendum. Evidently, MARTA's political advisors were evenly divided at the time as to whether to put the question before the voters in the general election, or to call a special

election in the spring of 1969 after the publication of the Atlanta Area Transportation Study scheduled for April. Some argued that the chances of success would be enhanced by holding the referendum in conjunction with the presidential election, since more voters would be drawn to the polls--especially larger numbers of the poor and disadvantaged who, it was thought, would benefit most from the proposed system. It was also believed that, should strong opposition to the plan develop, the opposition's efforts to attract negatively-inclined voters to the polls would have less of an impact on the outcome if held in conjunction with the general election, when a more balanced electorate would be likely to turn out. Proponents of a special election, on the other hand, reasoned that the presidential campaign would divert attention from the rapid transit question, thus weakening the effect of the transit campaign and preventing the issue from receiving adequate consideration by the electorate. They believed the referendum should be held at a time when voter attention would be focused solely on the transit bond issue.

In early 1968, the MARTA board decided to place the question on the November ballot in the belief that it would be a relatively calm political year. There was no way to foresee the political storm which followed--President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election, the King and Kennedy assassinations, the imposition of a federal income tax surtax, and the rise of George Wallace. There is no way for us to assess the impact of these events on Atlanta voters' views on transportation, although one observer of

the election made the obvious but still important point that "less attention was consequently paid to the MARTA issue."

Helen Bullard & Associates, a consulting firm which had handled many major political campaigns in the city and throughout the state, was retained to conduct the MARTA campaign. Gerald Rafshoon, a local advertising agent, was hired for media advertising. Because MARTA was a state authority, it could not appropriate any of its funds for actual campaign expenses. A citizens' committee, which called itself "Rapid Transit Now!", solicited funds to be used towards campaign expenses. A total of $100,000 was collected, primarily from retail merchants in the downtown business district. This sum was sufficient to cover the costs incurred in the three-week campaign.

Miss Bullard rented a large streetfront store at the junction of two major streets in downtown Atlanta for a MARTA headquarters. It was staffed with paid secretaries and volunteer workers who distributed rapid transit literature, balloons, and bumper stickers. Because of the time factor, only one major piece of official literature was prepared and distributed. This brochure gave answers to the most frequently asked questions about rapid transit and the Atlanta system. It also included a map of the proposed rail corridors and routes for the 1400-mile feeder bus system. About 200,000 copies of this brochure were printed in the middle of October, but the time factor prevented their systematic distribution in the manner MARTA desired. Campaign officials had hoped to place a copy of the brochure in the home of every registered

voter by election day. Instead, they had to settle for volunteer distribution on street corners, in buses, at shopping centers, and through local area schools.

The Rafshoon Agency's approach to selling rapid transit was to sell it like any advertised commodity: they tried to stress the attractiveness and convenience of the system while avoiding a discussion of "technicalities." Their advertising campaign was directed at the 40% or so of the electorate which survey research polls had indicated did not have firm positions on the bond issue at the start of the campaign. Because of the time factor, media advertising did not attempt to respond to charges put forth by the opposition. Advertising was limited to television and radio spots which stressed the convenience and safety of rapid transit as opposed to the frustrations, inconvenience, and high risk of highway traffic accidents associated with Atlanta's congested expressways. Longer segments of air time were purchased for programs in which the system's proponents discussed the recommended plan and answered viewer questions. Local television and radio stations also sponsored public service programs about the bond referendum, thus giving MARTA officials opportunities to present the plan and argue for its acceptance. It may have been unwise for MARTA to have taken advantage of these free opportunities, however, because the system's opponents demanded and received free "equal time" to air their criticisms of the plan. This gave the plan's critics valuable exposure which they otherwise would not have had, thereby strengthening their position with the voters.

In retrospect, it appears that an information-oriented media advertising campaign might have been more successful. Many voters had legitimate questions about the proposed system, but instead of having them answered, they were deluged with ads urging rapid transit adoption for attractive yet simplistic reasons. People received more propaganda about the system than they did concrete information with which to make an intelligent judgment. Little mention was made of alternative systems which had been considered by MARTA prior to the adoption of the recommended plan. Thus, many people could not understand why seemingly more attractive alternatives had not been adopted to decrease costs and provide more efficient service. Some felt the plan should have utilized existing railroad tracks which radiated outward from the central city rather than constructing new tracks. Others believed busways were the answer. MARTA's apparent reluctance to defend its choice over possible alternatives left many with the impression that the proposed system had not been sufficiently well planned--an impression the opponents of the plan utilized to their political advantage. Perhaps this failure to discuss alternative systems was not the failure of the political campaign as much as of the preceding public information program. MARTA officials probably should have made a greater effort to educate the general public about rapid transit during the planning process; as various plans were considered and rejected as being infeasible, the public should have been informed why such plans would not provide a viable system for the Atlanta area. Thus, many of

the fundamental questions asked about rapid transit and alternative systems would have been answered before the political campaign even commenced. As one individual involved with the MARTA campaign said, "To get people who are unfamiliar with rapid transit to approve it, you need to conduct a two or three-year drama as the system is being planned."

Many voters received the impression that the plan was poorly prepared when,during the campaign, MARTA officials admitted they had not worked out certain details about the system. Such details as parking fees at suburban transit stations and routes for the 1400-mile feeder bus system were perhaps secondary to the technical planning of a complex transit system, but it was essential for voters to know these details if they were to be able to understand exactly what service the proposed system would offer them. Some of the electorate, it can be assumed, determined how to vote on the issue by weighing the cost of the system to them through increased ad valorem taxes against the increased convenience to them through either use of the system itself or reduced expressway congestion. The absence of necessary details prevented adequate weighing of these considerations. Some voters, especially in the black community, were not even made aware of the fact that feeder buses would be a part of the transit system. They consequently concluded that if a transit station were not to be located within walking distance of their homes and they had no automobiles to drive to the station, they would not be able to utilize the system.

Many of those interviewed about the failure of the MARTA campaign felt that the brevity of the campaign was perhaps a crucial factor in the defeat of the proposal, especially given the general ineffectiveness of the earlier public information effort. But this feeling is not unanimous. At least one person actively involved in the campaign told us that "the time was not determinative." Opinion was so divided on this issue that a few individuals stated that they felt that the shortness of the campaign was to MARTA's benefit. A longer campaign, they felt, would have allowed the opposition to consolidate and give MARTA an even more decisive defeat than the one it actually suffered.

The opposition to the MARTA proposal was not well organized during the campaign. As mentioned in Chapter III, it was led by Everett Millican, a highly respected Atlanta alderman. (Although it was pointed out in the press and elsewhere during the campaign that Mr. Millican was the retired executive of a major oil company, his opposition to the proposed mass transit plan appears to have been based on relatively objective factors.) He originally opposed placing the question on the general election ballot before the results of the Atlanta Area Transportation Study were published, and later challenged what he claimed to be the "exorbitant" cost of the proposed system and the failure of MARTA to consider more attractive alternatives. In Mr. Millican's opinion, the massive cost of the proposed system, and the unanswered questions about the plan, had led "half the businessmen" in Atlanta to oppose the system privately. He was not opposed to public transportation expenditures, he explained, but this was "a grand old scheme that we cannot afford." As noted above, it was Millican's resolution, as an

alderman, which asked MARTA to make a full study of the role of alternative technologies. He also emphasized the fact that MARTA had no firm commitment from the federal government for its share of the system costs, thus implying that even if the bond issue were successful, there was no positive assurance that the total system would ever be constructed. This opponent made several well-publicized appearances before civic clubs and on television to discuss his position. During the final days of the campaign, he purchased advertising at his own expense to urge the voters to defeat the MARTA plan.

Various members of the local John Birch Society who had been expressing concern over rapid transit since 1965 supported the alderman's challenge, although the Society itself took no stand on the issue. The organization previously had opposed the creation of MARTA and other authorities like it on the ground that they were not directly responsible to the people.

Governor Lester Maddox was also a frequent critic of the proposed plan, primarily because of the costs involved. In a series of television confrontations with MARTA officials, he questioned the accuracy of the cost estimates for the system and urged that the plan be tabled until more accurate estimates could be obtained. He also contended that a more modern type of system, such as a monorail, should have been selected so that it would not become obsolete soon after construction.

As discussed briefly in Chapter III, widespread active opposition to the proposal was most evident in the city's black community. The effectiveness of this opposition is apparent, since the MARTA proposal was defeated in all of the predominantly black precincts. This result surprised those who were running the MARTA campaign. They had expected black support for the project, because,

in the words of one of them, "The Negroes would have profited most and paid the least for the system." This view was not shared by many in the black community who felt that MARTA was meant primarily to serve the white business interests. They noted that there were few stations easily accessible to the black community, and that most blacks live in the central city and are adequately served by buses already. Black critics also noted that the large new Model Cities housing project, Perry Homes, was not to be served by a MARTA line, though several black leaders acknowledged in interviews that they realized that such a line would not be financially feasible.

Opposition in the black community came initially from the small, militant Metropolitan Atlanta Summit Leadership Congress, but the prodding of this group, who urged a vote against rapid transit as a sign that the black community could no longer be taken for granted by the city's white "power structure," caused the larger more moderate Metropolitan Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference also to oppose MARTA. It is interesting to note that the Conference supported the successful school bond issue, which the Congress opposed, but that both black groups were united in opposition to MARTA. One of the grievances of the blacks was that they had not been adequately consulted in the planning process, as described more fully in Chapter III. That this feeling of being ignored by the MARTA planners was not without its basis in fact can be illustrated by the fact that it was not until the last week of the campaign that a black "community relations representative" and a

black secretary for the MARTA office were hired, and that these were the first members of the staff to be dismissed after the defeat.

With some important exceptions, city and county officials generally did not campaign in favor of the transit proposal. Since the proposal was very controversial, many refused to speak out for the plan although they basically agreed with it. As indicated in Chapter III, this reluctance to campaign may have resulted from a failure on MARTA's part to educate local officials about rapid transit and to cultivate a close working relationship with them while the system was being developed.

Some observers believe that had a few key political leaders, including Mayor Ivan Allen, come out more strongly for the plan, the vote would have been substantially reversed. The Rapid Transit Now! citizens committee chose as its head former Governor Carl Sanders, who made himself available for all engagements that could be scheduled during the three-week campaign. Although Mr. Sanders' leadership lent additional prestige to the group, he had no actual political organization and, as is the case with any former governor in any state, he was not without his share of political enemies.

Rapid transit was easily the most publicized issue to come before Atlanta voters in recent years. The plan received the strong endorsement of Atlanta's two major newspapers, the Journal and the Constitution. Both did a comprehensive job of reporting MARTA activities during the planning stages and both published editorials urging voter approval of the transit system. During

the campaign they printed several full-page articles discussing the plan and the criticisms raised by those opposing it. The Northside News, an ultra-conservative paper in the northern residential district, was very critical of the plan and of MARTA itself. Also, at least one local Negro paper, the Atlanta Inquirer, opposed the bond issue in several editorials.

The MARTA question was the last item on a general election ballot containing 118 different issues for voter consideration. There were 33 elections for political office, 83 proposed amendments to the Georgia constitution, and 2 special elections--a water flouridation referendum which passed, and the rapid transit referendum. There is disagreement as to the effect on the outcome of the question's position on the ballot. Some argue that the ballot placement had an adverse effect on the election result because of the high attrition rate of those voting in the presidential election who did not reach the transit issue. Based on a spot check of precincts it appears that this attrition rate ran well over 50% in many predominantly black districts, while it fell to around 5% in many white sections of the city. Those blacks who did vote on the issue, however, overwhelmingly opposed it. It is believed that this relatively high rate in some areas was due largely to persons' voting a straight party ticket and disregarding other ballot questions. Others argue that it was advantageous to have the referendum as the last ballot item since the issue's proponents were able to instruct their supporters to move to the end of the

ballot and vote "yes" on the last question. It is equally clear, however, that MARTA's opponents were able to instruct their followers to cast a negative vote in the same manner. Apparently voters heeded such instructions, because the vote on the referendum was generally heavier than on the constitutional amendments preceding it.

The rapid transit question as it appeared on the ballot asked the voter whether the jurisdiction in which he resided should execute a contract obligating it to pay MARTA an aggregate amount not to exceed a specified sum over a 35-year period. Prior to the election, a newspaper poll of 460 area residents indicated that 63% of those polled favored rapid transit; however, this poll was far off the mark as recorded in the actual outcome, possibly because the poll question did not include the cost of the system while the ballot did.

On election day Atlanta-area voters defeated the MARTA proposal: the transit issue received only a 42.8% affirmative vote, whereas over 50% in each voting locality was required for adoption of the contracts. The referendum results were as follows:

Jurisdiction	For	Against
City of Atlanta	38,675	53,660
Fulton County (excluding Atlanta)	14,619	25,871
DeKalb County (excluding Atlanta)	32,568	35,397
TOTALS	85,862	114,928

With a few aberrant exceptions, the only wards in the city of Atlanta where the proposal was successful are located in the

northern residential area and are comprised primarily of upper-middle-class whites. It is probable that these voters could most easily identify with the members of the MARTA board and those publicly supporting the system. It also appears that some of these residents desired a rapid transit system not because they intended to ride it but because they hoped such a system would attract large numbers of other commuters away from their automobiles, thereby substantially reducing the traffic congestion on the city's expressways.

The strongest vote against the plan was registered in Fulton County's tri-cities area, where there was wide-based sentiment that the residents should not have to pay for a system which, they felt, offered them inadequate service. Those voting on the question in black sections of the city were 2 to 1 against the proposal.

In conclusion, it appears that a longer, better organized, more technically-oriented campaign might have been successful in overcoming the failure of the prior public information drive to educate the electorate about rapid transit during the planning process. Through its public information activities, MARTA should have been laying the political groundwork for the transit referendum far in advance of the actual selling campaign. Although the MARTA public information staff did a commendable job in the activities which it undertook, such activities were aimed primarily at the middle-income white community and so-called "opinion leaders"--a much too limited constituency to insure electoral approval of transit

system financing. The support of the poor and the black community was virtually taken for granted until it was too late. A far more intensive public information program should precede any vote on a proposal as costly, new, and technically complex as was rapid transit to many Atlanta voters.

B. COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

The five rapid transit bond campaigns offer close contrasts and comparisons on the question of the relevance of the campaign itself to the referendum outcome. A sixth, New York State, while offering several interesting insights, differs quite distinctly from the others. The New York bond issue was state-wide, while the others were limited to metropolitan areas; in addition, the New York issue was an inseparable part of a package which included highway and airport development in many different parts of the state, while in the other states the transit element was voted on individually, even where (as in Seattle) it was presented as part of a package. Therefore our focus will be on the five other transit campaigns, with occasional references to New York.

Of the five transit proposals studied, three were rejected by the voters.

One of the most basic political decisions facing those planning a rapid transit bond campaign is whether to have the voting as a part of a general election, or whether to hold a special referendum. This decision is often quite controversial, as was the case in Atlanta, but there is little conclusive data to indicate if either is preferable. Statistically, two of the failures

occurred as a part of general (presidential) elections--Los Angeles (1968) and Atlanta (1968); but so did two of those which were successful--San Francisco (1962) (this was not a presidential election, but the Nixon-Brown gubernatorial race aroused considerable interest among the voters) and Washington (1968); Seattle's failed in a special election (February, 1968), but New York's passed in a November, 1967, special bond election. (While several local elections were being held on this date, the bond issue was the only statewide issue, and the only issue on the ballot in many areas.) The arguments against a special election were based primarily on the fact of voter apathy--fewer people are likely to vote in a special election. As a result of this assumption, it was believed that a well-organized opposition would be able to mobilize sufficient strength to defeat the proposal; in contrast, the larger numbers voting in a general election would be more likely to vote in favor of rapid transit once they were already in the voting booths, but these same people would not be sufficiently motivated to vote during a special election. This theory is based on the assumption that the larger the numbers voting, the larger the "yes" vote will be. There has been little research carried out to substantiate this hypothesis, but in some studies done in connection with the Seattle bond issue, the data fails to support it. In some districts, usually those of higher income and more education, the number of "yes" votes did increase with the number of those voting, but in other areas, especially the crucial middle-income districts, there was a negative correlation--the more voters, the more "no" votes on transit. On the more general question of voter

turnout for a special election, as opposed to a general election, Seattle provides an interesting study, for a record number of voters turned out for the "Forward Thrust" special election. This seems to indicate that an intensive campaign on an issue of considerable public interest can turn out many voters for a special election.

There are several arguments against having such issues on the ballot in a general, especially a presidential, election. It is felt that voters will not pay sufficient attention to transit. And if those other issues also concern large public expenditures which may be the targets of "taxpayers' revolts," it is even possible that, far from diverting public interest from transit, the convergence of issues may actually make voters openly antagonistic to all further tax-increasing expenditures, including transit. This seems to have occurred in the Atlanta and Los Angeles elections in November, 1968, when an intensive presidential campaign focused on high levels of government expenditures (the War on Poverty and the 10% surcharge). The Curtis Study in Los Angeles noted "the consistently negative mood of the electorate on all propositions," and felt that "the impact of substantial increases in State and Federal taxes and the increase in Los Angeles City Sales Tax all occurring in 1968 may have been contributing factors" to the defeat of the transit proposal. But it was during the same election that the Washington proposal received its large public endorsement. This might be due to the fact that a large segment of the Washington area voters work for the government, or in government-connected jobs, and may look more favorably on increased government expenditures than the average American voter.

A related argument against the general election is the large number of issues and contests the public is likely to be asked to vote on in such an election. It is felt that even if no other issues capture the public's interest, the sheer number of questions on a ballot may scare away many voters or provoke them into non-rational voting patterns. For example in San Francisco, in November, 1962, the voters filled 24 elective offices and had to decide on 36 state and local propositions, and in Atlanta in November, 1968, the voters were faced with a ballot containing 118 items with rapid transit the last. The successful San Francisco proposition, however, was in the middle (the first of the propositions, after the elective offices) and some state bond issues on that ballot which were even more "buried" were also successful.

The available data does not lead to any obvious choice between special and general elections for transit bond issues. Transit seems to be an issue which few voters feel is of central concern to themselves, and they are therefore more likely to be persuaded to vote against; thus a reasonably active (though not necessarily large) opposition can probably defeat it in either type of election. Since there is not a great deal of evidence that the larger number of voters in a general election will overcome this opposition (and may even reinforce it), we tend to feel that a special election might be slightly more advantageous for transit proponents, especially if they plan to conduct an intensive campaign.

Two factors seem most crucial in transit bond elections--the nature of the campaign and the activity of the opposition Before discussing them specifically, we should state our working

hypothesis, which is indicated in the preceding paragraph. It seems apparent that while most people are aware of great deficiencies in the transportation system, they are not convinced that rapid rail transit is the solution. Many of them are aware, either through personal experience or second-hand, of the difficulties of those cities which already have rapid transit lines; the image of the jammed New York subway car at rush hour seems to be the common impression. Those voters also know that the cities which already have rapid transit still have vast traffic problems on their streets and highways; instead of easing one unpleasant situation, rapid transit seemingly has created a second. The public seems to be waiting for something revolutionary in transportation, and probably feels that such innovations are going to come quite soon. With such a perspective, it tends to be unwilling to spend the vast amounts needed to create a rapid transit system in an already developed metropolitan area. A public tired of high taxes is unlikely to be willing to pay further large sums of money unless it has been convinced that the money will lead to a true solution to a pressing problem.

It is against this general climate of opposition that a bond campaign must be waged. Let us look first at the question of the length of the campaign. In this area analysis is too often shortsighted, since many consider "the campaign" as a relatively short-term period of intensive public relations activities directed specifically at election day. But the actual process of politicizing potential voters on transit begins far before the formal campaign. It often antedates the establishment of the transit authority it-

self and it may be intimately tied in with the entire planning process of the system. It seems quite probable that this earlier period, rather than the formal campaign itself, is crucial to the final voter reaction. It is during this period that a very important image-making process occurs during which the voters should become alerted to the need for change and generally convinced of the competence, objectivity, and balance of transportation experts who are trying to reach a feasible overall solution. Since the fundamental opposition to expensive change is so deep, the time needed to overcome it must be long and well-used.

In all the cities under discussion, traffic and transportation problems had long received some public discussion and in all of them (except New York) specific planning for a rapid transit system had been underway for several years. In San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Washington the study and planning process had been carried on for more than a decade prior to the voting, while in Atlanta it had gone on for slightly under ten years. Seattle was somewhat different since the Forward Thrust program was of a fairly short duration (3 years), but earlier discussions on the need for metropolitan government had raised the issue of future transportation improvements. In New York, the plan was submitted only ten months prior to the election; this was not a detailed plan of development; rather, it was an authorization of funds for general improvements in different kinds of transportation. The nature of the various planning processes and a consideration of their effects on transit voting are discussed in detail in an earlier section of this report, so only a short summary need be given now. The planning body

should make every effort to keep the citizenry informed as the transit plan is developed, and should set up structured techniques, such as advisory boards, community meetings, and joint planning teams, to integrate representatives of various segments of the public into the planning process. It is during this period that there should be open discussion of alternatives, so that the public will be aware of the reason for their rejection. At this time, too, the basic need for a mixed solution to the many aspects of the metropolitan transportation problem should be stressed, so the voters can see that, for the large bill they will be asked to pay, they are going to get a balanced system with a number of different valuable services--including particularly rapid line-haul, effective feeder and downtown distribution systems, which, if possible, take into account the increasingly complex pattern of urban trips.

An example of the problems which can be caused by a lack of communication between planners and the public occurred in Seattle. Another item in the Forward Thrust package, which included the rapid transit proposal, was an authorization of funds for highway expansion. This item passed easily while rapid transit was defeated. Gogerty's research uncovered considerable evidence that many of the voters had looked on the highways as an alternative to rapid transit, rather than as a coordinate part of a general plan of transportation. These studies revealed that the voters looked on highways as a better long term solution to transportation problems than rapid transit, and the highway proposal called for considerably less local money. Thus it is not surprising that voters would pick what seemed to them the

better and cheaper of several choices. Those who planned Forward Thrust, and those who ran its campaign, should have placed more emphasis on the interdependency of these two items than they did--perhaps even to the extent of combining them in one question put to the voters, as was done in the New York State transportation bond issue proposition.

The overriding importance of the public's perception of the planning process makes the final election campaign of less than paramount importance, but it nonetheless plays a major role in solidifying voter preferences. In each case, the campaign was conducted by some combination of public (usually a metropolitan transit authority) and private groups. In Seattle and Los Angeles the Authority was forbidden by law to solicit votes as such, but in San Francisco, BARTD won a taxpayer's suit allowing the use of District funds to help finance its campaign. Most of the citizens' groups acted as funnels for donated money and volunteers. Most money for the campaigns came from private individual and business--including Chamber of Commerce--donations. Public money was often used for a "public information" program which tended to carry over into the campaign itself. In none of these campaigns was there any indication of under-financing. In Seattle and Washington, the citizens' groups played the major roles in the campaign, with the public authorities somewhat in the background, while in Atlanta, San Francisco, and Los Angeles the influence of the public authorities probably predominated. Seattle's Forward Thrust program was initiated and developed by a private organization, with little formal connection with the metropolitan government. However, many of those active in Forward Thrust were also those who were active in establishing that government; the initiative for both came from essentially the same interests.

The citizens' groups in all areas were invariably made up of civic leaders, usually business leaders, with varying proportions of politicians.

In all the areas, advertising agencies or public relations firms were retained for the campaigns, but differences in the types of campaigns waged may have been crucial. In both Seattle and Atlanta, the agencies' efforts were directed at a specific segment of the voting public, and constituted sales campaigns, trying to sell rapid transit as you would "sell a bar of soap." The segment at which they aimed was a "swing" vote group, the lower-to-middle-class property owner. It was felt that this class of voter would be the least certain in regard to rapid transit, and would be the most easily swayed to support it. However, post-election voting studies in both these cities, as well as in Los Angeles, found that these voters tended not to vote for rapid transit; most either did not vote on the issue at all, or actually voted against it.

In light of the data available after the elections, the designation of this particular socio-economic group as the 'swing' vote, and the decision to direct the campaign toward them, may have been unwise. The ability to forecast in advance the relative appeal of an issue to various voting groups, and the decision of how to attack the problem once such groups have been identified, must be based on what is now still an inexact sociological determination. We have made an effort to draw some tentative conclusions about these matters from various analyses of the

voting results on mass transit.

Generally, upper- and lower-income groups supported transit by higher percentages than did middle-income groups. (For purposes of this discussion, "upper-income" is defined as family units earning $10,000 and up; "middle-income" as families earning between $7,000-$10,000; and "lower-income" as families earning less than $7,000.)[2]

In Seattle, the transit proposal received a vote of approval from 75% of the upper-income voters, 37% of the middle-income voters, and 55% of the lower-income voters.[3]

In Los Angeles, the transit proposal received a vote of approval from 47% of the upper-income group, 42% of the middle-income group, and 58% of the lower-income group. (Those earning over $20,000 supported the transit proposal with 56%.)[4]

In Atlanta, support in high-income precincts ranged around 60%, middle-income precincts were around 30%, and low-income precincts were also around 30%.[5]

We have broken down the Atlanta data in somewhat greater detail. First, low-income areas presented the following picture: the predominantly low-income black precincts tended to vote about 30% in favor of the proposal, with no one black precinct found over 44%, the regional average. The low-income white precincts were more varied. The few low-income white areas to be directly served tended to support the proposal at around 60%; all others tended to vote "yes" at about 30%. Second, most middle-income precincts voted for the plan with about 30%; several middle-income precincts that were located adjacent to upper-income neighborhoods

on the Northside, however, tended to vote about 60% support, much like their more affluent neighbors. (Most of these middle-income precincts were to be served by the NNE transit line, although several were not.) Third, higher-income areas were quite uniformly high, at about the 60% rate noted above.[6]

One way to explain these correlations of transit voting patterns with income level is to look at a current theory in political science regarding the relationship of income level to attitudes toward public expenditures. The theory[7] states that for complex reasons upper-income voters have different criteria for evaluating public expenditures than do low- and middle-income voters. The upper-income home owner tends to vote for proposals when they are "in the public interest," and not simply when the expenditure will return some benefit to him privately. By contrast, the low-income renter primarily supports only those proposals which will return desired goods and services to himself or to people with whom he immediately identifies. And the middle-income home owner supports expenditures which are in his own interests, but the direct threat of increased taxes constrains his support even of expenditures which would directly benefit him.

This set of hypotheses suggest that a transit proposal, to be supported in a referendum, must obtain the support of the higher-income groups as a set of services which will be for the benefit of "the public interest" as those groups perceive that interest; and of the lower-income groups as services which will

directly benefit the voters. One thus may expect a kind of "U"-shaped curve in results of transit referenda if the system adequately serves the low-income voters and if it has been sold to the higher-income voters as a system that will be to the long-run good of the area. Deviations from this pattern require some explanation.

The Seattle data indicate, for instance, that low-income voters gave transit significantly less support than low-income housing or increased fire protection, other issues on the ballot. From this, Gogerty has suggested that transit is less relevant to the needs of the low-income area because these areas tend to be close-in to the center of the city and are already served as well by buses as they would have been by bus-plus-transit. This same type of analysis has been put forward as a partial explanation of why the Los Angeles Mexican-Americans rejected the system while the blacks supported it: the Mexican-Americans live considerably closer to the center of Los Angeles, and would not benefit greatly from the regional line-haul system, while the blacks, more distantly isolated in Watts, would have been directly united with the downtown job and entertainment centers by the transit system.[8]

For the low-income voter to vote in his "private-regarding" way, the campaign must show him what his private benefits will be. In neither Atlanta nor Seattle was the campaign geared in this manner; the tone of both campaigns (recall Atlanta's failure to describe adequately any feeder system) seems to have assumed that if the system were "sold" to the public as being in

the area's long-run interests, that would suffice. Our analysis suggests that it does not. Thus, while we do not imply that any "strategy" could have overcome the anger Atlanta's blacks felt at being ignored during the planning, it is still important to note that no specific effort was made to appeal to the low-income voter in terms of immediate benefit to him.

Further analysis of the correlation between income level and voting preferences would require an intricate sociological study and is beyond the scope of this report. We have tried merely to suggest the rough dimensions of the correlation, and the policy implications which appear to follow therefrom.

Education is obviously one key--but the above analysis suggests that more than one kind of education will be required, since different groups of voters appear to have different sets of values by which they judge the worth of public investment. As one political scientist has stated:

> The reformer has assumed that if you just give the people the facts, they will act in favor of metropolitan wide government and other objectives of the reformer. Of course, there is no reason why he should have ensnared himself with this delusion. The writings on the nature of the voter and how he makes up his mind have been outlined...since before World War II.

Thus, while many-faceted public education is important, it should probably be particularized more than has been the case in the past: while the unlikely middle-income vote is being cultivated, the potential convergence of interest between upper- and lower-income voters should also be reinforced. It may be, therefore, that the campaign should be structured to emphasize the particular concerns of the latter two groups--the good of the larger community for the one; and a quicker ride to work for the other. In any event, the middle-income voter seems less likely than the other groups to vote in favor of

expenditure for transit--regardless of the nature of the "educational" campaign.

The efforts to lure voters in all the cities were carried out mainly through media advertisements, especially spot commercials on television. These commercials usually emphasized the frustration and dangers of traffic congestion on the highways, and suggested that rapid transit would be the cure. But they made no effort to answer or counter the opposition's arguments, especially those which claimed that there were cheaper alternatives which would do a better job than that proposed by the partisans of rapid transit. The lower-to-middle-class property owners were likely to pay the most for the system (proportionately) and would probably use it the least, since most members of the class have cars and use them. They were therefore very reluctant to approve tax increases which would fall on them. In Atlanta and Seattle, the bonds were financed directly by property taxes; in Los Angeles a sales tax was to be used, but the voters knew that the property tax could be used to meet any deficits, and, knowing of San Francisco's experience, they expected deficits. In Washington and San Francisco, on the other hand, the focus of the campaign was a wider audience and the emphasis seems to have been on information, answering questions and meeting the opposition's points, rather than on propaganda.

In San Francisco, the campaign was consciously conducted with two foci: one was the civic and opinion leaders, the influential leaders of the communities in the Bay area, who were primarily reached through a very active speakers bureau

provided through the Junior Chamber of Commerce; the other was the general public, who were to be reached by speakers, media advertisements (which do not seem to have been used as much here as elsewhere), displays of future transit vehicles, a pamphlet featuring a map of the proposed transit system, and community meetings run by the citizens' groups. As mentioned earlier, stress was placed both on innovation and on the need for rapid transit, especially in view of predictions of how different the situation would become if a new transit system were not built. Because of the good groundwork done during the planning years, much of the potential for opposition had been dispelled and a favorable image of rapid transit seems to have reached a large segment of the public.

San Francisco had one other advantage which, by its very nature, was not available to the other cities: BARTD was the first new rapid transit system to be planned in this country for half a century. Thus proponents could claim that their system took advantage of all the knowledge gained in other systems during the intervening years as well as of modern electronic and design advances, and so represented a new solution to the urban transportation problem. In stressing modernity and innovation they focused interest on their ultra-modern cars, their computerized dispatching system, and their automatic fare collection system.

This claim could not be made in the other cities, and several of them received considerable negative feedback from the difficulties facing San Francisco's effort. These

difficulties were primarily financial, with construction costs rising far above the levels anticipated in the original proposal. The Curtis Report in Los Angeles found that voters referred to San Francisco when they expressed fears that their system would cost even more than was being proposed. As previously noted, Governor Maddox of Georgia returned to his state from a visit to California and expressed similar fears on television while the MARTA campaign was in progress. But the backlash from San Francisco was related not only to finances, but also to the "image" aspect. Though it is too early to tell if the innovations of BART really do lead to improvements in service, the very fact that BART is underway has removed the glamor of innovation for the other cities. This had noticeable effects in Los Angeles, where no effort was made to imply that anything innovative was being offered, as well as in Seattle.

The campaign in Washington, D.C., or more correctly in its Maryland and Virginia suburbs, was not carried out over as long a period or as intensively as that in San Francisco, but there, too, the emphasis was on building up a grass roots movement among all population groups: the campaign was not aimed at one questionable segment. And there, too, the emphasis was on education rather than propaganda. In most metropolitan Washington communities, citizens' groups were created which ran door-to-door campaigns and had numerous meetings in which a movie on the advantages of rapid transit was shown and representatives of WMATA were present to answer

questions. The community-wide basis of much of the planning process paid its dividends in public awareness and support.

All campaigns made varying use of traditional campaign techniques--mailings (there were no mailings in San Francisco), speakers, downtown headquarters, travelling "road shows" in suburban shopping centers and elsewhere (perhaps more of these would have been worthwhile in some of the campaigns), and literature handouts. In this latter area, and the related one of mailings, several mistakes in some of the campaigns may have played a small but significant role in the defeats. The showing of non-existent streets on which some of the feeder buses were supposed to travel has already been mentioned in the case of Atlanta. In Seattle, the campaign was kicked off by the general mailing of a pro-Forward Thrust tabloid to all those on a mailing list supplied by the Pacific Bell Telephone Company. The tabloid was meant to influence the marginal middle-income group thought by the public relations firm to be crucial, yet the manner of its mailing sent it to a wider selection of voting groups, with possible adverse results within some groups.

Seattle's campaign was largely planned and conducted on the basis of several in-depth voter studies. This seems to be the only one of the elections which made much use of this

tool. In fact, the use of such studies in Seattle may have hurt the transit proposition more than it helped. For the original poll showed many people in favor of rapid transit; when later polls (during the campaign) showed rapid transit doing well, but the proposed stadium (another part of the Forward Thrust package) doing poorly, Forward Thrust switched the emphasis of the campaign to the stadium issue. Thus during the crucial period of the campaign little emphasis was placed on the rapid transit part of the program. By the time further studies had shown that voter sentiment had swung against rapid transit, it was too late to reverse the trend.

The role of local and state political leaders supporting the referenda does not seem too important except in Atlanta. In all the other campaigns political leaders almost unanimously backed the transit campaign, either with endorsements or active campaigning. It seems that few people were persuaded by their endeavors. While it seems that few voters in a marginal issue are swayed to support the issue by political endorsements, opposition by leading political figures may have considerable impact on uncertain voters. An exception to this may be found in the situation, such as occurred in New York's bond issue, when a leading political figure--in that case, Governor Rockefeller--is identified with the proposal from the start. The success of the proposal thereupon becomes related to his popularity and to the amount of effort he puts into campaigning for it.

The role of the press is also questionable. Almost uniformly, voting studies show that few people are influenced by the editorial

stands of newspapers, but the papers, especially through their news columns, do help shape the degree and kind of public knowledge of an issue. In all the cities except Los Angeles, the major papers supported in one degree or another the transit issue and provided varying amounts of favorable publicity. Interestingly, in San Francisco, the Chronicle, while supporting the bond issue, does not seem to have given much space in its news columns to the BARTD campaign, but through the years of planning had given consistently favorable reporting. In Los Angeles, the major papers were not sympathetic. The Times, in particular, was quite hostile, though "editorially" neutral: it gave considerable news coverage to the activities of the opposition, and little to that of the supporters. In addition, the Times waged a campaign against the general manager, leading to his resignation at a crucial time. The paper also broke a "scandal" story concerning the District a short time before the election. While few voters, according to the Curtis study, said they were swayed by the Times' activities, it is difficult to say how great an influence it had on the general climate of opinion concerning the issue.

In addition to the major newspapers in the localities studied, in several of the campaigns non-areawide or special group papers played some role. In Atlanta, the conservative Northside News sent out its message of opposition to its followers. In Seattle, the house organ of the large and powerful Teamsters Union was vehemently against rapid transit, and seemingly had an influence even beyond that of the union membership and their families. Gogerty notes that its editor is "one of the best-read and certainly the most widely feared newspaperman in the Northwest."

The nature of the formal opposition raises an interesting point. In those areas where bond issues were defeated, some proponents emphasize the existence of a large and well-financed opposition, yet analysis seems to indicate that this was not the case. In fact, the opposition was usually reasonably small and although well-financed, did not really need very much money. In two cities, Atlanta and Seattle, considerable use was made of the FCC "equal time" provisions to raise questions about rapid transit. In Seattle, for every hour of free time given Forward Thrust to argue for all its proposals, including but not limited to transit, the opponents were able to get an hour specifically devoted to rapid transit. In both cities, hindsight suggests that it was probably a mistake to have used free media time to support the transit issue, since that gave the opposition free time to answer back. Transit proponents in both cities now feel they should have used paid time (they had the money, the opposition may not have) instead.

In Los Angeles and Seattle, the opposition did not seem to come from any recognizable, or organized, power groups, but seemed to be much more of a grass roots manifestation of anti-transit feeling on the part of the voters. In Seattle more people voted on transit than any other issue, and it was soundly defeated. It must be noted that the transit proposal was the single biggest proposal in the Forward Thrust package, larger than all the others combined. Since there was also the "highway alternative," discussed earlier, it does not seem strange that the already pressed taxpayers might decide that the bill was just too high for the

promised return. In Los Angeles, all propositions on the 1968 ballot were defeated, but transit suffered the biggest defeat. Here, too, it was the largest single item and seemed to offer the smallest return to many voters. In both these cities there was the feeling that rapid transit represented an erosion of their "way of life", which seems to be very much personified by the private automobile. It was the fear of the loss of this way of life, and at an enormous price tag, which seems to have played a key role in the defeat of rapid transit in these two cities. Yet San Francisco is in the same region and its residents to a large extent share the same "way of life." There rapid transit was approved, and there was little mention of the loss of a way of life. Perhaps the stress on need and innovation was able to overcome this obstacle.

In both Washington and San Francisco, the scenes of successful bond issues, the opposition does not seem significant. There was some in San Francisco, mainly from a few labor groups and rural districts, but it had little influence. In Washington, what little opposition there was appeared in the final week, and ran into a well-planned, factual counterattack by the supporters of the proposal. It seems that the careful, sustained and widespread cultivation of citizen support was sufficient to counter opposition arguments. In Seattle and Atlanta, the opposition used their free time and other resources to imply that the planning elites had not considered all the alternatives or were working for ulterior motives. Such criticisms did not carry much weight in San Francisco or Washington.

But even in these cities the supporters could not carry much of the deeply entrenched, middle-income, property-owner opposition, especially in those areas not directly served by the lines. A majority of this group, not surprisingly, voted against rapid transit in all the areas studied. This perhaps shows the advantage of New York's multi-purpose transportation package, which seemed to offer something to everyone.[9]

In conclusion, the most important factor seems to be careful cultivation of citizen support, especially during the planning process, with a stress on need and the showing that the proposed transit plan is the best alternative among a number considered. This should be done through an educational campaign which focuses on the various considerations which may concern subgroups of the voting public rather than a short campaign with one main thrust largely of propaganda value. Efforts should be made to build support at all levels and among all groups. And in the campaign itself, it should be obvious that an effort should be made to meet, or forestall, opposition arguments. The proposed system should be coordinated with highway and other transportation services and facilities. And, where possible, actually blending the transit proposal with a larger transportation package presented to the voters as a unit, seems to have great merit.

Even so, some local issue, or a taxpayer's revolt, or a major opposition, might well doom any general transit proposal--given the widespread (and in many ways, given present technological options, quite reasonable) commitment to the automobile.

Chapter VI

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions are tentative and suggestive, rather than final and definitive. This is so for several reasons.

First, our own training precluded us from doing a detailed quantitative study of the actual vote tallies, or from conducting any statistically representative post-election sampling and polling. Our training is for the most part in law, and our attempt--collecting impressions, jogging memories, probing for patterns--has been to "get the facts" as a lawyer would try to do while being alert to inconsistencies, and testing qualitative judgments against whatever "evidence" is available.

Second, even if our training had included more familiarity with quantitative data, we would have been required for the most part to collect our own, and even then would have had limited opportunity to cross-check our results with other studies elsewhere. What few post-election transit studies we have found have given inadequate attention to a number of factors which seem to us of considerable interest. These difficulties were somewhat accentuated by a general lack of studies on "non-candidate" elections. This branch of political science research seems to have suffered from a comparative lack of emphasis in the past--but one likely to be remedied as trends like "the taxpayers' revolt" make local referenda on particular public expenditures more critical for public policy and decision-making.

Even if our training had been more varied, and the data and studies available more relevant, we were limited by the fact that the study was conceived and made well after the holding of the

referenda. Thus we had no opportunity to establish any adequate base lines--not simply in a quantitative sense, but in a journalistic sense as well. We have looked at the newspapers of the time, but it is difficult to get a "feel" for the impact on the voting public of the various brochures, public meetings, and television and radio announcements. While later reports told us that a position had been well publicized, the individual experience of one who was present might have given a better idea of how much of that publicity really "got through" to the public. Thus as quasi-journalists, we missed the immediacy of the events. (This distance from the events was felt both in time and in geography: Most of our research was carried out physically distant from the sites, and even in Atlanta, the only community where we did any field work, the interviews were conducted over a very limited period of time and quite early in our study, before we were aware of some of the dimensions of the problems.)

If we were too distant from the events to be good journalists, we were too close to be good historians. Our main source of information was people--people who for the most part were participants in the referendum process. They are all still close enough to the events--indeed, mass transit as an issue is continuing in all of the locations studied--to be concerned about their stance in the future as well as in the past, and even concerning past events to be alert to their present reputations in the community. This does not imply that there was any conscious deception; rather, we are simply noting that many people who shared with us their information

and their insights were naturally(and probably subconsciously) eager to minimize or expand their role in producing the ultimate result. We have tried to discount such hindsight as well as we could, by talking to as many different sources representing as many different views as possible. Nevertheless, we are well aware that there may be sides of an issue or even issues themselves of which we are unaware or to which we have given inadequate treatment.

In spite of these limitations, we do feel that our study has been of some value in throwing light on the difficulties inherent in rapid transit bond referenda, and that our general conclusions will be of use to students of further campaigns and to supporters of these proposals.

Our first conclusion from this study is that mass transit is not a service that the auto-owning majority consider to be of basic importance to themselves. Thus while voters may occasionally find themselves very concerned with problems of transportation, particularly when they are caught in traffic jams or being trampled in the rush for a subway car, most generally accord transportation low priority among situations demanding change. Few people,except those whose homes or businesses are being destroyed, become as aroused by problems of subway construction as they do by such matters as education. This disinterest in transit may largely be a result of the fact that many voters see themselves as deriving at most secondary benefits from mass transit, in that the roads on which they still plan to drive will, they hope, be less congested.

Combined with the majority's failure to perceive any important personal stake in mass transportation projects, the very high cost of these proposals makes them generally unattractive. In every instance studied, they were by far the most expensive item on the ballot. In Los Angeles, the SCRTD proposal was the largest bond issue ever voted on in the country at that time, and in Seattle the rapid transit proposal cost more than the other twelve items in the Forward Thrust package combined. It is interesting to note that this cost factor was modified in Washington, where rapid transit supporters scored their most impressive victory, and amplified in Atlanta, where rapid transit received its most serious defeat. In Washington, the voters were voting only to cover the cost of the is to be paid for by the federal government pursuant to Congressional appropriation, and that amount did not appear on the ballot. In Atlanta, the ballot, as required by Georgia law, showed not only the amount of the principal to be paid on the bonds, as was done in the other cities, but also included all the interest payments. While this was arguably a more realistic statement of the eventual total cost, it gave the average voter a distorted picture of the cost of MARTA's proposal when compared to those of other cities.

Thus in all rapid transit proposals the voters are being asked to approve the expenditure of very large sums of money, which they know will be paid for by themselves through higher taxes, for an item which few conceive as being directly beneficial to themselves. In this perspective it is easy to see that proponents of these measures start with the odds weighted heavily against them. To

overcome this opposition, they must make a major effort to convince the voters that the cost will be justified by the benefits which will accrue both to the community as a whole and to indentifiable groups of potential riders. To do this, the proponents must emphasize that transportation is a crucial factor among the problems which confront any metropolitan area, that the rapid transit solution they offer is part of a balanced transportation system which in toto is the best means of dealing with this factor, and that particular problems in making the transit service accessible (such as feeder systems, and park-and-ride facilities) have been considered and solved.

Transit backers faced the further obstacle of a possibly outmoded technology. At a time of revolutionary change in most aspects of our style of living, and with some of the most symbolic advances occurring in the field of transportation technology (supersonic jets and space flights, for example), fixed-rail rapid transit seems somewhat old-fashioned. While engineering studies may show that such systems are the best of those currently feasible, many voters believe, though few have any knowledge of actual proposals, that major breakthroughs are imminent. Even if modern Americans could be convinced that the private automobile is not the best solution for urban transportation problems, they are understandably reluctant to sink such large amounts of money into a rapid transit system which may be outmoded even before construction is completed. When they have become aware of options such as the Rapid Busways proposal in Atlanta, which are interim in nature and might involve greatly reduced dislocation and capital costs, voters will legitimately question why such apparently reasonable alternatives have been rejected. And even if

an existing technology requiring a major capital investment is chosen--such as traditional rail transit--emphasis on automation and computers may help to convey an aura of futurism.

Nor are transit planners themselves free from the reservations which the voters have expressed. The planners are faced with the tension between a current need which must be met and a knowledge, somewhat more informed than that of the average voter, that none of the alternatives currently available really do adequately fulfill the need. Yet, they are also aware that major breakthroughs in this area rarely occur "overnight", that between experimental advances and actual implementation there exists a long period of testing and modification. They know that certain advanced concepts, such as dual mode vehicles, have been involved in this experimental process for a long period of time already, and yet still do not show much hope of being ready for implementation on a large scale. Faced with this knowledge, and aware of the urgency of the problems facing their cities, planners in many cities are unwilling to wait for such advanced concepts to become usable. They are willing, rather, to accept a proven system, even though far from perfect, to meet a current problem.

While planners in the cities under discussion have demonstrated an awareness of technological innovation, we feel that, in some instances, they may have placed too high an emphasis on the proven system, possibly as a result of some exaggeration of the immediacy of the transit crisis in their own minds, to the detriment of possible interim solutions. MARTA's rather superficial rejection of the Rapid Busways proposal may be an example of this all now-or-nothing attitude. Similarly motivated may have been MARTA's decision to go ahead with the all-rail proposal without waiting for the results of

the AATS study, despite indications that that study would recommend a mixed bus and rail system. It is almost a law of bureaucratic nature that once a project becomes accepted or a goal fixed, all suggestions which might lead to modification are looked upon with great distrust and great efforts are made to discredit them. It appears that this is what has happened in many transit planning agencies: the planners despair of discovering anything revolutionary, so fall back on the well-known, unwilling to take the risks of half-way steps and interim solutions. This tendency is perhaps reinforced by the consulting agencies which do much of the actual groundwork and planning. These agencies seem to have developed an expertise in, and possibly a bias toward, fixed-rail transit, and direct their studies accordingly. It is our feeling that groups planning transit systems should give far greater attention than they have in the past to such interim transit solutions as express bus service, reserved highway lanes, "dial-a-bus", busways, and "dual-mode" vehicles. These solutions may offer (1) the flexibility that is important in a time of change, (2) transit innovations which are going to be operational someday in the near future, and (3) which may also be available at a cost that is far more palatable to the average voter. If it is decided, after careful and full study of the alternatives, that a fixed-rail system is still the best for the locality, then the voting public should be made well aware of why that decision was arrived at, preferably at the time the decision is actually made.

The necessity for complete and timely public education (and participation) as transit plans are being developed has been discussed at some length in the body of this report. While we feel that this

is a very important area, it, too, is not without its contradictions. It is very hard to determine the point at which a large flow of information becomes confusing rather than educational. In all the cities under discussion a bewildering array of commissions and governmental bodies conducted studies and produced proposals for transit systems. In some cities, such as San Francisco, the studies agreed on the need for a fixed-rail transit system for the region and differed only as to the scale and location of the proposed system.

In other areas, notably Atlanta again, the proposals were often divergent and contradictory. Some were the result of honest differences of opinion as to what was the best type of transit system for the region, but others seem more to be the result of struggles among various planning agencies over jurisdiction. All of these proposals received considerable publicity in the local press (it should be noted that press publicity alone is far from the same thing as an adequate public education campaign), and surely must have caused confusion and uncertainty among the voters. They may feel that if the experts are so divided and uncertain, it is probably unwise to approve such a large investment of tax dollars as will be called for in whatever proposal is finally submitted.

Even when the experts are not divided or uncertain, they may appear to be so to a public confused by a proliferation of different studies done at different times by different agencies and ad hoc review committees, each with its own special name. Review of transit proposals by a number of groups representing different interests and viewpoints is of course valuable. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that there may be a substantial cost in voter confusion unless such review committees are made more clearly a part of the regular and expected planning process.

Even so, it is our opinion that it is not so much the confusion resulting from conflicting original proposals that causes the greatest erosion of public confidence, but it is more the failure to resolve satisfactorily these differences or to explain adequately why no such resolution is possible, that does the greatest harm. For often those whose plans have been rejected play a key role in opposition to the actual proposal. While it is obvious that all suggestions cannot be included in the final proposal, and that some areas are not susceptible to compromise, these suggestions can still be treated in such a manner as not to antagonize their supporters. If it is made clear that each proposal has been given a sympathetic hearing and careful study by the responsible body with reasoned responses to criticisms and, in some cases, offers of further cooperation, much will have been done to mitigate the effects of the confusion. This procedure will not satisfy all who may offer alternate proposals, but by making available to the public the substance of the above procedures the planning body will be able to combat this opposition more effectively, and will aid the public's understanding. Of course, some of the difficulty stems from an uncertainty as to which is actually the "responsible body." Here it is necessary that the legislature, the metropolitan council, or the executive, whichever has ultimate responsibility in the given jurisdiction, act quite decisively in establishing responsibility and making clear the chain of command, including review boards, if thought necessary.

Whatever procedures are adopted, the necessity for clear and adequate public information should not be forgotten. Although few

may pay any attention to it, these few may become crucial at the time of the actual campaign. Those in power should not use the possibility of some confusion as an excuse for keeping information from the public. They should strive to explain, not gloss over, the difficulties and make every effort to clear up any possible confusion. Not only do the basic premises of democracy which require an informed electorate call for this procedure, but so do very practical considerations of building political support.

Of course, other factors in addition to adequate information play a role in developing support for transit proposals. Perhaps the most basic of these is cultivation of the "interest groups" which play such a great role at all levels of a pluralistic democracy. Interest groupings showed up in our study to be roughly consistent with income-class categories. As noted in Chapter Five, available data indicates that general support for rapid transit and other public expenditures is grouped at the lower and upper levels of the income spectrum, and opposition is strongest in the middle grouping. The common explanation for this is that those at the lowest income levels derive significant if not the greatest benefits from these expenditures, and pay the least directly for them, since their tax rates are relatively low. The upper-income group, while apparently deriving the least direct benefit is generally better educated and seems more willing to pay for what they perceive to be the general good of the community. (There is considerable evidence, interestingly enough, that most upper-income-serving suburban commuter lines are really subsidized by the in-town transit users, and that many upper-income

people derive great advantage from such lines at a lesser direct cost. Thus there may be more "self-interest" in the upper-income voting pattern than appears at first--especially since fast suburban service usually requires fewer inner-city stops in areas where more of the poor tend to live.)

The middle-income group, however, rarely has an income margin sufficient to absorb all the proposed new taxes, and can least afford to have taxes raised. Being largely auto-owning, middle-income voters also see the system as being of little benefit to themselves, and are not generally in favor of seeing their limited dollars going for the benefit of others. Two approaches suggest themselves in response to this situation. One stresses building support at both poles, while largely ignoring the middle, in order to offset the negative middle-income vote. The second approach calls for a great educational effort to develop support even among the middle-income voters, to persuade them that the system would indeed serve them and would be worth the cost. It seems to us that transit campaigners should adopt plans which attempt elements of both these approaches. The educational, and political, campaigns should be directed at all levels of the populace, showing benefits which would accrue to each, but special emphasis might be given to those groups where support is more likely to be forthcoming if it could be motivated. In approaching middle-income voters, the emphasis should be on the importance to them of particular indirect benefits (such as less congestion, less pollution, good access to the

core in bad driving weather, etc.), to show that it is not only a minority which is benefitted, but, in different and quite specific fashions, themselves as an identifiable part of the community as a whole.

A further, though related, "interest group" factor entered into at least some of the transit campaigns which we have studied. This is the factor of race, and the issues of community participation which have been raised within the context of the current racial upheaval. These racial factors are very much a product of our current political climate (peculiarly that of the past two years, since they were not noticeably present in the initial BARTD proposal in 1962 though the later crisis in Berkeley arose specifically from these causes) and they may not be present in the future if the lessons of our immediate past are well-learned. These lessons will require a fundamental change in the whole transportation planning process; transformation, not simply transition, is required if the process is to respond adequately to a deeply held feeling that people are being manipulated by some higher authority, with no ability to affect and shape an important part of their environment.

In the traditional "class" analysis just discussed, the blacks, who are disproportionately represented in the lower income groups, should be in favor of rapid transit proposals. But in at least one city, Atlanta, they were actively opposed to the transit proposal, even while many admitted that they would benefit from it. This seemingly irrational position becomes understandable when one accepts that the black community in Atlanta saw other issues involved in

MARTA than merely a rapid transit plan which might benefit them, and those other issues took precedence in their eyes. The key issue there was one of community participation in the planning process. While we note elsewhere that other groups, particularly local political leaders, felt unnecessarily excluded from this process, their "exclusion" was perhaps due to a lack of political sophistication on the part of the MARTA Board. It should be reasonably easy to include these political leaders in the planning process sufficiently to please them; this was done adequately in San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington (or the Washington suburbs, at least). MARTA, and other transit agencies, are an element in an almost century-old reform tradition, which had public-spirited citizens, usually businessmen and professionals, play a major role in initiating and carrying through civic improvements. While much of this citizen activity was inspired by a middle-class distrust of politicians, the historical actuality saw citizen-reformers and politicians working together, albeit often uneasily, in the development of these projects.

This combination worked together successfully for so long, that they failed, in most places, to realize that a new movement was growing, and that their plans, no matter how well-intentioned, were no longer going to receive the rubber-stamp approval of those whom they intended to benefit. In Atlanta, the issue came to the fore over rapid transit, though this is not necessarily how it has occurred in other cities. The blacks felt that one upper-income black man on the MARTA Board was not sufficient representation for their community, and that MARTA had not really consulted them or looked out adequately for black interests in drawing up the plan. To drive this message

home to the white community they voted against MARTA's proposal and contributed significantly to its defeat. While the exact method to be used to achieve adequate community participation--larger percentages of true community representatives on the Board (though these may be very difficult to designate), community boards of varying amounts of power, or large numbers of public hearings or neighborhood referenda, or greater reliance on public officials elected by wards or districts, among others--must be determined by the situation existing in each community, the important point to be remembered is that some provision must be made for such participation and that it must be more than merely "token." And such participation should be designed to involve all elements of the community, not just the blacks and not just the low income groups. Indeed effective community participation may be one way to win more support from middle-income home owners.

Another aspect of the racial problem intrudes into these campaigns. This is the problem of prejudice itself. It should not be forgotten that a decision not to vote for something which will help others may be influenced by the fact that those "others" are black. This feeling, we should note, is not limited to certain middle income voters, but it appears on all income and class levels. Nor is it only a problem of whites. Data from Los Angeles indicates that the sizeable Mexican-American community there opposed the SCRTD proposal. Studies have found that the Mexican-Americans in California regard the blacks as their greatest rivals. They feel that the blacks have been benefitting disproportionately from Federal poverty

programs, and are therefore opposed to anything which they feel will benefit the blacks. The SCRTD plan gave reasonable service to black areas, but was not of much benefit to the Mexican-Americans, who are concentrated much closer to the downtown area than are the blacks, so it was natural for them to oppose it.

Realizing the great obstacles to voter approval of rapid transit bond issues, we still do not feel that it is futile to offer such proposals to the public where it is felt they are necessary. Though three proposals were defeated in 1968, another was approved overwhelmingly, as was another the previous year (New York's), and one five years earlier. We suggest that the proponents and the planners approach their task with an awareness of the nature of the obstacles, an open mind to deal with new approaches, and a flexibility in dealing with problems. Even so they are more than likely to suffer defeat, either from general public opposition to mass transit in their locality, or from a defect in their own plan, or from a somewhat tangential local issue, like that of race and community participation in Atlanta, or just from a general voter reaction against high taxes.

One method of minimizing the risk of defeat--a method which has been successful in New York and New Jersey--is that of presenting a <u>combined</u> transportation package to the voters. Such a package includes funds for mass transit, highway construction, local road improvement, and airport facilities. This package has several advantages. It offers transportation benefits for everyone, so that no group feels that it is voting funds solely to help others. It requires that the transportation bureaucracies reach their own political

accommodations before going to the voters. It also recognizes the essential fact that no one mode of transportation is self-sufficient but that a balance among facilities and services is essential for the well-being of a metropolitan area or a state. The package can be presented with itemized amounts for each of the types of activity (though the items should be approvable only as a whole, and not, as with Forward Thrust, individually) or can be expressed as a lump sum for general transportation expenses, with the executive or the legislature responsible for disbursing the funds. While the New York and New Jersey plans are state-wide, there is no reason why a similar plan could not be proposed for a metropolitan area, with local road improvements and traffic bottle-neck elimination replacing expressway construction as an area of emphasis.

This combined plan is, of course, not without its disadvantages. If one of the principal objections to rapid transit is its cost, the addition of other expensive items to the proposal will surely not make the total any cheaper or more palatable to those whose major objection is to rising taxes. And some voters may not consider the added price of mass transit worth the new roads they want. If the number of voters who think this way is large, then the proponents will be faced with the same educational problems discussed above.

Even with these possible objections, we think that the idea of combined transportation packages deserves careful study by transit supporters, and may indeed prove to be the only way in which a sufficient amount of support may be developed, in a true something-for-everyone tradition, to win at the polls.

Two other assumptions are worth critical examination by localities considering major transportation expenditures: one is that bond issues are the best source of revenue; the other is that bond issues must be approved in a public referendum. As to the first, we will merely note that other revenue sources can be considered. These could include various state taxes, including auto excise taxes, and vehicle fuel taxes. Or they could be metropolitan taxes and tolls designed to discourage automobile entry into the central business district, including tolls that might vary inversely with the number of passengers in the car--a device both to raise revenue and to discourage driving cars with only one passenger. Obviously, such other sources of revenue are controversial and must be assessed both for their intrinsic advantages and disadvantages as well as their political chances in a particular state-metropolitan context. Controversy, however, is not going to be avoided regardless of the funding mechanism chosen--including, as the experiences in the cities studied here have shown, bond issue referenda.

The second assumption is also worth examining: the very framework in some state constitutions which requires that a bond issue be approved in a referendum. There are other options which can still keep public expenditures of this kind within limits. One could, for instance, look to the state legislature, rather than to the public directly, for such control. Political accountability is essential in this area, but the framework within which this accountability is exercised might be worth the long-range attention of people serious about developing adequate metropolitan transportation systems.

One essential point is worth emphasizing in conclusion: it should be clear that even in the best of local circumstances, a transit bond proposal is going to have a difficult time being approved. This is so for one simple reason of enormous significance: until automobile congestion becomes far worse, only a minority of people within a metropolitan area are ever likely to feel that mass transit is of direct personal utility. And the auto-owning majority has a good chance of carrying the day at the polls in an area where there is no "bill of rights" to protect the transit-riding minority. Yet the paradox is that it is the very preference of the majority for the private auto--and the land use patterns which this preference has produced--which make the difficulties of the minority in traveling in a metropolitan area so great, and so deserving of concerted public attention. This is the fundamental dilemma facing transit proposals, and it might as well be faced.

Chapter II

FOOTNOTES

1. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Outline of ...40 Mile System, p. 12 (September 30, 1968).

2. The ARMPC 1961 proposal; the so called "Basic System" of MARTA's 1967 proposal; the MATSC proposal; and the five county system of the MARTA 1967 proposal.

3. The 1967 Basic System; the 1967 four county system; the MATSC system; and the five county 1967 system.

4. The first stage of the 1960 ATS rail plan; the ATS Rapid Busways Plan; and the full 1960 ATS rail plan.

5. ARMPC, Rapid Transit for Metropolitan Atlanta (September 1967).

6. MARTA, Rapid Transit Progress, The MARTA Newsletter.

7. The system linked the lines as follows: E-W; N-S; NW-S; and NE-S. All lines would have utilized the Peachtree corridor tunnel if the routing had linked; N-S; E-NW; and W-NE.

8. Simpson and Curtin, Rapid Atlanta. Quoted in the Newsletter of the Institute for Rapid Transit, Volume 4, No. 2, July 1, 1963. All of the facts in this paragraph come from this source.

9. Newsletter of the IRT, supra no. 8, p. 12.

10. The Atlanta Transit System, Inc. Rapid Busways, p. 1 (1967).

11. Ibid, p. 1.

12. Ibid, p. iii.

13. Ibid, p. 5, quoting 1962 MATSC Report.

14. Meyer, Kain and Wohl, The Urban Transportation Problem, (1965).

15. Op. cit., p.5. Note 10, above.

16. Ibid, p. iii.

17. Ibid, p.7.

18. MARTA, Review of Rapid Busways, August, 1967. Covering letter to Ivan Allen.

19. Ibid, p. 1.

20. Ibid, p.5. However, if the East-West line were to utilize bus services, as discussed in this document, the volume projected is so low (5000 passengers per peak hour in 1988) that a bus station with only two pull off lanes in each direction could more than handle the traffic. Such a station could fit in the space allocated for the "Transit Center" of the rail facility, and provide feeder service to the important Peachtree Corridor tunnel.

21. Ibid, p.9.

22. ARMPC, September 1967 Report, p.75.

23. MARTA, Request for amendment to HUD Contract No. H-771.

24. In several appearances reported in the Atlanta papers, Bennett emphasized the importance of taking the best elements from each plan.

25. "Chamber of Commerce Slows Up on Rapid Transit," The Atlanta Constitution, December 29, 1967.

26. Ibid, December 5, 1967, "Aldermen Call for a Study of Rapid Busways Proposal."

27. At a meeting of the Harvard Business School Club of Atlanta, Nov. 15, 1967, Chairman Rich expressed his cooperation in taking elements from both the Busways and the PBTB plans.

28. HUD News, Washington, D.C., July 3, 1968.

29. This term was used to describe the scope of the project in the Request for amendment of HUD contract No. H-771.

30. Lundy, "MARTA Friend, Foe Collide," the Sunday Atlanta Journal and Constitution, November, 1968. (Covers following 3 paragraphs).

31. The Toronto Transit Commission currently runs cars of nearly 75 feet in length; it is argued that the extra length brings about a savings in truck costs, as fewer cars are needed per train.

32. Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, "Metro is Ready" 1968. Revised February 7, 1969, "Adopted Regional Rapid Transit Plan."

33. Southern California Rapid Transit District Final Report, May 1968.

34. This figure is included for comparative purposes only; it was derived from a yearly figure.

35. A good source of information on BARTD is Chapter 9 of Urban Mass Transit Planning, Wolfgang S. Homburger, ed., Berkeley, California, 1967.

36. DeLeuw Cather & Co., Report on Comprehensive Public Transportation System for the Seattle Metropolitan Area, October 1967.

37. The Atlanta Constitution, October 28, 1968, "These Answers May Dispel Rumors about Vast Project," Dick Hebert.

38. Davis, Morris and Saul Levine, "Towards a Sociology of Public Transport," in Social Problems, Vol. 15, no. 1, Summer 1967.

39. From a mass-mailing pamphlet, "Your Metro System..." WMTA.

40. "Rapid Transit Now," a pamphlet prepared for the election.

41. Unpublished notes for an upcoming report.

42. Richard Bergholz, "Public Wants Rapid Transit--But NO TAXES," Los Angeles Times , June 12, 1963, cited in Meyer Kain and Wohl, p. 105.

43. Dorothy D. Corey Research, "An Analysis of the November 1968 Vote on the Rapid Transit Bond Issue," Los Angeles, Feb. 1969.

44. This is calculated on the basis of lane capacity figures used in the Appendix of Meyer, Kain and Wohl. The design of bus stations is discussed in this appendix.

45. This is the charge now being levelled against the Voorhees proposal. It should be noted that this paragraph concerns cities on the scale of Atlanta and Seattle, and its conclusions are not universally applicable.

46. See the discussion in Tomorrow's Transportation, the summary of the HUD New Systems Study, (1968), p. 65 ff. In contrast to this visionary study, we are describing something quite simple: a bus that has the ability to be driven through a downtown distribution tunnel, probably in "train formation." Automation could well come at a later point in time.

47. The Vice President of the Southern California Auto Club wrote in Westways magazine that no "serious" study of alternative technologies had ever been made. A brief analysis of the constraints used in the study of the potential contribution of private busways suggests that the charge is entirely valid. Reprinted by the Auto Club, 1968.

48. In "Speeches of Forward Thrust," mimeo by that agency (1968).

Chapter III

FOOTNOTES

1. Schneider, Lewis M., "Planning Rapid Transit for Atlanta," Case developed as part of the Program on Business Leadership and Urban Problems of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, (1968), p. 7.

2. Quoted in IRT Newsletter, Vol.4, no. 2, p.11 (July 1963).

3. Metropolitan Transit Commission, "Crosstown and Bypass Expressways," (1959).

4. Ibid, pp. iii-iv.

5. ARMPC, "A Matter of Much Importance," p.4 (1967).

6. Ibid, p.4.

7. Ibid, p.4.

8. Martin, Metropolis in Transition, HHFA, p. 70 (1963).

9. Ibid, p. 70. Martin does not report that any highway officials attended.

10. Phrase quoted in Martin, p. 65.

11. Ibid, Chapter VI.

12. Ibid, p. 71.

13. Ibid, p. 71.

14. Quoted by Martin, p. 71.

15. Ibid, p. 72.

16. Richard Rich, Speech of Nov. 17, 1967, p.7 of that text.

17. ARMPC, "A Matter of Much Importance," p. 12 (1967).

18. ARMPC, "Rapid Transit for Metropolitan Atlanta," p. 3, September 1962.

19. Ibid, p.3.

20. Ibid, p.3.

21. E.W. Nelson, "A Report on MARTA's Activities," in the Georgia Professional Engineer, (April 1969), p. 10. (Emphasis added).

22. Sommerville, quoted in Passenger Transport, p. 1 (Feb.9, 1968).

23. MARTA, "Amendment Request to Technical Studies Grant---HUD contract No. H-771," p.1.

24. Ibid, p.1.

25. Ibid, p.3.

26. Ibid, p. 5.

27. M-A-R-T-A--Act No. 78--1965 Session of the General Assembly, p. 9.

28. Speech of Richard Rich, Nov. 7, 1967, p.1B.

29. See Edward Banfield, Big City Politics, Chapter on Atlanta (1965).

30. Ibid.

Chapter IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Good Government Atlanta, Report on city taxes, 1965.

Chapter V

FOOTNOTES

1. We have depended on the following: Gogerty, Robert, "Analysis of Forward Thrust," (1967), "Attitudes Affecting the Forward Thrust Campaign," (1968), plus drafts of papers in progress (1969). All unpublished, for the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle.

   Curtis, John, "Analysis of Vote on Rapid Transit Proposition 'A'" by the Director of Rapid Transit Planning for the District, (1969) (for Los Angeles).
   Dorothy Corey Research, "An Analysis of the November 1968 Vote on the Rapid Transit Bond Issue," (1969) (for Los Angeles).
   Homburger, Wolfgang S., "An Analysis of the Vote on Rapid Transit Bonds," (1963) Research Report #36, the Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering, U. of California, Berkeley (for San Francisco).

2. Using the data supplied by the 1960 census.

3. These figures, it should be noted, were derived by observing "sample" precincts, not by aggregate data. See Gogerty, "Working Paper on the Banfield-Wilson Hypothesis," (1969).

4. These figures represent the average vote for each income level from all precincts. See Curtis Report.

5. For the Atlanta data, most of the voting precincts of the City of Atlanta (only) were examined in terms of voting, race, and income level as of 1960. The figures presented here are intended to suggest the pattern of voting; no statistical significance is implied for the individual figures.

6. The Atlanta data also reveals who had sufficient interest in the transit proposal actually to vote on it, one way or the other: 65% of the upper-income group; 55% of the middle-income group; 35% of the low-income whites; and only 25% of the registered voters in predominantly black precincts.

7. See Wilson and Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," 58 Amer. Poli. Sci. Rev. 876 (No.4, December 1964).

8. The San Francisco data was not studied in a way either to confirm or challenge these tentative conclusions. It is true that Homburger found no significant correlation between income level and propensity to support the transit issue. This is not inconsistent with our findings, however, for we would look for a negative correlation from low to middle income, followed by a positive correlation from middle to upper income levels. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that this pattern did occur in San Francisco. The only area which gave transit a needed vote of over 60% was San Francisco County. There, two thirds of the support could be explained by the propensity for renters in that county to support the issue strongly. Much of the rest of the vote can largely be explained by the fact the high income home-owning neighborhoods in the north of

the city gave overwhelming support at more than 67%. Interestingly enough, the highest support in San Francisco County came from this area, which was to receive no change in transportation in the proposal. By contrast, the only area which failed to return a simple majority was located in the southwest of the county, which received improved trolley service as well as the BART line towards Daly City. The area has relatively few renting units, and is comprised mainly of middle income owner-occupied housing units.

9. New Jersey also has had a successful referendum with a transportation "package." In the November, 1968, general election, New Jersey voters approved a $640 million transportation bond issue, with $440 million earmarked for highways, and $200 million for mass transit (including commuter rail, new cars, electrification, new stations, with park-and-ride facilities, and grade crossing elimination.) New York Times, November 3, 1968, p. 60:1. The referendum passed with 1,249,302 votes in favor, and 712,507 opposed. New York Times, November 8, 1968, p. 28:3. This amounts to 63.6% in favor of the package. At the same election, other bond issues for education and low-income housing also passed, with slightly lower percentages.

APPENDIX

PROPOSED RAPID TRANSIT CONTRACT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the 1st day of _____, 196____, by, between and among the City of Atlanta, a duly chartered and existing municipality of the State of Georgia (hereinafter sometimes called the "City"), Fulton County, a political subdivision of the State of Georgia in which a large portion of the City is located (hereinafter sometimes called "Fulton"), DeKalb County, a political subdivision of the State of Georgia in which a small portion of the City is located (hereinafter sometimes called "DeKalb") and the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (hereinafter sometimes called the "Authority"), a public body corporate and a joint instrumentality of the City and the Counties of Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton and Gwinnett organized and existing under an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, approved March 10, 1965, Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2243 (said Act as amended by an Act of said General Assembly approved March 4, 1966, Ga. Laws 1966, p. 3264, and as the same may be hereafter amended, is hereinafter referred to as the "Act");

WITNESSETH, THAT:

WHEREAS, the Authority was created and now exists for the purpose of planning, designing, leasing (as lessee), purchasing, acquiring, holding, owning, maintaining, improving and administering a rapid transit system within the metropolitan area (the territory comprising the Counties of Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton and Gwinnett, including the City of Atlanta), and operating the same, or contracting therefor, or leasing (as lessor) the same for operation by private parties, and is authorized to issue its revenue bonds to finance the cost of such an undertaking and the Authority, pursuant to the Act, is now organized, existing and operating; and

WHEREAS, the Act was adopted and the Authority thereby created pursuant to and in accordance with an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Georgia (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 1008), ratified at the November, 1964, General Election and thereafter duly proclaimed, which amendment sets forth that "the acquisition, establishment, operation or administration of a system of public transportation of passengers for hire within the metropolitan area of the City of Atlanta and the Counties of Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, Clayton and Gwinnett, is an essential governmental function and a public purpose for which the powers of taxation and eminent domain may be exercised and public funds of said counties and municipality expended"; and

WHEREAS, the Constitution and laws of Georgia, including specifically but without limitation the aforesaid Constitutional Amendment and the Act, authorize the City, Fulton and DeKalb each to contract with the Authority for any period not to exceed 50 years for the use of a rapid transit system provided by the Authority within said metropolitan area; and

WHEREAS, after careful investigation, the Authority, the City, Fulton and DeKalb have each determined that the acquisition, construction and operation of a rapid transit system, including the use of buses as well as a rail system, in a portion of said metropolitan area (hereinafter called the "System"), initially designed primarily for the benefit of the residents of the City, Fulton and DeKalb, is in the best interests of the City, Fulton and DeKalb, respectively, and to that end the acquisition and improvement of the existing Atlanta bus operations of the Atlanta Transit System, Inc., is desirable to the development of a balanced transportation system throughout the City, Fulton and DeKalb; and

WHEREAS, the Authority has caused preliminary plans and recommendations, dated September 30, 1968 (hereinafter called the "Engineering Report") for the acquisition and construction of the System (including the acquisition and improvement of the existing Atlanta bus operations of the Atlanta Transit System, Inc.) to be prepared by Parsons Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel, General Engineering Consultants, Glenn Building, Atlanta, Georgia, and the City, Fulton and DeKalb each have reviewed and approved said Engineering Report (a copy of said Engineering Report is on file in the office of the Authority and, by this reference thereto, is hereby incorporated herein); and

WHEREAS, the said Engineering Report has been approved on the assumption that the United States of America and the State of Georgia would defray a substantial part of the cost of acquiring, constructing and improving the System, if the entire System as set forth in said Engineering Report is to be acquired, constructed and improved; and

WHEREAS, it has been determined and said Engineering Report indicates that a smaller, but nonetheless feasible system can be constructed without financial contributions from the United States of America or the State of Georgia, but that in any event the Authority will have to provide not less than $377,600,000 for acquisition and construction purposes; and

WHEREAS, it has been determined that the most desirable method of providing said funds is through the issuance of revenue bonds by the Authority; and

WHEREAS, the City, Fulton and DeKalb each are willing to make the payments hereinafter set forth in consideration of the undertaking on the part of the Authority to issue its revenue bonds, and to acquire, construct, operate and maintain the System and make the same available for use; all for the safety, health, welfare and social and economic well-being of the people in a portion of said metropolitan area and the development of the educational, commercial and industrial resources thereof; and

WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to make provision whereby additional bonds may be issued from time to time and ranking pari passu with the bonds contemplated to be issued pursuant to this contract upon meeting certain conditions in order to facilitate the expansion of the System into other political subdivisions or within the City, Fulton and DeKalb; and

WHEREAS, the City, Fulton and DeKalb each have determined that the best method of accomplishing the respective purposes aforesaid is for the Authority to acquire and construct the System and to provide for the initial operation and maintenance of the same as a public facility primarily for the benefit of the residents of the City, Fulton and DeKalb, respectively; and

WHEREAS, the Authority will be required to pledge, irrevocably, that portion of the funds to be derived under this contract which are hereafter designated for debt service purposes for the payment of the principal of, interest, and premium, if any, on such revenue bonds as the same mature; and

WHEREAS, the Authority also will be required to pay from the gross revenues arising out of the operation and ownership of the System (excluding any payments for debt service under this contract) the cost of operating and maintaining the System and will be required to pledge, irrevocably, the funds which it might be entitled to under this contract for Operating Reserve Fund purposes for the payment of any deficit in the cost of operating and maintaining the System;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the undertakings hereinafter set forth, the City, Fulton and DeKalb and the Authority, each acting by and through its authorized officers, pursuant to ordinance or resolution duly adopted and properly passed by its governing body and, in the case of the three parties first named, the approving vote of its electorate as required by the Act, agree as follows:

1.

This contract shall become effective as of the date hereof and shall continue in force from said date until such time as the principal, interest and premium, if any, on the Authority's revenue bonds, the payment of which might be secured by this contract, have been fully paid, or provision duly made therefor, and all other financial obligations of the parties arising hereunder have been paid or duly satisfied, but in no event for more than 50 years; provided, however, the same shall have been approved in referenda held as required by Act on or before April 1, 1970.

The Authority covenants and agrees as follows:

(a) From time to time during the term of this contract, it will issue and sell (at competitive bidding unless otherwise permitted by the Act and agreed to by the City, Fulton and DeKalb in the manner hereinafter provided in paragraph 5) Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Revenue Bonds, Series 19__, in the aggregate principal amount of $377,600,000. The bonds may be issued from time to time as determined by the Authority, the bonds of each such issue to be coupon bonds registrable as to principal only and also as to principal and interest, in denomination of $5,000 each (or multiples thereof), to bear interest at a rate or rates not to exceed the maximum permissible interest rate per annum now or hereafter specified in the Act, payable semi-annually on the 1st days of June and December in each year. Said bonds shall be dated December 1, 1969, and shall mature on December 1st in the years and amounts set forth in the Trust Indenture attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and by this reference thereto incorporated herein. It is understood and agreed, however, that the Authority will notify the City, Fulton and DeKalb not later than April 15th of the year prior to the year in which it intends to issue any of said bonds. The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Revenue Bonds, Series 19__, referred to in this paragraph, are sometimes hereinafter called the "Bonds."

The City, Fulton and DeKalb recognize that in the aforesaid Trust Indenture the Authority has reserved the right, from time to time, upon compliance with the conditions specified in said Trust Indenture, to issue additional bonds to finance additions, extensions and improvements to the System in order to expand the System into other political subdivisions or within the City, Fulton and DeKalb, and that any such bonds hereafter issued will rank pari passu with the Bonds herein contemplated to be issued and that the payments for debt service on the Bonds hereinafter provided for will be commingled with the debt service payments on any such future parity bonds (which may be provided by parties other than the parties to this contract), and the Bonds herein contemplated to be issued and any such future parity bonds will be secured by and shall be payable from a common sinking fund. The Authority agrees, however, that it will not issue any such parity bonds without the unanimous prior approval of the City, Fulton and DeKalb.

(b) The Bonds will be issued under and secured by a basic Trust Indenture (herein referred to as the "Trust Indenture") substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A." All funds realized by the Authority from the sale of the Bonds or from or on account of the ownership of the System, during the term of this contract, shall be handled and disbursed in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said Trust Indenture;

(c) To the extent of the funds available to it from the sale of the Bonds or otherwise, it will acquire, construct, improve and equip the System substantially in accordance with the aforesaid Engineering Report (or as the same may be modified as hereinafter provided) as promptly as practicable and it will commence service on said System or any operable portion thereof as soon as practicable and it will continuously operate and maintain the System so as to make its benefits primarily available to the residents of the City, Fulton and DeKalb;

(d) It will operate the System in an efficient and economical manner and will maintain the System, or cause the same to be maintained, in a good state of repair, order and condition, and in a good state of operating efficiency.

It will further, to the extent practicable, prescribe, revise and charge such rates and charges for transportation so that, together with any other income, the total income and revenue derived by the Authority, other than the payments under this contract for debt service purposes or into the Operating Reserve Fund, shall at all times be sufficient to provide for the payment of all expenses and charges payable from such income and revenue, including, but without limiting, the generality of the foregoing, all operating and maintenance costs and expenses and all payments required to be made into the Replacement and Improvement Fund, the Pension Fund and the Injuries and Damage Reserve Fund.

(e) It will comply with the provisions of all pertinent laws now in existence or hereafter enacted which relate to its budgets or budgeting procedures;

(f) Any extensions to the System whether into other political subdivisions or within the City, Fulton and DeKalb and any connection of any other transportation system with the System must be approved by the City, Fulton and DeKalb in the manner hereinafter provided for in paragraph 5.

The City, Fulton and DeKalb each covenant and agree as follows:

(a) They, and each of them, have taken all necessary action to approve the above referred to Engineering Report, which approval is hereby ratified and reaffirmed, and a record of such approval and a copy of such Engineering Report, together with proper authorization for the execution of this contract, appear in their official minutes and records;

(b) To pay to the Authority in full discharge of the financial responsibility of each hereunder the percentage hereinafter specified of the following sums at the times specified:

(i) On the 1st day of April, 1970, and on the 1st day of April in each year thereafter, to and including the 1st day of April, 2005, an amount equal to the total interest and principal payable on the Bonds on the 1st days of June and December of that year; provided, however, such payments shall be reduced by the amount actually on deposit with the Trustee on March 1 in each year and available under the Trust Indenture for the payment of such principal and interest; and

(ii) On the 1st day of April to make payments into the Operating Reserve Fund in the years and amounts set forth below:

Year	Amount
1970	$1,900,000
1971	1,000,000
1972	1,000,000
1973	1,500,000
1974	2,500,000
1975	2,500,000
1976	2,500,000

Thereafter, on the 1st day of April in each year, to and including April 1, 2005, the sum of $2,500,000 per year; provided, however, such payments shall be reduced by the amount actually on deposit with the Trustee in said Operating Reserve Fund on March 1 in each year.

(iii) It is expressly provided, however, that no reduction in payments due under the provisions of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) shall be authorized until the City, Fulton and DeKalb have received written notice and certification from the Trustee of the amount of the reduction permitted at that time and no reduction in said payments shall be made in excess of the amount so certified by the Trustee.

(c) The percentage of the total payments required pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (b) above shall be borne by the City, Fulton and DeKalb in accordance with the schedule set forth below:

Year	City	Fulton	DeKalb	Year	City	Fulton	DeKalb
1969	59.0%	14.7%	26.3%	1988	51.1%	22.6%	26.3%
1970	58.7%	15.0%	26.3%	1989	50.6%	23.1%	26.3%
1971	58.3%	15.4%	26.3%	1990	50.1%	23.6%	26.3%
1972	57.9%	15.8%	26.3%	1991	49.7%	24.0%	26.3%
1973	57.6%	16.1%	26.3%	1992	49.2%	24.5%	26.3%
1974	57.1%	16.6%	26.3%	1993	48.6%	25.1%	26.3%
1975	56.7%	17.0%	26.3%	1994	48.2%	25.5%	26.3%
1976	56.3%	17.4%	26.3%	1995	47.7%	26.0%	26.3%
1977	55.9%	17.8%	26.3%	1996	47.2%	26.5%	26.3%
1978	55.5%	18.2%	26.3%	1997	46.7%	27.0%	26.3%
1979	55.1%	18.6%	26.3%	1998	46.1%	27.6%	26.3%
1980	54.7%	19.0%	26.3%	1999	45.6%	28.1%	26.3%
1981	54.3%	19.4%	26.3%	2000	45.1%	28.6%	26.3%
1982	53.9%	19.8%	26.3%	2001	44.5%	29.2%	26.3%
1983	53.4%	20.3%	26.3%	2002	44.0%	29.7%	26.3%
1984	53.0%	20.7%	26.3%	2003	43.5%	30.2%	26.3%
1985	52.5%	21.2%	26.3%	2004	43.0%	30.7%	26.3%
1986	52.0%	21.7%	26.3%	2005	42.4%	31.3%	26.3%
1987	51.6%	22.1%	26.3%				

It is further understood and agreed, anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, that the total dollar amounts which the City, Fulton and DeKalb are obligated to pay or that they can be called upon to pay under this contract cannot under any circumstance exceed the following:

	Total Obligation
City	$505,608,000
Fulton	226,258,000
DeKalb	261,166,000

Of such total obligation, no more than the following amounts may be required to be paid in any one year:

City	$16,891,000
Fulton	9,194,000
DeKalb	7,908,000

Provided, however, if the amount paid in any one year by any of them is for any reason whatsoever less than the amount required to be paid in that year, the total amount payable by that party in the next succeeding year shall be increased by the amount of any such deficiency.

It is further expressly agreed that the debt service payments shall constitute a first charge on the total amount obligated and shall also constitute a first charge on the total amount authorized to be paid or paid in any one year.

It is further understood and agreed that the City, Fulton and DeKalb, or any of them, may prepay any of such amounts.

(d) The covenants and agreements to pay the amounts specified above shall constitute only the several promises of each of the City, Fulton and DeKalb.

(e) The City, Fulton and DeKalb will each levy such taxes as may be necessary to make the payments set forth in this paragraph 3; provided, however, its duty to levy such taxes shall abate to the extent that its funds from other sources are used to make such payments.

(f) The obligations to make the payments at the times and in the manner specified above are absolute and unconditional and such payments shall not abate or be reduced because of damage to or destruction of the System or any part thereof, interruption or stoppage of service or for any reason whatsoever. Furthermore, they, and each of them, will not exercise any right of set-off or any similar right with respect to any such payment, nor will they, or each of them, withhold any such payment because of any claimed breach of this contract by the Authority or any other party hereto. This provision is expressly for the benefit of the holders from time to time of the Bonds and shall not affect the obligation of the Authority to perform this contract or otherwise, but this provision shall not otherwise affect the remedies available to the City, Fulton or DeKalb on account of any such claimed breach.

(g) The parties hereto recognize that during the acquisition, construction and improvement of the System it may be necessary to condemn certain personal property or parcels of real property or rights or interests therein, from time to time, and that any such condemnation action shall be brought by the City, Fulton or DeKalb for the benefit of the Authority if at the time the Authority has no power of eminent domain. To this end, the City, Fulton and DeKalb each, severally, agree that upon receipt of a written request from the Authority setting forth the need therefor they shall exercise as expeditiously as possible their power of eminent domain to acquire the property or rights or interests therein described in such request and upon the acquisition of title thereto shall convey the same immediately to the Authority at cost (which shall include acquisition, court costs, attorneys' fees, witness fees, special masters fees, appraisals, the cost of additional personnel to acquire rights of way and any other costs incurred in connection with such acquisition); provided only that the party called upon to exercise such power concurs that the exercise of such power is in the public interest and the Authority shall advance such funds as shall be required to accomplish such acquisition.

(h) To convey, without cost to the Authority, any and all easements in, across, through and above public property as may be necessary or desirable to facilitate the construction and efficient operation of the System; provided only that the granting party agrees with the Authority that the grant of such easement is in the public interest and the Authority shall pay, or cause to be paid, any costs incurred in connection with the utilization of any such easement, such as, without being limited to, utility relocation costs and any damages to or alterations of existing structures.

4.

The parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:

(a) Nothing in this contract is intended or shall be construed as prohibiting or impairing the right of the City, Fulton or DeKalb to make contributions to the Authority of money or property, either real or personal, in addition to those provided for in this contract or to enter into additional contracts with the Authority or among themselves to the full extent now or hereafter permitted by law; nor as prohibiting or impairing the right of the Authority to lease the System or portions thereof; provided only, that all such leases are consistent with the operation of the System as a public facility for the benefit of the City, Fulton and DeKalb, respectively, and the residents of each such party hereto; and, that the terms and conditions of any such agreement involving the entire System or any substantial portion thereof shall have been approved unanimously by the City, Fulton and DeKalb in the manner hereinafter provided in paragraph 5.

(b) This contract has been made for the benefit of the holders from time to time of the Bonds and may not be amended, modified or canceled in any way not herein contemplated which would adversely affect the rights of such holders without their consent.

(c) Payments required to be made pursuant to this contract by the City, Fulton and DeKalb, respectively, to the Authority for debt service purposes shall not be commingled with any other funds of the Authority (except to the extent hereinbefore provided for in the event of the future issuance of parity bonds by the Authority) and shall be used solely for the purpose of paying the principal of and the interest on the Bonds (and any such future parity bonds). To that end, the parties hereto hereby assign this contract and the right to receive so much of the payments hereunder as are made for debt service purposes or for deposit in the Operating Reserve Fund to the Trustee under the Trust Indenture for the benefit of the holders from time to time of the Bonds (and any such future parity bonds) and agree that the City, Fulton and DeKalb each shall make all of said payments for debt service or for deposit in the Operating Reserve Fund directly to said Trustee acting pursuant to said Trust Indenture.

(d) Should any phrase, clause, sentence or paragraph of this contract be held to be invalid, unconstitutional or unenforceable, it shall in nowise affect the remaining provisions and the same shall remain in full force and effect.

(e) When the Bonds secured by this contract have been fully paid, including principal, interest and premium, if any, or provision duly made therefor, and all other financial obligations of the parties hereto have been paid, the City, Fulton and DeKalb shall be relieved of any further payments hereunder.

(f) In addition to any budget requirements imposed by law, the Authority shall prepare annually, in accordance with procedures and guidelines prepared jointly by the chief financial officers of the City, Fulton and DeKalb, a budget covering all of its financial program, operations and expenditures of all funds received from any and all sources, and shall include details with respect to all items of expense, as well as revenues, including salary scales and fares to be charged all capital expenditures to be made and all other relevant matters. Should it become necessary because of any emergency or unforeseen circumstance for the Authority to amend its budget during any year, the same shall be prepared in the same manner as the annual budget. Each such annual budget and any amended budget shall be approved by the City, Fulton and DeKalb in the manner hereinafter set forth in paragraph 5 before any expenditures are made pursuant thereto; provided, however, the Authority may continue to operate in accordance with its last approved budget until a new budget shall have been approved.

(g) Except as otherwise provided, the Authority shall not convey, sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of, encumber or alienate any of its assets without prior approval of the City, Fulton and DeKalb in the manner

hereinafter set forth in paragraph 5; provided, however, assets other than real property which are considered by the Authority not to be necessary for the proper operation of the System may be disposed of by the Authority without such prior approval, to the extent of $100,000 in the aggregate in any one calendar year.

(h) The Authority may not make any capital expenditures not approved in its annual budget except those incident to the initial acquisition, construction and improvement of the System or the expenditure of insurance proceeds or other expenditures required to be made to replace existing plant, facilities and equipment which may become damaged or destroyed.

(i) Any sums received by the Authority from the sale, lease or other disposition of its assets shall be held and applied as provided in the Trust Indenture.

(j) In recognition of the fact that (i) the acquisition, construction and improvement of the System of the character planned by this contract is an undertaking of great magnitude and complexity which will require a number of years to complete, (ii) radical changes in the areas proposed to be served by the System will undoubtedly occur during such period as witnessed by the widespread changes in this dynamic metropolitan area now occurring and forecast to occur in the coming years, and (iii) equally radical changes are now occurring and will continue to occur in the technology of mass transit in the coming years, it is agreed that provision should be made to permit deviations from time to time from the aforesaid Engineering Report including, without limitation, changes in the order of acquisition and construction of particular proposed lines or projects and the substitution of newly conceived and planned lines or projects for presently proposed lines or projects. Thus, nothing in this contract shall be construed to prevent or forbid the Authority and the City, Fulton and DeKalb by unanimous agreement from modifying or amending the aforesaid Engineering Report (including the addition or substitution of newly conceived and planned lines or other projects) or this contract during the development period of the System where in the untrammelled discretion of the governing bodies of each of such parties it is determined that the acquisition and establishment of the best possible rapid transit system for the metropolitan area and their respective entities at the lowest possible cost will be realized through such modifications and amendments. It is further understood and agreed by the parties hereto that no such modification or amendment of said Engineering Report or of this contract shall be permitted hereunder if such modification or amendment would be beyond that authorized by law or would adversely affect the rights of holders of the Bonds (including any parity bonds hereafter issued) without their consent or would result in the failure of the Authority to acquire and construct a feasible System out of the proceeds of the Bonds.

(k) The Authority shall not be required to pay any license fees or franchise fees to any of the other parties to this contract.

5.

Wherever the approval of the City, Fulton and DeKalb is required in the contract, each shall be entitled to one vote and the concurrence of any two of the three shall be controlling and to the extent authorized by law shall bind the other, except where unanimous approval is specifically required. All such approvals shall be upon written request from the Authority, shall require formal action of the governing bodies of the parties involved and shall be reflected in their official minutes and records.

In the event of a consolidation of any two of the participating governments, should the two remaining governments be unable to agree, the deadlock, to the extent not prohibited by law, shall be settled by a proper vote of the Authority.

The parties hereto further agree that where their consent, or the consent of any of them, is required for any thing or undertaking whatever in connection with the undertaking contemplated by this contract, such consent shall not be withheld arbitrarily or the privilege of dissent exercised to gain some concession or advantage personal to such party where the result of the same is not of mutual benefit to the System.

6.

The parties hereto agree that any failure of the Authority to comply with all of the terms, covenants and agreements contained in the said Trust Indenture shall constitute a breach of this contract and in addition to any remedy provided by law, the City, Fulton and DeKalb, or any one of them, shall be entitled to exercise any remedy provided to the bondholders in said Trust Indenture to the extent such remedy is applicable.

In the event the Authority shall be dissolved by operation of law or otherwise, the assets and liabilities of the Authority shall vest in the political subdivisions then contributing financial support to the Authority in such proportions as the total contributions made to the Authority by each such subdivision bears to the total contributions made by all such subdivisions.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto, acting through their duly authorized officers, have caused this contract to be executed in quadruplicate as of the day and year first above written, but actually on this the _____ day of _____, 196____.

Approved as to Form

_____
Associate City Attorney

Attest:

_____
Clerk

CITY OF ATLANTA

By:_____
Mayor

Approved as to Form

_____
County Attorney

Attest:

_____
Clerk

FULTON COUNTY

By:_____

_____

_____
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues

Approved as to Form

_____
County Attorney

Attest:

_____
Clerk

DEKALB COUNTY

By:_____

_____

_____

_____
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues

Attest:

_____
Secretary

METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY

By:_____
Chairman


NORCROSS
DORAVILLE
CHAMBLEE
BROOKHAVEN
LENOX
PIEDMONT
MOORES MILL
NORTH DRUID HILLS
BRIARCLIFF
NORTHSIDE
PEACHTREE-26th
NORTH DECATUR
EMORY
PERSHING POINT
TENTH
DECATUR
AVONDALE
NORTH
KENSINGTON
TRANSIT CENTER
EAST LAKE
CAIN
ASHBY
CANDLER PARK
HIGHTOWER
CHAPPELL
MORELAND
LYNHURST
UNIVERSITY
GRANT
WEST LAKE
GEORGIA STATE-CAPITOL
WEST END
OAKLAND CITY
LAKEWOOD
EAST POINT
TRI-CITY
MOUNTAIN VIEW
AIRPORT
FOREST PARK
FULTON CO
DE KALB CO
CLAYTON CO.
METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY
40.3 MILE SYSTEM
SEPTEMBER 7, 1968